



The Seventh Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture
Article 4
11-1-1997
Statutes of Limitation and Corporate Fiduciary
Claims: A Search for Middle Ground on the Rules/
Standards Continuum
Matthew G. Dore
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Matthew G. Dore, Statutes of Limitation and Corporate Fiduciary Claims: A Search for Middle Ground on the Rules/Standards Continuum,
63 Brook. L. Rev. 695 (1997).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol63/iss3/4
STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND CORPORATE
FIDUCIARY CLAIMS: A SEARCH FOR MIDDLE





I. The Flowering of the Adverse Domination
Tolling Theory and Recent
Judicial Pruning ................................................................ 706
A. Timing Problems in Failed Bank and
Thrift Litigation .......................................................... 706
B. The Adverse Domination Remedy ............................. 709
C. The Adverse Domination Theory
Flowers and Multiplies .............................................. 711
1. D & O Cases ........................................................ 711
2. Third Party Claims ............................................. 712
3. Adverse Domination Extends to
Corporate Litigation Generally .......................... 713
@1997 Matthew G. Dord. All Rights Reserved
t Associate Professor of Law, Drake University. Special thanks to Deans David
S. Walker, Robert C. Hunter and C. Peter Goplerud I, and to the Drake
University Law School Endowment Trust, for generous research stipends that
helped me complete this Article. Thanks to my colleagues Cathy Lesser Mansfield
and Gregory C. Sisk, and to C. Steven Bradford and Robert W. Hamilton, for
their review and comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks also to current
and former Drake Law School students Cynthia Smith Hurley, Cynthia Christy,
Ray Kloss, Chris Kragnes, Yujie Gu, David Malinger and Daniel Rubinstein for
their valuable research assistance. Finally, and most importantly, thnks to my
wife and colleague, Laurie Kratky Dor6, for the patient listening, wise counsel and
invaluable assistance she provided as I researched and wrote this Article. The
views expressed here are my own, as are any errors that remain.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
D. Recent Judicial Pruning of the
Adverse Domination Theory ................................ 715
E. The Need for Doctrinal Analysis ............................... 718
II. Historical Patterns, Underlying Policy
Debates and the Roots of the Adverse
Domination Tolling Theory ............................................... 720
A. Statutes of Limitation Supplant
the Laches Defense in Modern Corporate
Fiduciary Litigation ................................................... 720
B. The Underlying Policy Debate:
Rules/Standards Tensions in
Limitations and Corporate Law ................................ 722
1. The Rules/Standards Debate
in Limitations Law .............................................. 723
2. The Rules/Standards Debate
in Corporate Law ................................................ 726
3. Implications of the
Rules/Standards Debate
for the Statute of Limitations
Defense in Corporate Fiduciary
Litigation .............................................................. 731
C. Application of Statutes of Limitation
in Corporate Fiduciary Litigation
and the Roots of the Adverse
Domination Theory ..................................................... 732
1. Choice of Limitations Rule and
Defining Accrual .................................................. 732
2. Tolling Until Discovery in Fraud
and Fraudulent Concealment Cases .................. 733
3. Delaware's "Shareholder Discovery
Rule" for Derivative Suits ................................... 735
4. The Early Domination and
Control Cases ....................................................... 736
5. Doctrinal Hiatus .................................................. 739
Ill. The Logic and Limits of the Adverse
Domination Tolling Theory ............................................... 741
A. Rationales for the Adverse
Domination Theory .................................................... 741
1. Disability Arguments .......................................... 741
2. Disability Counter-Arguments ........................... 744
a. Derivative Remedies .................................... 744
[Vol. 63: 695
1997] STATUTES OF L MITAIONS AND CORPORATE CLAIMS 697
b. Authority Concerns ...................................... 746
3. Concealment Arguments ..................................... 748
4. Concealment Counter-Arguments ...................... 749
5. Discovery and Notice Arguments ....................... 751
6. Discovery and Notice
Counter-Arguments ............................................ 753
B. Implications of Doctrinal Rationales ........................ 754
1. Recognition of the Adverse
Domination Theory ............................................. 755
2. The Categories of Claims to
Which the Adverse Domination
Theory Applies ..................................................... 756
3. Claims Against Third Parties ............................ 758
4. Procedural Issues ................................................ 760
IV. The Adverse Domination Tolling Theory and
The Search for Middle Ground Between Rules
and Standards .................................................................... 763
A. Adverse Domination Standards Postpone
Resolution of Limitations Issues
U ntil Trial ................................................................... 764
B. Implications for the Statute of
Limitations Defense ................................................... 767
C. Reprise: The Rules/Standards Debate
in Limitations Law and Corporate Law ................... 769
1. Limitations Law Developments ......................... 769
2. Corporate Law Developments ............................ 773
D. Adverse Domination Developments
and the Search for Middle Ground ........................... 775
V. Proposals for Reform ......................................................... 778
A. Potential Judicial Reforms ........................................... 779
1. Claims Limitations .............................................. 779
2. Third-Party Claims ............................................. 781
3. Simplifying Factual Determinations .................. 783
a. Pleading Standards ...................................... 784
b. Judges as Fact-Finders ................................ 785
c. Shareholder Notice ....................................... 785
B. Potential Legislative Reforms ................................... 787
1. Currently Applicable Limitations
Provisions ............................................................. 788
2. Suggested Reforms .............................................. 789
a. Express Coverage ......................................... 789
698 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: 695
b. Tolling and Repose ....................................... 793
3. Potential Constitutional Objections ................... 794
Conclusion .......................................................................... 796
1997] STATUTES OF MITATIONS AND CORPORATE CLAIMS 699
INTRODUCTION
The tension between rules and standards is perhaps more
pronounced in corporate law than in any other legal discipline,
for the law uses both rules and standards to address the fun-
daiental problem of corporations: keeping managers (directors
and officers) faithful to owners (shareholders).' Legislatures of
every state have enacted rules-comprehensive governance
codes-to define the terms of the corporate relationship.' Yet
courts supplement these statutes with standards-open-ended
fiduciary duties-that further restrict directors' and officers'
discretion.' The proper accommodation of these competing
approaches to corporate law continues to engender debate
among scholars. "Contractarians" from the law and economics
movement favor bright-line, but permissive, statutory rules for
corporations, and a right to "opt out" of conventional fiduciary
duty schemes. "Anticontractarian" traditionalists, on the other
hand, support mandatory corporate rules of a more general
nature, backed by searching judicial review where appropri-
ate.4
Limitations law presents similar ruleslstandards tensions.
Statutes of limitation function as bright-line rules that estab-
lish time limits for the pursuit of litigation. The judicial stan-
dard for determining when a claim should be time-barred, in
contrast, is the equitable defense of laches. Under this doctrine
a claim prescribes only when plaintiff has "unreasonably or
1 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW §.5, at 33-34 (1986) (descnb-
ing 'the major problem dealt with by corporate law" as "how to keep managers
accountable").
' The American Bar Association's REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION Aar
(1984) [hereinafter MBCA] is a good example of statutory corporate law as it ex-
ists in most states.
* See, eg., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (DeL 1985) (holding directors
liable for breach of the fiduciary duty of care); Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg.
Corp., 166 N.E.2d 793 (IMI. 1960) (holding directors liable for breach of the fiducia-
ry duty of loyalty). See also CLARK, supra note 1, at 34 (The most general formu-
lation of corporate law's attempted solution to the problem of manngerial account-
ability is the fduciazy duty of lyalty.")
" For a helpful overview of these competing perspectives on corporate law, see
John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out tie Contractual Theory of the Corpora.
tion, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919 (1988). See also
infra Part ILB.2.
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inexcusably" delayed its assertion and thereby caused "preju-
dice" to defendant.' As distinctions between law and equity
have blurred during this century, statutes of limitation have
eclipsed laches as the controlling defense in most cases.6 Yet,
in recent decades, laches have made a comeback in the guise of
fact-based tolling doctrines that extend limitation periods.
Most prominent among these is the "discovery rule," which
postpones accrual of a cause of action (and therefore running of
the statute of limitations) until plaintiff, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, discovers or should have discovered the
claim.7 Courts have struggled to define the proper parameters
for the discovery rule and similar tolling doctrines.8 Thus,
limitations law, like corporate law, reflects a continued search
for the proper accommodation of bright-line rules and fact-
based standards.
This Article explores the contemporary confluence of corpo-
rate law and limitations law, and their inherent
rules/standards tensions, in the "adverse domination" tolling
theory. Adverse domination asserts that while directors and
officers control a corporation, the statute of limitations does
not run on any corporate claim that may implicate them.' As
will be explained, this theory is a fact-based standard premised
on the fiduciary obligations of corporate managers, obligations
that assertedly justify tolling bright-line limitations rules that
would otherwise apply."
In the wake of the recent bank and thrift crisis, federal
regulators successfully invoked the adverse domination theory
as an antidote for limitations problems in hundreds of director
and officer liability cases ("D & 0 suits") and related litigation
they pursued as successors of failed institutions." Courts
1 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 3.3.2, at 183 (1991).
See infra Part II.A.
7 2 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 11.1.1, at 134 ("ITihe discovery rule . . . allows
the cause of action to accrue when the litigant first knows or with due diligence
should know facts that will form the basis for an action."). For a general discus-
sion of the discovery rule and the issues it presents, see 2 CORMAN, supra note 6,
§ 11, at 134-205.
' 2 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 11.1.3, at 143-54. See also infra Part IV.B.
' See, e.g., FDIC v. Hudson, 673 F. Supp. 1039, 1042-43 (D. Kan. 1987) (ap-
plying adverse domination theory to postpone accrual of breach of fiduciary duty
claims against bank director).
10 See infra Part III.A.
' Representative cases include Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Bryan, 902
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have since extended the theory beyond the failed financial
institution context. In the past few years, for example, the
adverse domination theory has defeated corporate directors'
and officers' statute of limitations defenses in insurance com-
pany receiverships, bankruptcy cases and Delaware corporate
fiduciary litigation.' The theory has also been applied to toll
limitations when a corporation pursues litigation against third
parties, such as malpractice claims against lawyers and ac-
countants who failed to prevent or detect wrongdoing by corpo-
rate directors and officers. 3
Adverse domination is no panacea for limitations problems
in corporate fiduciary litigation, however. Indeed, as Part I of
the Article describes, courts throughout the country, including
dozens of federal district courts, nearly half the federal circuit
courts, and numerous state supreme courts and lower appel-
late tribunals, are now divided over key aspects of the theo-
ry.4 In the early years of the bank and thrift crisis judicial
enthusiasm for adverse domination standards threatened ex-
tinction of the limitations defense for claims that implicate
corporate fiduciaries. More recently, the pendulum has begun
to swing in favor of statutes of limitation. Courts have parted
company on the basic question of institutional competen-
cy-whether judges intrude on the legislative prerogative in
the corporate context when they engraft adverse domination
tolling standards on bright-line statutes of limitation.' Courts
F.2d 1520 (10th Cir. 1990); RTC v. O'Bear, 840 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Ind. 1993);
FDIC v. Howse, 736 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Hudson, 673 F. Supp. at
1039; and FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Md. 1984). Indeed, in mid-
1993, the RTC could boast that "district courts [had] never resolved [the limita-
tions] issue against the RTC on summary judgment, and that the FDIC's average
[was] nearly as good." RTC v. Dean, No. Civ 91-2026, 1993 WL 837065, at *4 n.7
(D. Ariz. July 20, 1993).
' See, e.g., Levitt v. Riddell Sports, Inc. (In re MacGregor Sporting Goods Inc.),
199 B.R. 502 (Bankr. N.J. 1995) (bankruptcy case); Clark v. Milam, 452 S.E.2d
714 (W. Va. 1994) (insurance company receivership); Safecard Serve., Inc. v.
Halmos, 912 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 1996) (action by corporation against director for
insider trading under Delaware law).
,' See, e.g., Clark, 452 S.E.2d at 718 (claims against lawyers and accountants).
14 Part I of this Article discusses these divisions and identifies the courts that
have generated them. One does not need this detail to appreciate the growing
scope of adverse domination jurisprudence, however. For example, a recent
WESTLAW search using the query " 'adverse domination' and limitations and cor-
poration" lists over 150 cases noting the existence of the theory or applying it in
some fashion. Most of these cases were decided in the last dozen years.
"5 Compare, e.g., RTC v. Armbruster, 52 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
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have also begun to disagree about the categories of corporate
fiduciary cases to which the adverse domination theory should
apply and whether the theory should toll limitations for corpo-
rate claims against third parties. 6 Among courts that support
the adverse domination theory, long-standing divisions contin-
ue over the procedures for implementing its tolling stan-
dards.1 All of these developments demonstrate the need for
reassessment of the adverse domination tolling theory, and,
more generally, the need for critical reevaluation of limitations
- issues in D & 0 cases and related corporate litigation settings.
Part II of the Article supplies the necessary historical and
policy background for such analysis. It explains that, since at
least the turn of the century, courts have generally substituted
bright-line statutes of limitation for equitable laches standards
in corporate fiduciary litigation. Yet, as Part II also explains,
current adverse domination tolling standards do not completely
break established patterns. While the adverse domination
theory lay virtually dormant until the bank and thrift crisis,
its roots can be found in persistent limitations and corporate
law strains that have preserved a role for standards in the face
of the growing popularity of bright-line rules.
Part III of the Article evaluates the several rationales
courts have relied upon to adopt the adverse domination tolling
theory. Some courts assume that a corporation is "disabled"
from pursuing claims that implicate its directors and officers
adverse domination as part of Arkansas law); RTC v. Everhart, 37 F.3d 151 (4th
Cir. 1994) (same-Virginia law); RTC v. Artley, 28 F.3d 1099 (11th Cir. 1994)
(same-Georgia law); FDIC v. Cocke, 7 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1993) (same-Virginia
law), and Brandt v. Basset (In re Southeast Banking Corp.), 855 F. Supp. 353,
358 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (same-Florida law) affd, 69 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir. 1995), with
FDIC v. Jackson, 133 F.3d 694, 698-99 (9th Cir. 1998) (adopting adverse domina-
tion as part of Arizona law); RTC v. Scaletty, 891 P.2d 1110 (Kan. 1995) (adopting
adverse domination doctrine as part of Kansas law), and Hecht v. RTC, 635 A.2d
394 (Md. 1994) (same-Maryland law).
16 Compare, e.g., FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1313 (5th Cir. 1993) (adverse
domination applies only to claims against directors and officers for conduct more
serious than negligence), with Jackson, 133 F.3d 698-99 (contra) and Scaletty, 891
P.2d 1110 (contra). Compare also FDIC v. Shrader & York, 991 F.2d 216, 227 (5th
Cir. 1993) (adverse domination does not apply to corporate claims against third
parties, like outside lawyers and accountants), with Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1984) (contra).
17 Compare, e.g., Hecht, 635 A.2d at 394 (adopting "majority disinterested direc-
tor" formulation of adverse domination), with Clark, 452 S.E.2d at 719 (adopting
the competing "single disinterested director" formulation).
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because of conflicts of interest and other practical barriers to
litigation which exist while these managers remain in control
of the entity. Others view the adverse domination theory as
rooted in problems of concealment and notice. Part III finds
these rationales largely persuasive, provided one embraces an
expansive view of corporate directors' and officers' fiduciary
duties. Part IlI also explains the implications of the various
competing rationales for adverse domination issues that divide
the courts.
Part IV of the Article then identifies a serious problem
with the adverse domination tolling theory: because all ratio-
nales that support the theory are rooted in open-ended fiducia-
ry standards, the theory's application inevitably entails com-
plex factual inquiries that typically cannot-be resolved short of
trial. And if trial is necessary to determine the merits of the
limitations defense for most corporate fiduciary claims, then
the statute of limitations' purposes and function as a bright-
line rule are substantially defeated. Part IV points out that
such a change in limitations rules for corporate fiduciary
claims flies in the face of a trend in both limitations law and
corporate law toward a "convergence" of rules and standards
that accommodates values of both through compromise. This
larger perspective, Part IV argues, best explains judicial trends
that have expanded, then later contracted, application of the
adverse domination theory. Indeed, Part IV concludes, many
recent judicial efforts to limit application of adverse domina-
tion tolling standards effectuate desirable reforms that pre-
serve the policies behind rule-based statutes of limitation.
Part V then identifies additional "middle ground" compro-
mise positions that courts might adopt to resolve limitations
disputes in corporate fiduciary litigation. It concludes with a
statutory limitations proposal that includes both tolling and
repose concepts, which together may achieve the optimum
balance between bright-line limitations rules and fact-based
tolling standards.
To date, legal scholars have virtually ignored these is-
sues.'8 Yet the tremendous volume of litigation over statutes
18 Although several writers have chronicled limitations developments in finan-
cial institution receivership litigation, including use of the adverse domination
theory, most of this work is primarily descriptive. See, e.g., D. Annette Fields et
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of limitation and adverse domination tolling standards in re-
cent years, and the damage amounts at stake in those battles,
show their practical importance in corporate litigation. 9 In-
deed, the significance of limitations rules and tolling standards
in corporate cases may increase as changes in the securities
laws prompt greater reliance on state corporate law.20
And while it is tempting to regard statutes of limitation as
"procedural" defenses unworthy of scholarly or judicial atten-
tion, they are not mere technicalities. Indeed, they "are funda-
mental to a well-ordered judicial system."2' Thus, judicial atti-
tudes towards statutes of limitation, while historically antipa-
thetic, 22 now acknowledge that such defenses reflect signifi-
cant "substantive" policy determinations."
al., The Statute of Limitations, in DEFENDING BANK & THRIFT DIRECrORs & PRO-
FESSIONALs 143 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-514,
1994). Student commentary has slowly begun to fill this void. See Michael E.
Baughman, Comment, Defining the Boundaries of the Adverse Domination Doctrine:
Is There Any Repose For Corporate Directors?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1065 (1995);
Kelly Tubman Hardy, Note, The Doctrine of Adverse Domination and Tolling the
Statute of Limitations, 54 MD. L. REV. 670 (1995); Sheila S. Woodward, Comment,
Adverse Domination and the Statute of Limitations Defense in Bank Di rector Lia-
bility Cases: Greater Protection for Directors in FDIC v. Dawson, 80 IOWA L. REV.
177 (1994). See also C. A. Beier, Civic Duty and Civic Risk: The Supreme Court
Throws the Balance Out of Whack, 34 WASHBURN L.J. 495 (1995) (practitioner's
essay).
19 The limitations defense was one of the most frequently litigated issues in D
& 0 suits that followed the bank and thrift crisis. See Ronald R. Glancz & Melis-
sa Landau Steinman, Recent Developments in Director and Officer Liability Litiga.
tion, in DEFENDING BANK & THRIFT DIRECTORS & PROFESSIONALS 41 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-532, 1994). As this litigation un-
folded, key decisions on the scope of the adverse domination tolling theory affected
billions of dollars in claims. See Marianne Lavelle, Thrift Officials are Finding the
Law is on Their Side, NATL L.J., July 11, 1994, at B1. See also Albert R. Karr,
Interstate Banking Clears the Senate, Goes to Clinton, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1994,
at 20.
2 For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), imposes
pleading requirements and discovery restrictions that have shifted litigation from
federal court to state court. See John Gibeaut, Corporate Boards Can Kill Suits,
A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 43 (citing unnamed study that documents 26% shift to
state court).
21 1 CORMAN, supra note 5, §1.1, at 10.
1 COEIMAN, supra note 5, §1.1, at 10. ("Courts have variously described stat-
utes of limitations as arbitrary by necessity; a mechanical operation possibly unre-
lated to the merits of litigation; failing to create vested property rights; or not
affecting fundamental rights.").
For example, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state limitations rules
as substantive law. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945). In a
[Vol. 63:695
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At the most basic level, limitations rules encourage plain-
tiffs to pursue their claims promptly and assure a measure of
fairness to potential defendants by precluding litigation of
claims where fact-finding is likely to be impaired by the pas-
sage of time.' As the Supreme Court explained over fifty
years ago: "The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is
unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the
period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims
in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.'
There is also an important social dimension to statutes of
limitation. Because courts can more quickly and accurately re-
solve controversies where evidence is fresh, statutes of limita-
tion promote a societal interest in a speedy, efficient justic
system.26 Indeed, one commentator argues that statutes of
limitation promote efficiency generally by adding a temporal
dimension to legal rights that reduces uncertaintyY
Limitations scholarship outside the corporate context ac-
knowledges the importance of limitations problems, and it is
time for corporate law commentary to do so as well." As will
similar effort to accommodate the substantive import of limitations rules in state
court proceedings, judges, and even legislatures, have developed significant excep-
tions to the lex fori choice of law rule that generally applies in such cases. See 1
CORMAN, supra note 5, § 1.5.1, at 82-84.
24 See Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes
of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453, 471, 488 (1997). Professor Ochoa and Judge
Wistrich provide a comprehensive and thoughtful review of the justifications tradi-
tionally offered for statutes of limitation.
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944). See generally 1 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 1.1, at 11-14. The concern is, in
part, that plaintiff may intentionally delay pursuit of his claim until defendants
ability to resist it is impaired by the passage of time. 1 COIIAN, supra note 5,
§ 1.1, at 11-14.
26 1 CORIAN, supra note 5, § 1.1, at § 1.1, at 16 ("Judicial efficiency is the
reward when these statutes produce speedy and fair adjudication of the rights of
the parties. Certainty and finality in the administration of affairs is promoted, and
courts are relieved of the burden of trying stale claims when plaintiffi have 'slept
on their rights."). See also Lyman Johnson, Securities Fraud and the Mirage of
Repose, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 607, 632 (1992) (making similar observations and label-
ing them as the "social dimension" of statutes of limitation).
', Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. CIM. L.
REV. 1175, 1181-83 (1986).
' Limitations problems in a variety of disciplines have attracted much
scholarly attention. See, e.g., Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limita-
tions in Toxic Substances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 965 (1988); Laurie L. Kratky,
Comment, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability: Death Before Conception?, 37
SW. L.J. 665 (1983); Jocelyn B. Lamm, Easing Access to the Courts for Incest Vic-
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be shown, over the past two decades, limitations disputes in
corporate fiduciary litigation have added new verses to a very
old song in both corporate and limitations law: the tension
between bright-line rules and fact-based standards. So viewed,
the issues this Article explores may offer new lessons for both
of these categories.
I. THE FLOWERING OF THE ADVERSE DOMINATION TOLLING
THEORY AND RECENT JUDICIAL PRUNING
This Part of the Article describes how, starting in the
1980s, federal regulators successfully used the adverse domina-
tion theory to solve limitations problems in failed bank and
thrift cases. This Part also describes how the theory then rap-
idly spread to corporate litigation generally. Finally, this Part
identifies key doctrinal questions that have emerged as courts
have, in recent years, rejected the adverse domination theory
or retreated from its expansive application.
A. Timing Problems in Failed Bank and Thrift Litigation
In the 1980s and early 1990s, banks and savings and loans
failed at an unprecedented rate. 9 The Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, and its now extinct colleagues, the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and the Resolution
Trust Corporation (hereinafter collectively the "FDIC"), typi-
cally acted as receivers or successors of these institutions. Most
were organized as corporations, and the FDIC inherited any
claims the institutions might have against their former direc-
tors, officers or professional advisers. 0 A tremendous number
tims: Toward an Equitable Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 100 YALE L.
J., 2189 (1991). There is also recent work of broader scope that implicates or focus-
es on limitations issues. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 27; CORMAN, supra note 5
(two volume treatise on limitations).
" During the past ten years, for example, over 1,000 banks and nearly 900
savings and loans have failed. John L. Douglas, The Liability of Directors of Fi-
nancial Institutions, in DEFENDING BANK & THRIFT DIRECrORs & PROFESSIONALS
1995, 191 (PLI Litig. Course Handbook Series No. H-532, 1995). This trend, which
peaked in the early 1990s, has now subsided. The FDIC closed only six institu-
tions during all of 1996. FDIC, Closed FDIC-Insured Institutions and Assistance
Transactions for 1996 <http'J/www.fdic.gov/banknews/bkfai196.html>.
o For a discussion of the corporate form of ownership that prevailed among
[Vol. 63: 695
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of D & 0 suits and related malpractice actions ensued."
Statutes of limitation, however, posed considerable obsta-
cles to pursuit of these claims. Risky lending and other ques-
tionable activities that might create a cause of action on behalf
of a failed institution typically occurred many years before its
receivership. 2 Once a receivership began, generous federal
statutes of limitation applied to the FDIC's claims as an
institution's successor (three years for tort claims and six years
for contract claims)." But these provisions did not resurrect
any claims of the institution that had lapsed under state law
prior to the receivership.' As one court summarized the situ-
ation:
Improvident loans cause financial institutions to bleed internally.
The institutions seldom succumb quickly. They linger. Many years
usually pass by between the dates of the making of improvident
failed financial institutions and the capacities in which federal agencies can pursue
D & 0 and related malpractice claims, see Matthew G. Dord, Presumed Innocent?
Financial Institutions, Professional Malpractice Claims, and Defenses Based on
Management Misconduct, COLUML BUS. L. REV. 127, 129-32 (1995).
" For example, from 1992 to 1995, the FDIC and the RTC filed 593 'profes.
sional liability" lawsuits. Most fell into two categories: (i) breach of fiduciary duty
claims against directors and officers of failed financial institutions, and (ii) mal-
practice claims against their professional advisers, typically lawyers and accoun-
tants. FDIC Congressional Liaison Office Report, June 12, 1996 (copy on file with
author). As with institution failures, the volume of cases has now subsided. For
example, the FDIC filed only three professional liability lawsuits during the first
half of 1996. Id. A total of 153 cases against directors, officers and profe3sional
advisers of failed financial institutions were active at the end of that year.
Marianne Lavelle, FDIC Biggie Says Errors Were Jfade, NATL L. J., Dec. 2, 1996,
at A1O.
' In the southwest, where most thrift failures occurred, many loans and in-
vestments that caused insolvencies and receiverships in the late 19803 were made
in the early "boom" years of the decade. See generally NATIONAL COMIN ON FIN.
INST. REFORM, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT, ORIGINS AND CAUSES OF THE S&L
DEBACLE: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORLM 8, 43-55 (1993) [hereinafter ORIGINS & CAUS-
ES].
" 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A) (1994). Congress established a more generous
limitations rule for claims of fraud and intentional misconduct. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1441a(b)(14)(E), 1821(d)(14)(C) (1994).
34 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(B) provides that the federal statute of limitations
begins to run on the later of "(i) the date of the appointment of the [FDIC or
RTC] as conservator or receiver, or (ii) the date on which the cause of action ac-
crues." The courts have not construed this statute literally, but instead hold that
it tacks on an additional period, no less than that specified in § 1821(d)(14)XA), at
the start of the conservatorship or receivership, but only for claims for which state
law limitations periods have not expired as of that time. See, ag., FDIC v.
Dawson, 4 F.3d. 1303, 1307 (5th Cir. 1993) (collecting cases).
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loans and their cumulative effect of bringing the institution to its
knees. More time goes by before there is a federal agency ready to
file suit.... [G]enerally speaking, the statute [of limitations] would
run before the action could be brought by the federal agency unless
some special doctrine or exception exists which tolls the statute.5
State limitations law provided little help for the FDIC in
this regard. The critical issue in most cases, an issue legisla-
tures generally left for the courts to decide, was when the state
statute of limitations began to run-that is, when the failed
institution's cause of action "accrued."36 In corporate D & 0
suits of the type the FDIC typically pursued on behalf of failed
institutions, accrual could variously be defined as the time of
the alleged breach of duty (an "occurrence" rule), the time the
breach produced losses (a "damage" rule), or the time disinter-
ested representatives of the institution or its shareholders
learned about the breach (a "discovery" rule).7 Courts had
traditionally declined to depart from the occurrence rule in
corporate cases. As summarized in a leading treatise: "General-
ly,.., the statute of limitations begins to run against an ac-
tion against the directors of corporations for their malfeasance
or nonfeasance from the time of the perpetration of the wrongs
complained of."3"
RTC v. Scaletty, 891 P.2d 1110, 1114 (Kan. 1995).
Legislatures often provide that the limitations period for a cause of action
begins upon its "accrual," but, intentionally or not, allow the courts to define that
term. See, e.g., 1 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 6.1, at 373-75 ("A cause of action does
not necessarily accrue on the date of the wrongful act, but instead when the
plaintiff has a legal right to maintain his or her action, leaving the court to ascer-
tain when such action effectively could be initiated."). See also, 1 CORMAN, supra
note 5,§ 6.1, at 370-71. There were other important questions besides "accrual" of
course, such as which statute of limitations applied to D & 0 claims. As discussed
in Part V of this Article, only a few states have express statutes of limitation
covering such cases. The range of options available to courts was necessarily limit-
ed to statutorily prescribed time periods, which in most jurisdictions did not ex-
ceed 6 years. See infra Part V.B.1-2.
" See 1 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 6.1, at 370.
38 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, ET AL., CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 1306.10, at 683 (Penn. ed. 1994) [hereinafter FLETCHER, CORPORA-
TIONS]. See also id. § 1306, at 675-76; Annotation., Limitation of Actions Against
Directors of Corporation for Malfeasance or Nonfeasance, L.R.A. 1917A, 980, 982.
Indeed, this pattern holds even where the full extent of damage from the corpo-
rate fiduciary's wrongdoing is not apparent until long after the transaction is ap-
proved. For example, many courts have held that a cause of action against bank
directors for improper approval of a loan accrues "as soon as the loan is made and
the bank parts with its money," rather than at the time the loan matures or the
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Nor did delayed accrual or "tolling" doctrines hold much
promise for the FDIC. 9 Courts rejected the damage rule on
the theory that a corporation is entitled to sue (and its legal
rights are "fixed") as soon as a breach of duty occurs. 0 The
discovery rule typically applied only in cases where corporate
fiduciaries were alleged to have engaged in fraud or fraudulent
concealment.4 Even if the discovery rule did apply, notice to a
single disinterested corporate representative of the institution
presumably satisfied its requirements.4 Moreover, courts gen-
erally refused to recast as "continuing wrongs" (for which ac-
crual is delayed) either the continued ill effects of past breach-
es of duty by corporate fiduciaries, or their failure to prosecute
such breachesY In short, under accrual principles that pre-
vailed in most states at the inception of the bank and thrift
crisis, the FDIC's D & 0 claims and related malpractice claims
were time-barred.
B. The Adverse Domination Remedy
The limitations issue was critical in the first reported
borrower defaults. 3A FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS, supra, § 1306, at 677. See, e.g.,
Corsicana Natl Bank v. Johnson, 251 U.S. 68, 86 (1919); RTC v. Bladell, 930 F.
Supp. 417, 429 (D. Ariz. 1994). Accord Nunrick v. Baker, 14 N.Y.S.2d 503, 506
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939). There are occasional exceptions, however. See, eg., FDIC v.
Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding claims against directors for
improper approval of loans were timely under either damage rule (when loans
were not repaid) or discovery rule). Accord System Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Boyldn,
683 So.2d 419 (Ala. 1996) (corporation's claim against CEO for improper payments
accrued when IRS disallowed deductions for the payments).
This Article equates 'tolling" of limitations for a claim with postponement of
"accrual" of the cause of action beyond the point when breach of duty occurred.
Although these two concepts might not be the same for all purposes, see, eg.,
West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 40 n.6 (1987), most courts have not distinguished
them when applying adverse domination analysis. See Hecht v. RTC, 635 A.2d
394, 402 n.11 (Md. 1994) (collecting cases).
See, eg., Kabn v. Seaboard Corp., 625 A.2d 269, 271 (DeL Ch. 1993).
' These tolling exceptions are discussed in more detail in Part II(C(2).
See 3 A. FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS, supra note 38, § 790, at 15.
See, e.g., Kahn, 625 A.2d at 271. In the case of a continuing
wrong/continuing injury, the plaintiffs harm *results from continued unlawful acts
and differs from the continuing ill effects of an original violation... Postpone-
ment of the date of accrual until termination of a continuing wrong permits the
inclusion of damages for the duration of the violation." 1 CORMAN, supra note 5,
§ 7.4.11, at 601.
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failed bank D & 0 decision of the 1980s, FDIC v. Bird." The
FDIC sued an insolvent bank's directors on behalf of the insti-
tution, alleging lending violations and related breach of fidu-
ciary duty claims.45 The defendant directors, citing the pre-
vailing "occurrence" theory of accrual, contended that the stat-
ute of limitations started running on claims against them at
the time any improper loans were made, and had therefore
expired prior to the receivership." The FDIC, citing a handful
of older cases (discussed in detail in Part II) that recognized a
"domination and control" tolling exception, argued that the
bank's cause of action did not accrue "while the culpable direc-
tors remain[ed] in control of the bank."47 The court adopted
the FDIC's position, reasoning that in light of defendants'
control of the institution, there was no meaningful opportunity
for a suit to protect the bank's interests "prior to the bank's
failure and the appointment of the receiver."8 Thus, modem
adverse domination tolling standards were born.
As more banks and savings and loans failed in the early
and mid-1980s, other courts followed Bird's lead.49 By the
time the rate of bank and thrift insolvencies peaked in the late
1980s and early 1990s, the adverse domination theory was, as
one federal district court described it, a "widely-accepted propo-
sition."0 This same court summarized the three rationales
most often advanced for tolling limitations under the adverse
domination theory:5 (i) a corporate entity is "disabled" and
cannot sue wrongdoing directors or officers while they control
it; (ii) during the period of their control, directors and officers
are in a position to conceal information about their own wrong-
doing from those who might try to bring suit on behalf of the
" 516 F. Supp. 647 (D.P.R. 1981).
45 Id. at 648.
" Id. at 650-51.
' Id. at 651.
"Id. According to the court, such a tolling exception also comports with broad-
er corporate law trends, like the federal securities laws, that encourage disclosure
by corporate managers. Id at 651-52.
'" See, e.g., FDIC v. Berry, 659 F. Supp. 1475, 1486 (E.D. Tenn. 1987); FDIC
v. Dempster, 637 F. Supp. 362, 368 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); FDIC v. Buttram, 590 F.
Supp. 251, 254-55 (N.D. Ala. 1984); FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184, 1193-
95 (D. Md. 1984).
o FDIC v. Hudson, 673 F. Supp. 1039, 1042 (D. Kan. 1987).
This Article evaluates these rationales in detail infra Part III.
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corporation; and (iii) the corporation should not be charged
with "notice" of claims against wrongdoing directors and offi-
cers while they control the entity.62 As the following para-
graphs explain, until recent retrenchment in growth of the
adverse domination theory, these arguments threatened a total
eclipse of statutes of limitation in corporate fiduciary litigation.
C. The Adverse Domination Theory Flowers and Multiplies
1. D&OCases
In the early years of the bank and thrift crisis, the FDIC
uniformly succeeded in applying the adverse domination theory
to toll limitations for D & 0 claims.' The only issue on which
courts divided was the proper standard for determining when
adverse domination ceased. One line of cases held that adverse
domination tolled limitations so long as a majority of the board
was comprised of persons alleged to have engaged in wrongdo-
ing.'M A competing line of cases required the FDIC to make a
stronger showing of "fall, complete and exclusive control" of the
financial institution by defendant directors, i.e., to "effectively
negate the possibility that an informed director could have
induced the corporation to sue."' Under the latter version of
adverse domination, the presence of a "single disinterested
director" on the board might be sufficient to protect the
Hudson, 673 F. Supp. at 1042-43 (describing arguments and collecting cases).
Neither Hudson nor the decisions it cites expressly addresses how the potential for
derivative suits factored into the adverse domination analysis. This Article explores
this issue infra Part MA2.
' The most serious potential obstacle to adverse domination tolling arguments
in the early bank and thrift cases was the claim by defendant directors that
regulators' control over a financial institution prior to the receivership (e.g.,
through annual bank examinations, supervisory arrangements, consent decrees)
prevented adverse domination-a claim the courts consistently rejected. The courts
reasoned that regulators had neither the power nor the duty to sue prior to a
receivership. See, e.g., RTC v. Hecht, 833 F. Supp. 529, 532 (D. Md. 1993); FDIC
v. Howse, 736 F. Supp. 1437, 1442-43 (S.D. Tex 1990); Buttram, 590 F. Supp. at
254.
" See, e.g., Howse, 736 F. Supp. at 1441-42; Williams, 599 F. Supp. at 1195.
' See, e.g., Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d at 1523 (cit-
ing International Rys. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 414 (2d Cir. 1957).
Farmers relie on federal "equitable tolling" precedent from the Second Circuit
where this same domination standard was applied. See, e-g., United Fruit Co., 373
F.2d at 414.
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institution's interests, and therefore end adverse domination
tolling." These competing tests became known, respectively,
as the "majority disinterested director" and "single disinterest-
ed director" formulations of the adverse domination theory.
Even under the more onerous single disinterested director
formulation of adverse domination, the FDIC survived disposi-
tive limitations defense motions by raising fact issues about
the "disinterest" of directors that had not participated in the
alleged wrongdoing.57 Indeed, factual disputes about director
wrongdoing, director "interest" and similar issues on which
adverse domination tolling depends worked to the FDIC's ad-
vantage by enabling it to defeat motions to dismiss or for sum-
mary judgment based on limitations. The Resoulution Trust
Corporation boasted in 1993 that, despite repeated litigation
over adverse domination in dozens of lawsuits, "district courts
[had] never resolved [the limitations] issue against the RTC on
summary judgment, and that the FDIC's average [was] nearly
as good.""8 Thus, and not incidentally, the FDIC retained le-
verage for settlements.
2. Third Party Claims
Not only did the FDIC use adverse domination successfully
in D & 0 cases, it also applied the theory to toll limitations for
failed financial institutions' malpractice claims against lawyers
and accountants, and for similar claims against other third
parties. These cases, which proliferated alongside D & 0
claims in the wake of bank and thrift failures,59 were critical
to the FDIC's recovery efforts, since collecting judgments or
settlements against directors and officers of failed institutions
was often difficult."0 Until 1993, the FDIC was uniformly suc-
'6 See RTC v. Grant, 901 P.2d 807, 817 (Okla. 1995).
'T See, e.g., FDIC v. Appling, 992 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir. 1993) (fact issues pre-
cluded summary judgment on adverse domination); Bryan, 902 F.2d at 1523-24
(fact issues precluded directed verdict on adverse domination); RTC v. Dean, No.
91 Civ. 2026 1993 WL 837065, at *9 (D. Ariz., Jul. 20, 1993) (same-summary
judgment); FDIC v. Gantenbein, No. Civ. A. 90-2303-V, 1992 WL 279772, at *4 (D.
Kan. Sept. 30, 1992) (same).
' Dean, 1993 WL 837065, at *4 n.7.
' For details on the scope of the FDIC's malpractice litigation, see supra note
31. See also Dor6, supra note 30, at 129-30.
' Exclusions in directors' and officers' liability insurance policies made coverage
[Vol. 63: 695
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cessful in its arguments that adverse domination tolled stat-
utes of limitation applicable to a corporation's claims against
third parties where the claims might expose wrongdoing by
directors and officers. The FDIC contended, and the courts
agreed, that adverse domination tolling was appropriate in
these lawsuits because controlling directors of failing institu-
tions would not pursue such third party claims."' The FDIC
had more limited success using the adverse domination theory
to overcome time restrictions in insurance policies that covered
failed institutions' D & 0 claims."
3. Adverse Domination Extends to Corporate Litigation
Generally
Soon after the adverse domination theory attained promi-
nence in failed bank and thrift litigation, other corporate liti-
problematic in many cases. See, eg., Wisla C. Heneghan & Daniel E. Rhynhart,
Developments in Banking Law: 1994 (pt3), 14 ANN. REV. BANKING L 27, 29-30
(1995). Even where directors appeared personally wealthy, tracing non-exempt
assets and other obstacles complicated the prospects for recoveries. See, eg., Karr,
supra note 19. Directors' and officers' professional advisers, on the other hand,
provided more reliable deep pockets, since they were typically organized under a
partnership structure with substantial personal assets at stake, and were often
insured under malpractice policies that did not contain exclusions siilar to those
in D & 0 policies. See, e.g., Ronald W. Stevens, FDIC and RTC Suits Against For-
mer Directors and Officers: When Will the Pendulum Swing the Other Way?, 47
CONSUm FIN. L.Q. REP. 222, 227 (1993).
6 See, e.g., RTC v. O'Bear, 840 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Ind 1993) (appraiser);
FDIC v. Nathan, 804 F. Supp. 888, 890 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (attorney); RTC v.
Gardner, 798 F. Supp. 790, 792 (D.D.C. 1992) (same); Gantenbein, 1992 WL
279772 (attomey/director); In re American Continental Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1424,
1453 (D. Ariz. 1992) (attorney). Accord Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
727 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1984) (accountant-non-FDIC case); UT v. Cornfeld, 619
F.2d 909, 931 (2d Cir. 1980) (same).
For example, the FDIC often made claims on fidelity bonds that were in
effect at many banks and thrifts before their failure. See generally Michael Keeley
& Toni Scott Reed, 'Superpowers' of Federal Regulators: How the Banhing Crisis
Created an Entire Genre of Bond Litigation, 31 TORT & INS. LJ. 817 (1996). These
claims were based on alleged fraudulent or illegal conduct by the institutions'
directors or officers during the period of the bonds' coverage. Strict 'discovery of
loss" and related notification provisions had often expired before the FDIC made
its bond claims, however. Id. at 833. At least two federal circuits recognized the
possibility that adverse domination tolled the period for discovery of lo3s, though
neither applied the theory on the facts presented. See FDIC v. Oldenburg, 34 F.3d
1529 (10th Cir. 1994) (remanding for application of adverse domination theory);
California Union Ins. Co. v. American Diversified Say. Bank, 948 F.2d 656, 565
(9th Cir. 1991) (adverse domination not applicable on facts).
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gants invoked its tolling standards to solve limitations prob-
lems for D & 0 and related third party claims. Insurance re-
ceivers used adverse domination to resurrect otherwise untime-
ly D & 0 claims in the failed insurance corporation setting."
Bankruptcy trustees took the same approach when traditional
for-profit corporations became insolvent.' Like the FDIC,
these litigants also used the theory to preserve coverage under
corporate insurance policies with discovery of loss provisions
that had ostensibly lapsed.65 Most importantly, adverse domi-
nation tolling began to alleviate limitations obstacles in more
traditional corporate litigation venues, such as direct corporate
actions and shareholder derivative suits.' Responding to this
trend, the limitations discussions in leading corporate treatises
were supplemented to include references to the adverse domi-
nation theory.67
In short, by the early 1990s, it appeared that bright-line
statutes of limitation for corporate fiduciary claims and related
causes of action had metamorphosed into fact-based tolling
standards under the adverse domination theory. Limitations
periods were no longer measured from the occurrence of corpo-
rate fiduciaries' alleged misconduct but instead from the time
the corporation was in a meaningful position to police that
' See, e.g., Clark v. Milam, 872 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. W. Va. 1994); Guarantee
Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Blackburn (In re Blackburn), 209 B.R. 4 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1997); Clark v. Milam, 452 S.E.2d 714 (W. Va. 1994).
" See, e.g., In re MacGregor Sporting Goods, Inc., 199 B.R. 502 (Bankr. N.J.
1995); Kaliner v. Load Rite Trailors, Inc. (In re Sverica Acquisition Corp. Inc.), 179
B.R. 457 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); Schwartz v. Jetronic Industries, Inc. (In re Harry
Levin), 175 B.R. 560 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994). See also In re Lajet, No. 93-3266, 93-
3267, 1994 WL 392893, at *_ (E.D. La. June 2, 1994) (suit untimely even if ad-
verse domination applied).
' See, e.g., Paradis v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 796 F. Supp. 59, 62-63 (D.R.I.
1992) (collecting cases); In re Lloyd See., Inc., 153 B.R. 677 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1993).
6 See, e.g., Safecard Servs., Inc. v. Halmos, 912 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 1996) (direct
corporate action against director for insider trading under Delaware law); United
Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993) (direct D
& 0 suit following change in control, but court found adverse domination inap-
plicable on facts). See also Saylor v. Bastedo, 100 F.R.D. 44, 50-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(shareholder derivative suit); Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Markets, Inc., 677
N.E.2d 159, 173-77 (Mass. 1997) (reaching result similar to adverse domination in
derivative suit by applying trust principles and fraudulent concealment rule).
6 See, e.g., 3A FLETCHER CORPORATIONS, supra note 38, § 1306.20; DOUGLAS
M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 10.02 (1993 & Supp. 1997).
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misconduct. In most cases such a determination could not be
made prior to a trial on the merits.
D. Recent Judicial Pruning of the Adverse Domination Theory
The trend favoring adverse domination tolling has not
continued unabated. Judicial adoption of the theory has slowed
considerably in recent years, as has expansive application of
the theory in jurisdictions that previously embraced it.
The first significant reversal came in 1993, when the
Fourth Circuit declined to recognize adverse domination as
part of Virginia law.' The court reasoned that Virginia re-
quired intentional concealment of wrongful conduct by corpo-
rate fiduciaries before a court could toll limitations.' In sub-
sequent years, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits reached simi-
lar conclusions under Arkansas and Georgia law, respectively,
as did federal district courts interpreting the laws of Louisi-
ana, Illinois, Florida, and Tennessee." These decisions-all
from federal courts attempting to predict state
law-undoubtedly reflect restraint that is in part rooted in
federalism concerns.7' Yet this same forbearance was also the
product of concerns about the institutional competency of the
judiciary in matters of limitations, or, as the Eighth Circuit
expressed it, the "view that a reformulation of the law regard-
FDIC v. Cocke, 7 F.3d 396, 402 (4th Cir. 1993).
I& The court reaffirmed this position one year later in RTC v. Everhart, 37
F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply adverse domination to Virginia-based
financial institution chartered under federal law).
" RTC v. Armbruster, 52 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 1995); RTC v. Artley, 28 F.3d
1099 (11th Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Caplan, 874 F. Supp. 741 (W.D. La. 1995); RTC v.
Gravee, No.94 Civ. 4589 1995 WL 75373, at *_ (N.D. Il. [FEB. 22, 1995] 1995);
Brandt v. Basset, 855 F. Supp. 353, 358 (S.D. Fla. 1994); RTC v. Wood, 870 F.
Supp. 797, 811 (W.D. Tenn. 1994). See also RTC v. Barton, 96 F.3d 128 (5th Cir.
1996) (declining to apply adverse domination tolling principles as part of
Louisiana's contra non valentum doctrine where the claims against directors did
not allege fraud or misrepresentation by defendant directors); Howe Grain, Inc. v.
Bantz, 209 BR. 496 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1997) (predicting Nebraska law and declining
to apply adverse domination on the facts presented).
"1 See, eg., Wood, 870 F. Supp. at 810-11 (rejecting "application of the doctrine
of adverse domination in the absence of clear state intent" and citing with approv-
al the judicial restraint of the Fourth Circuit in FDIC v. Cachx, 7 F.3d at 396,
402 (4th Cir. 1993)). See also Artley, 28 F.3d at 1103-04 (refusing to adopt adverse
domination as part of federal common law); RTC v. Gravee, N.D. IlL Feb. 22, 1995
WL 75373.
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ing when the statute of limitations begins to run is a matter
better left to the legislature."72
At about the same time as courts began declining invita-
tions to adopt the adverse domination theory, the Fifth Circuit
began to restrict the theory's application in Texas, where state
courts had previously embraced it.73 The court ruled in one
case that adverse domination tolling standards did not apply to
D & 0 claims alleging "mere negligence" on the part of direc-
tors,74 in another that conclusory allegations of "gross negli-
gence" were insufficient to trigger the theory,75 and in yet an-
other that "some sort of self-dealing or fraudulent conduct is
required" for adverse domination tolling.76 Lower courts in the
Fifth Circuit interpreted Louisiana's adverse domination theo-
ry along similar lines.77 Following this lead, other federal
courts predicting state law on adverse domination limited its
application to claims against directors for conduct more serious
than negligence.7" The trend in state courts has been less
clear, with some embracing expansive versions of adverse dom-
ination, and others applying it quite restrictively.79
Federal courts have circumscribed the adverse domination
theory in other respects as well. In 1993, the Fifth Circuit held
that adverse domination was a "very narrow doctrine" applica-
ble only to D & 0 suits, and that the theory did not toll limita-
tions for a corporation's claims against third parties, even
72 Armbruster, 52 F.3d at 752. See also Brandt, 855 F. Supp. at 357.
Allen v. Wilkerson, 396 S.W.2d 493, 500-02 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
' FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1311 (5th Cir. 1993).
RTC v. Seale, 13 F.3d 850, 854-55 (5th Cir. 1994).
76 RTC v. Acton, 49 F.3d 1091 (5th Cir. 1995).
r' See, e.g., RTC v. Gaudet, No. 92 Civ. 2661 1996 WL 34131, at *3-6 (E.D.
La. Jan. 29, 1996) (adverse domination tolling in Louisiana requires the same level
of misconduct by directors as Fifth Circuit predicted for Texas law self-dealing or
fraudulent conduct).
7 See, e.g., RTC v. Franz, 909 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (Illinois law of
adverse domination requires that a majority of directors exhibit gross negligence or
recklessness); RTC v. Blasdell, 930 F. Supp. 417 (D. Ariz. 1994) (Arizona law of
adverse domination requires allegations of intentional misconduct or concealment).
But see FDIC v. Jackson, 133 F.3d. 694, 698-99 (predicting that Arizona law of
adverse domination would apply, "at a minimum" to gross negligence claims).
"' Compare RTC v.' Scaletty, 891 P.2d 1110 (Kan. 1995) (adopting adverse dom-
ination doctrine for all claims), and Hecht v. RTC, 635 A.2d 394 (Md. 1994)
(same), with RTC v. Grant, 901 P.2d 807, 814 (Okla. 1995) (limiting application of
the doctrine to claims for fraudulent conduct).
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where those claims might implicate controlling directors.'
This ruling significantly curtailed the scope of the FDIC's pro-
fessional malpractice litigation in Texas, and attracted a limit-
ed following elsewhere.8' And, starting at about the same
time, several courts reversed an earlier judicial trend and
ruled that regulators' prereceivership supervision of financial
institutions ended what would have otherwise constituted
adverse domination by allegedly culpable directors.'
Long-standing divisions among courts on procedural as-
pects of the adverse domination theory-in particular, the
competing "majority disinterested director" and "single disin-
terested director" versions of adverse domination-continue
unabated.' Several recent decisions treat these two alterna-
tives as presumptions: the majority disinterested director ver-
sion presumes that a corporation is incapable of suing while
controlled by a majority of directors who are implicated in
wrongdoing; the single disinterested director version presumes,
from the presence of a single disinterested director on a
corporation's board, that the corporation is in a position to sue
any wrongdoing directors or officers, whether or not they con-
stitute a majority of the board." In either case, however, the
' FDIC v. Shrader & York, 991 F.2d 216, 227 (5th Cir. 1993).
" See Lavelle, supra note 19 (describing impact of negative rulings in thrift
cases). While the majority view is that adverse domination applies to corporate
claims against third parties (see, eg., RTC v. Gardner, 798 F. Supp. 790, 795 & n.
6 (D.D.C. 1992) (collecting cases)), a few other courts have followed the Fifth Cir-
cuit and limited application of adverse domination to claim against directors and
officers. See RTC v. Aycock, No. 92 Civ. 761 1995 WL 46707 (E.D. La. Feb. 2,
1995) (adverse domination did not toll limitations for attorney malpractice claim
under Lousiana law); FDIC v. Leonard, No. 91-1773 (ED. Va. 1992) (same). See
also B.P. Oil, Inc. v. JR. Sousa & Sons, Inc., No. 83-4046 1995 WL 842003, at *9
(D. Mass. Sept. 12, 1995) (adverse domination did not apply to corporation's claims
against third parties).
See, eg., RTC v. O'Bear, Overholser & Smith, 886 F. Supp. 658, 663-67
(N.D. Ind. 1995) (consent decree ended adverse domination); RTC v. Phelps, 860 F.
Supp. 389, 390-391 (S.D. Ter 1994) (appointment of supervisory agent ended ad-
verse domination); RTC v. Holmes, 839 F. Supp. 449 (S.D. TeM 1993) (same).
' Compare Hecht, 635 A.2d at 402 (applying majority disinterested director
version), and Grant, 901 P.2d at 817-818 (same), with Clark v. ilam, 452 S.E.2d
714, 719 (W. Va. 1994) (applying single disinterested director version); United Park
City Mlines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993) (same).
"See, eg., Scaletty, 891 P.2d at 1113; Hecht, 635 A.2d at 407-08; Grant, 901
P.2d at 817.
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applicable presumption can be rebutted at trial.'
E. The Need for Doctrinal Analysis
These developments raise several issues. That courts have
refused to adopt or apply the adverse domination theory in so
many recent cases calls into question, implicitly if not explicit-
ly, the justifications traditionally offered to support it. Not only
are these arguments ripe for reevaluation, they also implicate
difficult questions of institutional competency. That is, when
one asks whether courts should toll bright-line statutes of
limitation with fact-based adverse domination standards, one
must also consider whether courts have any authority to do so.
An evaluation of the rationales for adverse domination may
shed light on this issue, as well as on divisions that have de-
veloped among courts concerning the categories of claims to
which it should apply and procedures for its implementation.
Of course, there is a somewhat cynical alternative explana-
tion for the conflicting developments described above, an expla-
nation that does not require doctrinal analysis. Most adverse
domination cases are a product of litigation that ensued in the
wake of the bank and thrift crisis. Changing views about the
causes of that crisis, and perceived abuses by government
regulators in the litigation that ensued in its wake, may have
contributed both to the adverse domination theory's meteoric
' Under the majority disinterested director version, defendants can prevail on
the limitations defense at trial despite the presumption by showing that a majori-
ty of the board was not involved in wrongdoing or was otherwise disinterested
with respect to the claim, thus ending adverse domination tolling. See, e.g., Hecht,
635 A.2d at 407; Scaletty, 801 P.2d at 1113. Under the single disinterested direc-
tor version, plaintiff can defeat the limitations defense at trial by showing that
allegedly disinterested board members were not, in fact, "willing and motivated" to
sue on the corporation's behalf. See, e.g., FDIC v. Appling, 992 F.2d 1109, 1115-16
(10th Cir. 1993) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment); Farmers &
Merchants Natl Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520, 1523 (10th Cir. 1990) (denying
defendants' motion for directed verdict).
In the Fifth Circuit, however, the courts have refused to follow this presump-
tion approach. Tolling apparently follows only where the corporate plaintiff both
pleads and sustains its burden of proof at trial that a majority of the board has
engaged in sufficiently serious wrongdoing. See FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303,
1311 (5th Cir. 1993). ("[Pjlaintiff still bears the burden of proving that a majority
of the board consisted of wrongdoers for the relevant time period; the [adverse
domination theory] does not shift onto the defendants the burden of proving that a
majority of the board was not culpable.").
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rise and to its more recent decline.'
Yet, while development of the common law is undoubtedly
influenced to some degree by the political capital of the liti-
gants that bring disputes to the courts, such explanations of
legal doctrine are not helpful tools for courts or lawyers to use
in resolving future disputes. Judges encapsulate policy deci-
sions, whether or not politically motivated, in doctrinal rules
that have the force of precedent. They may later temper the
logic of these rules, as Justice Holmes explained, based on
experience. i8ke most standard-based formulations in limi-
tations and corporate jurisprudence, the adverse domination
theory has developed as part of this common law process, and
its future largely depends upon it. Thus, while the political
At the outset, prevailing popular opinion blamed fraud and abuse by unscru-
pulous owners and operators as the primary causes of financial institution insol-
vency. See Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42
DUKE L.J. 469, 508-09 (1992) (describing popular acceptance of the fraud and
abuse theory in the early stages of the recent thrift crisis). By suspending limita-
tions under the adverse domination theory, courts facilitated the government's ef-
forts to catch and punish those the public believed to be responsible for the losses
incurred. See, eg., RTC v. Gardner, 798 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1992) (applying
adverse domination theory to toll limitations for claims against attorneys that
represented Charles Keating's Lincoln Savings and Loan); In re American Conti-
nental Corpi~incoln Say. and Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1424, 1453 (D. Ariz.
1992) (same).
Later, more complex views of the bank and thrift crisis emerged, challenging
the fraud and abuse theory, or at least its extent. See, eg., Swire, supra, at 509-
10 (describing a "stiff competition" explanation of the crisis); ORIGINS & CAUSES,
supra note 32, at 82-87 (describing differing views on role of fraud and abuse as
cause of the thrift crisis). At the same time, the FDIC and other regulators began
targeting not only fraud and abuse by those who managed financial institutions
(and professional advisers who knowingly assisted them), but also negligent mis-
management and malpractice claims based on negligence. See, eg., John K. Villa,
Liabilities of Bank and Thrift Counsel, in LITIGATING FOR AND AGAINST THE FDIC
AND THE RTC 1993, 485, 490-97 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Series No. A4-4429,
1993) (describing FDIC's "decision to sue" process).
As the categories of "wrongdoers" expanded into the mainstream, including
governors, federal judges, and Members of Congress who had associated with failed
banks and thrifts, and as regulators pursued more controversial liability theories,
so did the volume and force of opposition to the government's positions in failed
financial institution litigation. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LA33ORERS IN
DIFFERENT VINEYARDS: THE BANKING REGULATORS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(Discussion Draft Jan. 1993) (strongly criticizing the theories and tacties used by
the OTS against the Kaye, Scholer law firm). Against this backdrop, it is not
surprising that by the mid-1990s courts began to distance themselves from recov-
ery theories they had readily embraced in the heady early days of the bank and
thrift crisis.
8 OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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dimensions of failed bank and thrift cases can aid our under-
standing of them, the lessons of that litigation for the adverse
domination theory will be more helpful if articulated in tradi-
tional doctrinal terms. This Article now turns to that task.
II. HISTORICAL PATTERNS, UNDERLYING POLICY DEBATES AND
THE ROOTS OF THE ADVERSE DOMINATION TOLLING THEORY
This Part of the Article provides a historical and policy
background that puts adverse domination tolling issues in per-
spective. As this Part describes, early in this century the rule-
based statute of limitations began to supplant equitable laches
standards in corporate fiduciary litigation. Yet, even as the
substitution of limitations for laches became complete as the
century progressed, courts embraced various tolling theories
that preserved a role for the application of standards (and,
therefore, a degree of judicial discretion) to solve limitations
problems in corporate cases. This rules/standards tension is
reflected not only in the caselaw roots of the adverse domina-
tion theory, but also in larger policy debates concerning the
proper role of rules and standards in limitations and corporate
law.
A. Statutes of Limitation Supplant the Laches Defense in
Modern Corporate Fiduciary Litigation
Judges used trust principles to develop the law of
directors' and officers' fiduciary duties in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century." In express trust cases, the stat-
ute of limitations did not run on the beneficiary's claims
against the trustee so long as there was no denial or repudia-
tion of the trust. Instead, laches principles determined whether
suit was timely filed. 9 Not surprisingly then, in the early
"' See, e.g., LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 672 (3d
ed. 1994) ("Perhaps because many of the earliest corporations cases involved chari-
table corporations, courts began to analogize the duties of a director in managing
corporate property to the duties of a trustee in managing trust property.").
89 Note, The Statute of Limitations in Stockholders' Derivative Suits Against
Directors, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 842, 845 (1939) [hereinafter, Note, Statute of Limita-
tions].
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days of corporate jurisprudence, courts applied these same
equitable standards to determine the time bar in breach of
fiduciary duty cases against corporate directors and officers."
Indeed, some decisions endorsed the laches defense not only on
the basis of the express trust analogy, but also because laches'
flexible analysis, which balances the reasonableness of the
corporate plaintiffs delay against any resulting prejudice to
the defendant fiduciaries, produced more equitable results
than statutes of limitation.9
But the flexibility that trust principles offered was some-
what limited. As the twentieth century progressed, courts
began to sever corporate law's ties to the law of trusts, and the
limitations area was no exception.' The majority view
emerged that claims against corporate directors and officers
were more in the nature of claims for breach of an implied
trust, to which statutes of limitation could apply.' Nonethe-
less, courts continued to invoke laches standards in certain
cases based on their equity jurisdiction.'
Directors, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 842, 845 (1939) [hereinafter, Note, Statute of Limita-
tions].
' See, eg., Felsenheld v. Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co., 192 S.E. 545, 549 (W. Va.
1937); Greenfield Sav. Bank v. Abercrombie, 97 N.E. 897, 901 (Wass. 1912); Joy v.
Ft. Worth Compress Co., 58 S.W. 173, 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900); Ellis v. Ward, 25
N.E. 530, 533 (Ill. 1890).
91 See, e.g., Lippitt v. Ashley, 94 A. 995, 1004 (Conn. 1915) (suggesting that
whether laches or limitations applied in a corporate fiduciary case should depend
on the level of misconduct by the defendant-the more serious the offense, the
more appropriate the express trust analogy and concomitant relaxation of limita-
tions rules.) See also Brinckerhoff v. Roosevelt, 143 F. 478 (2d Cir. 1906).
See, eg., SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 88, at 672.
See, e.g., J.W. Oler, Annotation, Statute of Limitations in Stockholder's Deriv-
ative Suit Against Directors or Officers, 123 A.L.R. 346, 347-48 (1939) (CMlost of
the cases which ... discuss the question are to the effect that directors of a cor-
poration are not such express trustees as will prevent the operation of the statute
of limitations in their favor .... .); Note, Statute of Limitations, supra note 89, at
846 ("A majority of jurisdictions [hold that] directors, like agents held to a fidu-
ciary liability on constructive trust theories, may avail themselves of the statutory
bar."). See generally 3A FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS, supra note 38, § 1301 at _.
', Where claims against directors and officers were not remediable at law, for
example, some courts found authority to provide relief in equity and therefore
applied laches rather than statutes of limitations. See Oler, supra note 93, at 350-
51 (collecting cases). The equitable origins of the derivative suit offered further
theoretical support for the use of laches. See Note, Statute of Limitations, supra
note 89, at 847 (On the face of [the equity jurisdiction] rule, it might seem that
a stockholders' derivative suit would never be barred, since such a suit has always
been solely cognizable in equity .... ").
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majority of courts embraced the "concurrent remedy" theory,
which ultimately spelled the end for the laches defense in
corporate fiduciary litigation. Under this view, a court sitting
in equity could substitute laches for limitations only where its
equity jurisdiction was exclusive.95 Where there was a concur-
rent remedy at law, the court was required to apply the statute
of limitations. Not surprisingly, distinctions between laches
and statutes of limitation blurred under this theory." For ex-
ample, by 1970, the Delaware courts were applying the statute
of limitations "whenever plaintiff seeks money in a derivative
suit."8 Thus, despite a somewhat shaky start, courts ulti-
mately recognized and applied statutes of limitation to claims
against corporate fiduciaries.
B. The Underlying Policy Debate: Rules/Standards Tensions
in Limitations and Corporate Law
The substitution of rule-based statutes of limitation for
laches standards was much more than a simple choice about
which time-bar rule should apply. As many scholars have ex-
plained, rules-based modes of decision entail substantially
different jurisprudential and policy considerations than do
standards-based decisional processes.99 Indeed, as Professor
95 Note, Statute of Limitations, supra note 89, at 844. See generally 2 SPENCER
W. SYMONS & JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 419e (5th ed. 1941) ("If ... the cause is one of which courts of chancery take
exclusive cognizance, the statute [of limitations] will not necessarily be applied.").
""Id. See also 3A FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS, supra note 38, § 1303.
See Kahn v. Seaboard Corp., 625 A.2d 269, 273 (Del. Ch. 1993) (Allen,
Chancellor) ("As decades passed, [the distinctions between legal and equity jurisdic-
tion] evolved from every day practical knowledge of lawyers to professional exotica.
By the mid-twentieth century, judges were beginning to grow less comfortable with
those old concepts . . ").
" Id. at 274 (construing Bokat v. Getty Oil Co., 262 A.2d 246 (Del. 1970) and
other cases). The limitations defense was, however, subject to a discovery rule
exception for claims of fraud and self-dealing. This exception is discussed in more
detail infra Part II.C.3.
" For an excellent overview of these issues, see Symposium on Law and Phi-
losophy, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLVY 615 (1991). For an analysis of
rules/standards issues from an economic perspective, see Isaac Ehrlich and Richard
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
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Gail Heriot noted when she recently examined the
rules/standards issues that limitations decisions entail, choos-
ing between statutes of limitation and the laches defense is
akin to choosing between the rigid code-based laws of Solon
and the case-specific discretion with which King Solomon dis-
pensed justice."' The question is, which approach is prefera-
ble to carry out the substantive policy goals of limitations law,
both generally and in corporate fiduciary litigation?
1. The Rules/Standards Debate in Limitations Law
Professor Heriot offers several reasons why bright-line
rules may be the preferred vehicle for carrying out limitations
policies. When applied formalistically, i.e., measuring limita-
tions as a fixed period from the occurrence of defendant's ac-
tionable conduct, statutes of limitation provide better guidance
for adjudication of limitations disputes, and permit their reso-
lution with fewer errors and at lower cost. 1' Strict enforce-
ment of statutes of limitation can also provide better guidance
for conduct, enabling potential defendants to put their resourc-
es to productive uses once the statutory period has passed."e
Bright-line statutes of limitation can even be considered bene-
ficial from plaintiffs' perspective, for by clearly identifying the
point at which claims are barred, such statutes help prevent
premature "panic" filings by plaintiffs."es Moreover, Professor
Heriot argues, statutes of limitation enable legislatures to
achieve a value-neutral compromise between conflicting defen-
dant-focused and plaintiff-focused positions on limitations issues.'"I
rules/standards issues from an economic perspective, see Isaac Ehrlich and Richard
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Ralemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
" Gail L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and
the Doctrine of Laches, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 930-34 (1992).
101 Professor Heriot argues that when rules rather than standards govern adju-
dication, they minimize the costs of "(1) incorrect judgments resulting from mis-
takes in the application of discretion; (2) incorrect judgments resulting from errors
in the fact-finding process; ... and [(3)] administration. Id. at 935-39. Other
scholars have identified similar benefits from the use of rules in a legal system.
See Ebrlich & Posner, supra note 99, at 264-67.
" Heriot, supra note 100, at 940; Ochoa and Tistrich, supra note 24, at 468-
49.
10 Heriot, supra note 100, at 941; Ochoa and Wistrich, supra note 24, at 486.
104 She explains that a potential defendant would want the law to bar any
claim where the passage of time might impair one's ability to defend against it,
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The cost of bright-line rules, as Professor Heriot acknowl-
edges, is that they are both under- and over-inclusive. A rigidly
enforced statute of limitations will bar some claims where
plaintiffs delay in filing suit is reasonable and defendant is
not prejudiced by it, and will permit other claims where plain-
tiff has delayed without good reason and to defendant's detri-
ment."5 The loss of flexibility in adjudication is the trade-off
for the repose and simplicity of administration that bright-line
statutes of limitation make possible.
A time-bar based on laches does not suffer from these
problems. Indeed, that is the beauty of the laches defense:
because it bars litigation only where plaintiff has unreasonably
delayed pursuit of the claim to defendant's detriment, the
laches defense produces more equitable results in individual
cases where limitations issues are raised.' The drawback of
the laches defense is that, as a flexible standard, it is not a
helpful guide for litigants' conduct or judicial decisions. Poten-
tial defendants can never be sure of repose, nor can potential
plaintiffs ever be sure their claims are timely. In any given
case the reasonableness of plaintiff's delay might outweigh the
prejudice to defendant, or vice versa."7 In addition, when
courts decide issues such as the "reasonableness" of plaintiffs
delay or "prejudice" to defendant on a case-by-case basis, they
may misapply these standards in at least some cases.10 8 Fi-
regardless of whether plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to pursue the claim. A
potential plaintiff, on the other hand, would not be concerned about prejudice to
defendants, but rather about preserving a reasonable opportunity to sue. A bright-
line rule (e.g., a statute of limitations barring claims after X years) makes consen-
sus between these two divergent limitations "standard" formulations possible, for
such a rule is, on its face at least, neither defendant- nor plaintiff-focused. That
is, a statute of limitations of X years will not necessarily protect defendants
against all stale claims; nor will it necessarily allow all plaintiffs a reasonable
time to protect their rights. Most of the time, however, it will do both. Heriot,
supra note 100, at 941-43.
105 Heriot, supra note 100, at 937-38. See also Erlich and Posner, supra note
99, at 22 (describing general problems of over-and under-inclusion when rules are
used in place of standards).
106 See, e.g., 1 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 3.3.1, at 182 (describing operation of
laches principles in admiralty cases).
10 See Heriot, supra note 100, at 939 (describing benefits of certainty in limita-
tions rules). See also Erlich and Posner, supra note 99, at 262-63 (describing the
potential "chilling" effect of legal standards on conduct).
10" See Heriot, supra note 100, at 936-37 ("the further one proceeds towards the
standard end of the rule-standard continuum, the greater the likelihood of error in
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nally, to the extent that the proper outcome under laches stan-
dards is bound up with the merits of the claim, a court may
need to try a case in order to decide whether to bar it as
untimely 0 9
The rules/standards debate is evidenced in modern limita-
tions law by the discovery rule. This tolling doctrine replaces
the occurrence rule of accrual with a fact-based standard for
commencing the limitations period: accrual occurs when plain-
tiff "first knows or with due diligence should know facts that
will form the basis for an action."' Use of this more flexible
accrual principle has expanded in recent years from "foreign
object" surgery cases, to malpractice cases generally, as well as
to a host of other categories of litigation where plaintiff may be
"blamelessly ignorant" of the claim at the time defendant's
misconduct occurs."'
Discovery rule advocates contend that tempering bright-
line statutes of limitation with discovery rule standards better
effectuates limitations policy. They argue that legislatures
establish limitations periods assuming that plaintiff will know
of and be able to sue for wrongs committed against him; but
where plaintiff remains blamelessly ignorant of his injury by
the time limitations expires, he is deprived of the opportunity
the legislature intended to provide him to protect his
rights." Under this view, when judges apply the discovery
rule, they restore the unexpressed but implicit sense of balance
the legislature intended to achieve with statutes of limita-
tion."
the application of discretion."). See also Erlich and Posner, supra note 99, at 267
(explaining how rules reduce "mistakes and usurpations by adjudicators).
" See Heriot, supra note 100, at 938 ('The doctrine of laches, which shrouds
little or nothing from the judge's consideration, is more likely to involve significant
administrative costs than the statute of limitations."). See also Ehrlich and Posner,
supra note 99, at 266 ("Decision by standard ... increases the interval between
an incident giving rise to a legal dispute and final judicial resolution of the dis-
pute.").
11 2 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 11.1.1, at 134.
2 CORMAN, supra note 5, §11.1.2.2, at 139-140; Heriot, supra note 100, at
954-960.
12 See, eg., 1 CORMAN, supra note 6, § 7.4.2, at 542-43 (Repose is not inde-
pendent of the other goals of statutes of limitations, however, as these statutes
also recognize plaintiffs' interest in bringing meritorious claims.").
' See, eg., Johnson, supra note 26, at 636. Indeed, commentators have criti-
cized judges who decline to adopt the discovery rule on institutional grounds as
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As described in Part IV of the Article, there are a number
of concerns about the proper scope and use of the discovery
rule. Carried to its logical conclusion, the discovery rule may
entail factual inquiries about plaintiff's actual and constructive
knowledge that effectively reinstate laches standards and
thereby eliminate the ability of statutes of limitation to provide
repose."4 For present purposes, the important point is that,
despite the general triumph of statutes of limitation over la-
ches, the "rules/standards" debate in limitations law has not
completely subsided. Instead, the law has developed other
outlets for at least some of the judicial discretion that the
laches defense would otherwise entail.
2. The Rules/Standards Debate in Corporate Law
Even if one agrees that bright-line statutes of limitation
are more suitable than the laches defense for effectuating limi-
tations policy goals, it is less clear whether the same holds
true for corporate fiduciary litigation. As Chancellor Allen
noted in a recent Delaware limitations decision: "[Wihen we
ask whether the passage of time alone should bar a [suit
against] corporate directors... we are asking a very practical
question whose answer should make practical sense, while
being consistent with our legal traditions.""5 The "traditional
view" of corporate law raises questions about the bright-line
approach that statutes of limitation typically entail.
Under the traditional view, corporations are entities creat-
ed by concession of the state, which reserves the power to
regulate them in the public interest."' Traditionalists sup-
port the use of mandatory corporate governance rules (stat-
"ossified." See Green, supra note 28, at 978. An obvious line of attack on this view
is that the legislature struck what it believed to be the appropriate plaintiff-defen-
dant balance when it established the statute of limitations. See Heriot, supra note
100, at 961-62.
... Indeed, recent discovery rule developments in response to this problem have
significant implications for use of the adverse domination theory in corporate liti-
gation. See infra Part IV.B.1.
... Kahn v. Seaboard Corp., 625 A.2d 269, 275 (Del. Ch. 1993).
116 See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636
(1819) ("A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it. . .).
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utes) to the extent necessary to protect shareholder interests
and achieve other public policy goals, but do not reject judicial
standards."1 The traditional view holds that, as a further
means of accomplishing corporate laws regulatory tasks,
courts properly require corporate managers to discharge their
obligations to the corporation and its shareholders consistently
with fiduciary duties (the duties of care and loyalty).' These
fiduciary duties, derived from trust and agency law, have tra-
ditionally been enforced as fact-based standards rather than
bright-line rules. 9
Consider, for example, corporate directors' and officers'
fiduciary duty of loyalty, which prohibits their "use of corpo-
rate position to make a personal profit or gain other personal
advantage."'  In the seminal case of Guth v. Loft," the
Delaware Supreme Court described this duty in the following
terms: "The occasions for the determination of honesty, good
faith and loyal conduct are many and varied, and no hard and
fast rule can be formulated. The standard of loyalty is mea-
sured by no fixed scale." 's
117 See, e.g., ADOLF BERLE, JR. & GARDINER ]EmS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (justifying corporate law rules that protect share-
holder interests based on the separation of ownership from control in modern
public corporations). Some contemporary scholars advocate broader regulatory goals
for corporate law. See, e.g., PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell,
ed., 1995).
"' See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 1, §4.1, at 141 (describing duty of loyalty as a
"residual concept that can include factual situations that no one has foreseen and
categorized.").
" For a description of the trust and agency law roots of corporate fiduciary
duties under this view, see Victor Brudney, Corporate Gouernance, Agency Costs,
and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUm. L. REV. 1403, 1407-08 n.15 and accompa-
nying text (1985).
10 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS Introductory Note to § 4.01, 137 (1994) [hereinafter PRIN-
CIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]. The duty of loyalty might also he expressed
as "a duty in good faith to act in the best interests of the corporation." BRANSON,
supra note 67, § 8.02 at 394. See also IBCA § 8.30(a)(1) & (3).
5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
' Id- at 510. The fiduciary duty of care is also enforced by standards that
require corporate directors and officers to perform their functions "with the care
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances." MBCA § 8.30(a)(2). See also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 120, § 4.01(a). While the business judgment rule qualifies this open-
ended standard somewhat, it does so with judicially created standards rather than
bright-line rules. See Official Comment to MBCA § 8.30 ("he elements of the
business judgment rule and the circumstances for its application are continuing to
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While such open-ended legal duties offer little guidance for
either conduct or adjudication, traditionalists offer several
justifications. First, and as the preceding quote from Guth
suggests, standards are superior to rules as an enforcement
mechanism because one cannot readily contemplate all of the
possible situations in which fiduciary breaches might arise.
Second, when expressed as standards, fiduciary duties serve an
aspirational function.' Finally, without open-ended fiduciary
duties, shareholders might be reluctant to participate in a
corporate relationship in which they necessarily cede all signif-
icant means of control over their collective welfare to elected
managers.'
Formalistic application of statutes of limitation to
claims against corporate directors and officers ignores their
open-ended fiduciary obligations to further shareholder wel-
fare. As Chancellor Allen explained:
The corporate shareholder commits capital to the supervision and
management of the corporate board. In doing so the shareholder be-
comes dependent upon the skill and loyalty of those in control of the
corporate enterprise. Legally sanctioned relationships of dependence
and trust are important for the law to enforce for both instrumental
and expressive reasons. Given the fiduciary duties that the law
imposes upon the relationship among those serving as corporate
directors, stockholders are entitled to rely on the good faith of the
directors when they act with respect to the corporation's property or
processes. There is, of course, great social utility in the willingness
of some to trust others in this way. Since trust and good faith are
the essence of this relationship, it would be corrosive and contra-
dictory for the law to punish reasonable reliance on that good faith
by applying the statute of limitations woodenly or automatically to
that "the business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation." PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 4.01(c).
1 As the Washington Supreme Court observed in State ex rel. Hayes Oyster
Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 391 P.2d 979, 983 (Wash. 1964): "fidelity in the agent,
and not merely prevention of harm to the principal, is the law's goal." One might
question whether rigid, code-based approaches to the duty of loyalty, such as the
ABA has proposed can accomplish that same end. See MBCA §§ 8.60-8.63 (1989).
2 See generally Brudney, supra note 119.
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[claims against directors].Y
Indeed, from the corporate law traditionalistes perspective, an
arbitrary time bar on enforcement may inappropriately blunt
fiduciary duties' deterrent and aspirational functions. The
flexible defense of laches seems more congruent with the
"standards" that these duties traditionally represent.
There is, of course, an alternative view of corporate law
that is more firmly rooted in bright-line rules. Scholars in the
law and economics movement have in recent years advanced a
contractual paradigm to explain the law of corporations. From
this perspective, the corporation is not so much a creature of
the state as a web of voluntary economic relationships among
managers, shareholders, creditors, suppliers, employees, cus-
tomers and others that coalesce in a "nexus of contracts."'
Under this "contractarian" view of corporations, the role of
corporate statutes is not to establish mandatory rules for
shareholders and managers, but instead to create "off the rack"
corporate governance provisions for them to use. Shareholders
and managers should remain free to "opt out" of these corpo-
rate law default rules if they choose to do so.'
The contractarian view has important implications for the
role of standards in corporate law. Contractarians contend that
competitive economic forces, including the prospect for corpo-
rate takeovers of poorly-managed firms, the labor market for
corporate managers, and shareholders' ability to diversify their
investments, all minimize the importance of fiduciary duties
corporate managers owe to shareholders. 28  Thus,
contractarians argue, participants in the corporation should be
free to "opt out" of such duties. To the extent that
contractarians support application of fiduciary principles as a
matter of choice by corporate participants, they tend to reject
broad and open-ended formulations, and instead prefer inter-
pretations that (consistent with the contractual paradigm)
22 Kahn v. Seaboard Corp., 625 A.2d 269, 275 (Del Ch. 1993).
See generally Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11
GEo. MASON L. REV. 99, 99 (1989). The seminal work outlining contractual and
related economic explanations of corporate law that compete with the traditional
model is FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R FISCHEr, THE ECONOMC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
EASTERBROOK & FIScHEL, supra note 126, at 34-35.
'" EASTEIRROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 126, at 90-93.
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effectuate the likely intent of the parties had they bargained
over them.' The more limited role for standards is intended
to increase predictability and certainty in corporate law, a
result that not only conforms with contractarians' preference
for private ordering, but also reduces the liability exposure of
corporate managers and thus promotes what contractarians
contend is desirable risk-taking by corporate enterprises.
A number of recent developments are arguably consistent
with the contractual model of corporate law. Corporation codes
have become increasingly permissive in character.' The du-
ty of loyalty has become more "rule-based," as legislatures have
authorized procedures that help immunize conflict of interest
transactions from attack.' Moreover, in many jurisdictions,
corporate statutes now authorize charter provisions through
which shareholders may waive the corporation's right to im-
pose monetary liability on directors for most breaches of the
duty of care.'32 In short, as Professor John Coffee has ob-
served, the "fiduciary strictures of American corporate law,"
have "shrunk significantly" during this century.'33 Viewed in
this light, the substitution of statutes of limitation for laches in
corporate litigation echoes modern corporate law's greater
1" EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 126, at 92 (describing the fiduciary
principle as "a rule for completing incomplete bargains in contractual struc-
ture . . ").
13 For example, the Delaware General Corporation Law and the MBCA, both of
which have served as templates for corporate statutes in many states, eliminate
traditionally mandatory corporate governance rules like preemptive rights and
cumulative voting. See, e.g., MBCA §§ 6.30, 7.28; Del. Gen. Corp. L. §§ 161, 214
(1991).
131 See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 144 (1991); MBCA §§ 8.31-8.32 (now supersed-
ed by MBCA §§ 8.60-8.63). But see Ahmed Bulbulia and Arthur R. Pinto, Statutory
Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary
Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 201 (1977) (arguing that despite statutory
provisions governing interested directors' transactions which allow a director to
bypass fairness considerations if he obtains boara or shareholder approval, the
courts should continue to apply the fairness test to prevent oppression of the mi-
nority shareholders).
' See, e.g., MBCA § 2.02(b)(4); Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 102(b)(7) (1991). See gener-
ally James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and
Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207 (1988) (argu-
ing that shareholders are equipped to make well-informed decisions on limiting the
liability of directors and officers, thus eliminating the need for the legislature to
conduct further cost/benefit analysis in most circumstances).
"3 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An
Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1621 (1989).
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emphasis on bright-line rules and the concomitant relaxation
of fiduciary standards.
Yet, these "contractarian" trends have not ended the argu-
ments in corporate law about the need for both mandatory
rules and open-ended fiduciary standards. Debate continues
about the validity of the contractual paradigm for corporate
law, in part because of challenges to its "bargaining" model
and in part because its explanatory power is not complete.'
Moreover, since many disagree with implicit normative as-
sumptions of the law and economics movement, the case for
mandatory standards in corporate law will not likely rest any
time soon.'
3. Implications of the Rules/Standards Debate for the
Statute of Limitations Defense in Corporate Fiduciary
Litigation
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the substitution
of statutes of limitation for the laches defense in corporate
fiduciary litigation represents much more than a change of
labels. Statutes of limitation represent a bright-line rules ap-
proach to the limitations defense rather than a fact-based
standard. Strict enforcement of such statutes fosters underly-
ing repose values better than laches standards, but at the
expense of flexibility in adjudication of limitations disputes.
Indeed, the emergence of the discovery rule suggests that such
flexibility remains an important value in limitations jurispru-
dence.
Perhaps more importantly, the substitution of statutes of
limitation for laches may contradict corporate law's traditional
reliance on open-ended fiduciary duties to protect shareholders
from abuse by corporate managers. Without case-specific inqui-
'' See, eg., Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary DutieA in JOHN W.
PRATr & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUsER, PRINCiAls AND AGENTS: THE STR=U OF
BuSINESS 66-69 (1985) (arguing that legal relationships in the modem public cor-
poration are not primarily the product of actual contracts); William W. Bratton,
The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual Corporation, 87 NW. U. L. REV.
180, 193-97 (1992) (arguing that the failure of the corporate law of takeovers to
develop in conformity to the nexus-of-contracts model's predictions "show[s] em-
phatically that corporate law does not always instantiate contractual norms").
' See, eg., Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Cor-
porate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEL L. REV. 865, 891-96 (1990).
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ries as to whether a particular corporate fiduciary claim should
be time-barred, how can courts protect corporations and their
shareholders from fiduciaries who decline to police their own
derelictions in a timely fashion? Corporate fiduciary law's de-
terrent and aspirational function may be blunted if statutes of
limitation impose arbitrary time limits on its enforcement.
On the other hand, corporate fiduciaries have no less need
for repose than do other defendants, and if courts must balance
equities to determine the time bar in every case, meaningful
repose will not be possible. Moreover, such a balancing test
ignores the societal interest in limitations rules and the grow-
ing importance of rules in corporate law generally.
In short, persistent rules/standards tensions in both limi-
tations law and corporate law suggest that the substitution of
statutes of limitation for laches standards in corporate fiducia-
ry litigation is problematic. The following discussion, which
describes how courts have administered statutes of limitation
in corporate fiduciary litigation, and in particular the doctrinal
roots of the adverse domination theory, confirms that intuition.
As will be seen, for as long as courts have applied statutes of
limitation in corporate fiduciary cases, they have preserved
outlets for the exercise of judicial discretion. Viewed in this
light, adverse domination tolling standards may be more con-
sistent with corporate law traditions than a departure from
them.
C. Application of Statutes of Limitation in Corporate
Fiduciary Litigation and the Roots of the Adverse
Domination Theory
1. Choice of Limitations Rule and Defining Accrual
Today, in the wake of the concurrent remedy theory, it is
difficult to find cases where courts apply the laches defense to
claims against corporate fiduciaries.136 Because most states
have not adopted an express statute of limitations for such
' A rare but recent example is McDuffie v. O'Neal, 476 S.E.2d 702, 708 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1996) (concluding, in a shareholder derivative action that also sought
dissolution: "[This is an action in equity, and only the doctrine of laches, not the
statute of limitations, applies.").
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cases, however, two outlets for judicial discretion remain.'
In the absence of legislative direction, courts are free to decide
which limitations rule (e.g., the limitations period for tort cases
or for breach of contract cases) should apply to corporate fidu-
ciary claims, and when the corporate cause of action "accrued"
under the statute."5 As already described, the latter is the
most critical limitations decision in corporate fiduciary litiga-
tion, and courts making it have traditionally adhered to the
occurrence rule.'39
2. Tolling Until Discovery in Fraud and Fraudulent
Concealment Cases
Nonetheless, the prevailing "occurrence" definition of ac-
crual is subject to two long-standing exceptions in corporate
cases and in litigation generally. Where defendant is alleged to
have engaged in fraud or has fraudulently concealed her
wrongdoing from plaintiff, the court postpones accrual until
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered her cause of ac-
tion."4 Although these well-established discovery rule excep-
tions to the occurrence rule have frequently been lumped to-
gether under the "equitable tolling" heading, they are separate
and distinct tolling theories.' In fraud cases, courts apply
the discovery rule because defendant's actionable conduct is so
inherently deceptive that plaintiff may not learn of her injury
until long after the offense is completed." In fraudulent con-
' See discussion infra Part V.B.1-2. of existing statutes of limitation that ex-
pressly apply to corporate fiduciary claims.
I The range of judicial options is necessarily limited to statutorily-precribed
time periods, however, which rarely exceed six years. As in other areas of law,
many factors influence a court's decision on the appropriate limitations provision.
See generally 1 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 4.1.
See supra Part IJA
*" For a discussion of the fraud and fraudulent concealment exceptions in cor-
porate cases, see Note, Statute of Limitations, supra note 89, at 854-56; 3A
FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS, supra note 38, § 1306.10. For a discussion of these
exceptions in litigation generally, see 2 CORMAN, supra note 6, §§ 9.7 & 11.5.
1.. See Johnson, supra note 26, at 646-55. These exceptions are further distinct
from a third statute of limitations doctrine that is even more limited in scope:
equitable estoppeL Under this last concept, the court can preclude the defendant
from asserting a limitations defense where plaintiff was aware of the claim, but
defendant induced plaintiff to delay its pursuit. See 2 CORMAN, supra note 5,
§ 9.1.
1 See, eg., Johnson, supra note 26, at 635-36 (fThe grounds for suspending the
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cealment cases, courts withhold repose not only because of
plaintiffs discovery problems, but also because defendant
caused those problems by intentionally concealing her wrong-
doing after the fact (whether the wrong was initially fraudu-
lent or not), thereby reducing her legitimate expectations of re-
pose. 4'
Both the fraud and fraudulent concealment exceptions are
fairly narrow, of course, and one finds relatively few cases that
invoke them to suspend limitations against corporate officers
and directors.' They are noteworthy here because they en-
able courts to avoid formalistic application of statutes of limi-
tation. While one might question the source of courts' power to
apply such exceptions, its exercise is arguably consistent with
assumed legislative objectives.'45 Such assumptions are un-
necessary in most jurisdictions, because legislatures have gen-
erally codified the fraud and fraudulent concealment excep-
tions. 4 '
Whether judicially created or sanctioned by statute, these
statute were not simply the plaintiffs ignorance of claims, but the fact that the
claim itself was both the result of a deliberate defrauding effort by the defendant
and, by its very nature, difficult to detect." (citing Note, Developments in the
Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1220 (1950)).
1 Johnson, supra note 26, at 636. Explaining judicial recognition of the fraud
exception on the theory that:
[t]hrough the process of divining one of the vital (but unstated) premises
of limitations periods-a proper aspect of interpreting a statute-repose
was judicially thought to be legislatively regarded as a contingent value,
one reserved only for defendants whose dereliction had not simply been
committed a specified period of time before, but which had been un-
earthed (and unchallenged) for that entire period. Believing legislators
took that background assumption for granted, judges did too.
Johnson, supra note 26, at 636 (emphasis in original). See also Johnson, supra
note 26, at 653 (explaining judicial recognition of the fraudulent concealment ex-
ception on the theory that "Uiudges thought that, in enacting limitations periods,
legislators had addressed only the question of granting repose for one-shot wrong-
ful behavior and that they did not intend to confer repose on defendants commit-
ting secondary misdeeds, particularly where the very object of the later wrong was
to hide the earlier.").
14 Several sources collect cases. See, e.g., 3A FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS, supra
note 38, § 1306.10; Note, Statute of Limitations, supra note 89, at 854-56.
"4 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 26, at 636 (arguing that if legislatures intend
the limitations bar to operate only where plaintiff is aware of the claim, or only
where defendant has legitimate expectations of repose, the fraud and fraudulent
concealment exceptions seem appropriate vehicles to implement those policies).
1" Johnson, supra note 26, at 636.
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tolling exceptions are also important because they require
courts to apply the discovery rule in the corporate setting, and
in both fraud and fraudulent concealment cases, the courts
have had trouble doing so. For example, the courts have long
disagreed about whether knowledge of claims by one or more
disinterested directors constitutes discovery by the corporation
or whether a majority of the corporation's board must be both
disinterested and aware of the claim before corporate "discov-
ery" will occur.'47 Such disagreements foreshadow the majori-
ty/single disinterested director split in adverse domination
cases.
148
3. Delaware's "Shareholder Discovery Rule" for Derivative
Suits
As Chancellor Allen recently explained in his decision in
Kahn v. Seaboard Corporation,' the Delaware courts have
adopted an additional discovery rule tolling exception for
shareholder derivative litigation. Extrapolating from older
Delaware cases that applied the laches defense to claims of
self-dealing or more serious misconduct by corporate fiducia-
ries,' o modem Delaware courts hold that where a sharehold-
er derivative suit alleges that corporate fiduciaries have en-
gaged in (i) fraud or fraudulent concealment, or (ii) actionable
self dealing, the statute of limitations begins to run from the
time the plaintiff shareholder, or shareholders of the corpora-
tion generally, discovered or should have discovered the basis
for the claims in the exercise of reasonable diligence."5'
147 As one commentator observed over 50 years ago: 'The chief problem [with a
discovery rule in fraud and fraudulent concealment cases] ... is as to whose
knowledge constitutes knowledge to the 'corporation! sufficient to start the running
of the statute." Note, Statute of Limitations, supra note 89, at 854. Compare, e.g.,
Curtis v. Connly, 257 U.S. 260, 264 (1921) (Notice to an officer, in the line of his
duty, was notice to the bank. A single director like a single stockholder could
proceed in the courts."), with Grussemeyer v. Harper, 60 P.2d 702, 703 (Wash.
1936) ([The corporation and its stockholders had notice of the facts... from the
time that these respondents' trustees retired and were succeeded by a new
board ... .
1"8 See supra notes 54-56, 83 and accompanying text.
9 625 A.2d 269 (Del. Ch. 1993).
1"0 See, e.g., Bovay v. H.MI Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808 (Del. 1944).
m Kahn, 625 A.2d at 276-77. See generally, Staff Article, An Increasing Role for
Statute of Limitations in Courts of Equity: Kahn v. Seaboard Corp. and In re
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Although apparently limited to shareholder derivative
actions, this judicial modification of the Delaware statute of
limitations defense is important for at least three reasons.
First, Chancellor Allen justifies the tolling exception in Kahn
based on the "traditional view" of corporate law fiduciary du-
ties.'52 Second, the exception includes tolling for claims alleg-
ing self-dealing by corporate fiduciaries, and thus extends be-
yond the parameters of the traditional fraud and fraudulent
concealment tolling exceptions. Third, and finally, the excep-
tion avoids the difficulties of the "corporate discovery" inquiry
by focusing solely on shareholder knowledge.'53
4. The Early Domination and Control Cases
There are also a handful of cases dating from the turn of
the century that recognize a broader "control: or "domination"
tolling exception to the occurrence rule of accrual in corporate
fiduciary litigation. In the earliest reported case, National
Bank of Commerce v. Wade,"s the court concluded that "dom-
ination" or "control" of a bank by its directors and managing
officers justified tolling limitations for the bank's claims
against them until they relinquished control to their succes-
sors.'55 Wade and decisions following it offered three reasons
for such an exception to the normal occurrence rule: (i) while
one or more directors control a corporation, the entity is, as a
practical matter, unable to sue them;5 ' (ii) such directors
USACafes, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 493 (1994).
152 Kahn, 625 A.2d at 275 ("In functional terms there are good reasons why a
corporate stockholder ought to be treated differently than a plaintiff who is a
stranger to the defendant from whom he seeks compensation for a tort. That good
reason arises out of the assigned roles of stockholder and director in our corpora-
tion law."). See also supra note 125 and accompanying text (quoting from the
Kahn decision).
15 It is not clear whether the Delaware courts would apply the same discovery
concept in direct corporate actions, however. See Safecard Serv., Inc. v. Halmos,
912 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Wyo. 1996) (predicting the Delaware courts would apply the
adverse domination tolling theory in such cases).
'u 84 F. 10 (C.C.D. Wash. 1897).
1 Although influenced by the "trust" analogy, the court suspended limitations
primarily on the basis of control by defendant directors. Id. at 15.
'" See, e.g., Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. 1010, 1016 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1907) ("[]n
consequence of [defendants] having full control of the corporation no suit could be
brought . . . "); Ventress v. Wallace, 71 So. 636, 641 (Miss. 1916) ('[Iln the very
nature of things this suit could not have been filed any earlier.").
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have a duty to disclose or police their own misconduct, which
they breach by failing to take action against themselves;' 7
and (iii) such directors or their appointed officers are the only
means for the corporation to acquire notice of its claims
against them.' These are essentially the same arguments
courts have used in modern adverse domination cases, argu-
ments this Article examines along with other justifications for
the adverse domination theory in Part I.
From a historical perspective, there are not enough deci-
sions to permit any firm conclusions about the general accep-
tance of this theory prior to the recent bank and thrift crisis.
Most of-the early cases applying a domination and control
tolling rationale involved failed banks, and all presented cir-
cumstances where the "occurrence" rule of accrual would have
barred a corporate entity's claims against its allegedly respon-
sible fiduciaries. 9 The Second Circuit acknowledged the ex-
istence of a federal domination and control tolling theory in
two antitrust cases in the 1960s, but each time declined to find
the theory applicable on the facts."o Indeed, it was in one of
' See, e.g., Ventress, 71 So. at 640-41 ("As a part of their duties, [the defen-
dant directors] alone could determine the propriety of any suit at law or equity,
and were alone charged with the authority to institute such suits ... It is true
that the stockholders have their annual or periodic meeting.... but at these
meetings they looked to the directors, their agents, for a true and correct account
of their stewardship . . . ").
1"8 See, e.g., i. at 641 ('If anyone had notice of the negligence complained of, it
is these directors themselves ... ."). See also, eg., Farmer v. Standeven, 93 F.2d
959, 962 (10th Cir. 1937) (Symes, J., dissenting) (applying Oklahoma law); Beal v.
Smith, 189 P. 341, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920); Whitten v. Dabney, 154 P. 312, 315-
16 (Cal. 1915); Bilby v. Morton, 247 P. 384, 387-88 (Okla. 1925).
' In addition to the authorities cited in notes 155-158, supra, all of which
involved failed finanical service institutions and banks, the following list includes
all of the principal authorities endorsing a domination and control tolling theory
as a matter of state law: Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 415-16 (2d Cir.
1943) (applying New York law in a failed bank case); Adams v. Clarke, 22 F.2d
957, 959 (9th Cir. 1927) (applying Montana law in a failed bank case); Schilling v.
Parman, 35 F.2d 780, 780-81 (D. Or. 1928) (deciding a failed bank case); Greenleaf
v. Profile Cotton Mills, 180 So. 582, 583 (Ala. 1938); San Leandro Canning Co.,
Inc. v. Perillo, 295 P. 1026, 1028 (Cal. 1931); Bates St. Shirt Co. v. Waite, 156 A.
293, 297 (Me. 1931); Allen v. Wilkerson, 396 S.W.2d 493, 502 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965).
"' See International Rys. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408, 412-17 (2d Cir.
1967); Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1961).
Two district courts endorsed and applied the domination and control theory to toll
limitations for a corporation's securities claims. Saylor v. Lindsley, 302 F. Supp.
1174, 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Austrian v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64, 113-17
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these decisions that Judge Friendly first coined the term "ad-
verse domination."'61
These early domination and control cases are nonetheless
instructive for several reasons. First, they endorsed a tolling
doctrine that was the clear forbearer of the modern adverse
domination theory. Second, like the fraud, fraudulent conceal-
ment, and Delaware tolling exceptions, the domination and
control cases preserved the use of judicial standards to resolve
certain limitations disputes in corporate fiduciary litigation.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the domination and
control cases departed further from rule-based statutes of limi-
tation than did any of the other judicial tolling concepts ap-
plied in corporate fiduciary litigation.
Some courts invoked the domination and control tolling
exception to identify the point of corporate "discovery" of claims
in cases alleging fraud or fraudulent concealment, where, as
already explained, the discovery rule generally defines accru-
al.'62 But other courts applied the theory more broadly as a
"disability" tolling exception or as a discovery rule exception
for claims that did not allege fraud or fraudulent concealment,
but did raise allegations of self-dealing or other illegality."6
A number of courts applied the theory to even less serious
claims, like negligent mismanagement."6
The early domination and control decisions are also signifi-
(S.D.N.Y.). In all of these cases the courts concluded that a domination and control
tolling doctrine was subsumed within the general "equitable tolling" principle that
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946), held would be "read into every
federal statute of limitation." Since the latter tolling principle refers to the discov-
ery rule for claims of fraud or fraudulent concealment, see Johnson, supra note 26,
at 647-50, it is not at all clear that the domination and control theory should be
so readily included within it, however.
... Mouiecolor, 288 F.2d at 88.
12 See, e.g., Farmer v. Standeven, 93 F.2d 959, 963 (10th Cir. 1937) (Symes, J.,
dissenting) (applying Oklahoma law); Whitten v. Dabney, 154 P. 312, 315-16 (Cal.
1915); Beal v. Smith, 189 P. 341, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1920); Bilby v. Morton, 247
P. 384, 387 (Okla. 1925).
" See, e.g., Greenleaf v. Profile Cotton Mills, 180 So. 582, 583 (Ala. 1938)
(theft of funds); San Leandro Canning Co., Inc. v. Perillo, 295 P. 1026, 1028 (Cal.
1931) (improper commission payments); Bates St. Shirt Co. v. Waite, 156 A. 293,
297 (Me. 1991) (allegedly unlawful salaries).
16 See, e.g., Michelsen v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 415-16 (2d Cir. 1943); Rankin
v. Cooper, 149 F. 1010, 1016 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1907); Ventress v. Wallace, 71 So.
636, 641 (Miss. 1916).
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cant because, in many cases from this era, courts expressly de-
clined to adopt such an exception to the occurrence rule on the
ground that they lacked authority to do so.' Expressing sim-
ilar authority concerns, other courts narrowly construed the
domination and control concept once they recognized it, holding
that majority control of the board by defendant directors (as
opposed to total control) did not prevent accrual of a
corporation's claim, again foreshadowing the current majority
disinterested director/single disinterested director split in ad-
verse domination cases."ca
5. Doctrinal Hiatus
Aside from the theories and decisions described above, the
issue of tolling limitations does not seem to have arisen with
great frequency in corporate fiduciary litigation prior to the
"6 See, e.g., Squire v. Guardian Trust Co., 72 N.E.2d 137, 147 (Ohio Ct. App.
1947) ("In the absence of statute or controlling authority, the doctrine of continu-
ing domination will be rejected as a basis for tolling the statute of limitations.");
Mobley v. Faircloth, 164 S.E. 195, 196 (Ga. 1932) ('The General Assembly deemed
[the examination duties of state banking regulators] sufficient and appropriate
protection to all persons interested in or dealing with banhs chartered by this
state."); Pietsch v. Milbrath, 101 N.W. 388, 393 (Wis. 1904), overruled by Peters v.
Kell; 106 N.W. 2d 407 (Wis. 1960) ('While counsel earnestly insist that under such
circumstances the statutes of limitation ought not to apply, no authority is cited to
our attention varying the unqualified language of such statutes.... [Tihere is no
exception to the rule of the statute to fit a case of this sort.").
Other authorities rejecting the adverse domination theory include Laird v.
United Shipyards, 163 F.2d 12, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1947) (applying New York law);
Bluefields S.S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 F. 1, 20 (3d Cir. 1917) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Department. of Banking v. McMullen, 278 N.W. 651, 554-55
(Neb. 1938); Hart v. Guardian Trust Co., 76 N.E.2d 570, 586 (Ohio Ct. C.D.
Cuyahaga Oty. 1945); Jones M fining Co. v. Cardiff Mining & Milling Co., 191 P.
426, 430-31, rev'd, 72 N.E. 2d 137 (1947) (Utah 1920). Still other courts failed to
decide whether to accept or reject adverse domination on the ground that it would
be inapplicable on the facts in any event. See, e.g., Payne v. Ostrus, 50 F.2d 1039,
1042 (8th Cir. 1931) (applying Iowa law); Hughes v. Reed, 46 F.2d 435, 441-42
(10th Cir. 1931) (applying Oklahoma law).
16 See, e.g., Anderson v. Gailey, 33 F.2d 689, 592 (N.D. Ga. 1929). Indeed
courts generally disagreed whether majority control was sufficient to suspend limi-
tations under the domination and control rationale. Compare, e-g., Smith v. Lyle,
241 N.W. 512, 513 (S.D. 1932) (majority control sufficient to preclude corporation's
discovery of claim against its directors), and Mencher v. Richards, 9 N.Y..2d 990,
993 (App. Div. 1939) (same), with McNair v. Burt, 68 F.2d 814, 816 (6th Cir.
1934) (election of new directors sufficient to start limitations), and Van Schaick v.
Aron, 10 N.Y.S.2d 550, 560 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (same).
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bank and thrift crisis of the 1980s. There are several possible
reasons for this. First, with the adoption of federal securities
laws in the 1930s, shareholders of public corporations had
greater and more rapid access to information about potential
claims against corporate fiduciaries, 167 and also enjoyed
remedies against them that did not hinge on the corporation's
knowledge or ability to sue."s Second, for corporate claims
pursued through derivative litigation, weapons such as securi-
ties for expenses statutes, special standing requirements and
tle demand rule emerged, and thus may have obviated the
need for corporate fiduciaries to rely on limitations defens-
es. "'69 Third, in the close corporation context, courts began to
recognize the right of individual shareholders to pursue relief
against corporate managers on a variety of theories that did
not involve the right of the corporation as an entity. 7 ' Collec-
tively, these developments may have relieved pressure for the
relaxation of limitations rules in corporate fiduciary litigation
during the decades that preceded the bank and thrift crisis.
Yet, as the foregoing history and policy review demon-
strates, the difficult theoretical and practical questions that
emerge when statutes of limitation bar enforcement of corpo-
rate fiduciary claims are not new. These issues are particularly
problematic in receivership settings, which in modern times
include bankruptcy litigation and other specialized insolvency
venues applicable to regulated corporations. The trend has
been for courts to provide relief through tolling in exceptional
cases, but the parameters of an "exceptional case" have never
been clearly defined. The bank and thrift debacle has now
refocused the attention of both courts and litigants on this
problem, and in particular, on the merits of the adverse domi-
1" For example, the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq., imposed
significant mandatory disclosure obligations on management of corporations that
made public securities offerings. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a et seq., imposes similar obligations on all companies whose securities were
publicly traded.
1" See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994), providing remedy to security purchasers for
material misstatements and omissions in registration statement. The remedy al-
lows the security purchaser to sue, inter alia, directors of the issuer.
19 See generally SOLOMON, supra note 88, at 1047-1115.
170 See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). See
generally F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS ch.7 (2d ed. 1985).
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nation tolling theory, the issue to which the Article now turns.
III. THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF THE ADVERSE DOMINATION
TOLLING THEORY
This Part of the Article explains and critiques the several
rationales that litigants and courts have traditionally advanced
to support adverse domination tolling standards. Each ratio-
nale combines an existing limitations tolling theory with corpo-
rate fiduciary law, and is persuasive if one is willing to take an
expansive view of the latter. This Part also demonstrates how
the varied sources of doctrinal support for adverse domination
explain some of the conflicting positions courts have taken
when asked to apply its tolling standards. As will be shown,
however, doctrinal analysis does not explain all of the conflict-
ing positions, nor does it explain the pattern in which those
positions have developed.
A. Rationales for the Adverse Domination Theory
1. Disability Arguments
In most jurisdictions, statutes of limitation do not run
against certain categories of "disabled" litigants who are inca-
pable of protecting their rights, like minors, mental incompe-
tents, or incarcerated persons. 71 Many courts have offered
similar justifications for tolling limitations under the adverse
domination theory, i.e., that a corporation is "disabled" from
bringing any claims that might implicate its directors in
wrongdoing (whether the claims are against the corporation's
directors, its officers or third parties) during the period of such
directors' control.'72
17 See 2 CORMAN, supra note 5, §§ 10.2, 10.4 & 10.5.
1 One finds this rationale advanced in both contemporary and early adverse
domination decisions. See, eg., RTC v. Grant, 901 P.2d 807, 810 (Okla. 1995)
("The rationale for [adverse domination] is that control of the board by wrongdoers
precludes the possibility for filing suit. .. ."); Rankin v. Cooper, 149 F. 1010, 1016
(C.C. W.n. Ark 1907) ("[W1n consequence of [the defendant directors] having full
control of the corporation no suit could be brought... until a receiver was ap-
pointed."). The rationale is perhaps expressed most clearly in RTC v. Fiala, 870 F.
Supp. 962, 973 (E.D. Mo. 1994): "Based on these principles, where a suit arises in
the context of control by wrongdoers of the entity that would have initiated the
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From a technical corporate law perspective, the logic of the
disability rationale for adverse domination is straightforward.
The power to manage a corporation is vested in its board of
directors, so that members of the board are in a position to
control or "dominate" the corporation's decisions about who and
when to sue. 73 Of course, corporate boards rarely make for-
mal decisions expressly declining to pursue claims that might
implicate one or more board members before limitations on
such claims expire. Nonetheless, a board's failure to timely
litigate such claims achieves the same result. And since mem-
bers of the board owe the corporation and its shareholders a
duty of undivided loyalty,74 a duty courts have traditionally
enforced by subjecting board decisions to exacting scrutiny
where the interests of its members conflict with those of the
corporation, 175 one can legimitately question the board's pow-
er to bind the corporation in this regard. Thus, adverse domi-
action, but could not, it is the same as if the entity is suffering from an incapaci-
ty. Therefore [adverse domination tolling should apply]."
,73 See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION
139 (1976) ("Under the received legal model of the corporation, the board of direc-
tors manages the corporation's business and sets business policy; indeed, this as-
pect of the model is reflected in a central provision of the traditional corporate
statutes: 'The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board
of directors.' ").
"u Committee on Corporate Laws, American Bar Association, Corporate
Director's Guidebook, 33 BUS. LAw. 1591, 1599 (1978) ("By assuming his office, the
corporate director commits allegiance to the enterprise and acknowledges that the
best interests of the corporation and its shareholders must prevail over any indi-
vidual interest of his own. The basic principle to be observed is that the director
should not use his corporate position to make a personal profit or gain other per-
sonal advantage.").
... See, e.g., Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and
Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 36-7 (1966) (describing traditional view that
interested director transactions were voidable without regard to fairness). But see
Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr. The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty:
Understanding the Self-Interested Directors Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 655,
659-62 (1992) (challenging Professor Marsh's reading of the case law). While mod-
em corporate law has reduced the strictures of the duty of loyalty to some degree,
its core remains intact. For example, where a board of directors acts while subject
to a conflict of interest and its decision has not been approved by disinterested
directors or shareholders, its decision is not protected by the business judgment
rule, but is instead subject to searching court review for compliance with fairness
standards. See, e.g., MBCA § 8.31; Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 144 (same). Even where
statutory approval steps are followed, some jurisdictions still require a fairness re-
view. See, e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976); Remillard Brick Co.
v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
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nation tolling can be viewed as judicial recognition of a
corporation's decisional "disability" with respect to litigation
matters that implicate its board members, at least during the
period of their control.
Indeed, precedent on the issue of demand futili-
ty-whether shareholders are excused from seeking board of
directors' permission before instituting derivative litiga-
tion-directly supports the disability rationale for adverse
domination. While the standard for finding demand futility
varies depending on the court's understanding of the purpose
of the demand requirement, 76 the prospect of director liabili-
ty will at some point excuse the shareholder from making de-
mand on the board.'77 For similar reasons, courts allow com-
mittees of directors to settle derivative or other intracorporate
litigation claims against their fellow board members, but only
where the committee members satisfy requisite standards of
independence and disinterest with respect to the litigation. 7 '
Of course, the very existence of special litigation commit-
tees reveals a potential problem with the disability rationale
for adverse domination: a corporate board can act where less
than all directors have a conflict of interest. The board can
simply refer the matter to one or more of its disinterested
members, who can then decide the issue.' Adverse domina-
tion decisions applying the "single disinterested director" ver-
sion of the theory may implicitly take this possibility into ac-
count.8 Yet, there is an important distinction between a
1"8 Some jurisdictions view the demand rule as primarily a procedural device to
encourage intracorporate dispute resolution, while others view it as a recognition
of the substantive power of the board of directors. DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHARE-
HOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS LAW AND PRACTIcE § 5:09, at 29-31 (1987). Differenc-
es in demand futility standards are in part a function of different understandings
of the demand requirement. I& § 5:13, at 52.
17 See, eg., Kaufman v. Belmont, 479 A.2d 282, 286-87 (DeL Ch. 1984) (Dela-
ware futility standards require plaintiff to allege with particularity facts 'that
show that a reasonable doubt exists that the directors were not sufficiently disin-
terested or independent to have entertained a pre-suit demand. ... 7).
' See, e.g., DEMOTT, supra note 176, § 5:23 (discussing requirement that litiga-
tion committees maintain "independence").
17, See, e.g., MBCA § 8.25 (describing board's power to delegate its authority to
committees). Accord PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120,
§ 3.02 cmt. j. ("It is commonly provided by statute that the board may delegate to
a committee the authority to exercise any of its powers, subject to certain limita-
tions.").
" See supra Part I.C.1.
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board's failure to sue in adverse domination cases and deci-
sions of special litigation committees: the adverse domination
tolling theory responds to a corporate board's failure to take
action, not to considered and informed refusals to sue by disin-
terested directors. Courts traditionally have been less deferent
to director inaction than to action by corporate directors.181
Thus, some adverse domination decisions have assumed that,
absent express delegation of the decision to sue to disinterest-




A potentially serious problem with the disability rationale
is that the derivative suit has long enabled shareholders to
bring corporate claims against directors and officers, despite
their control of the enterprise."8 Shareholders can even use
derivative suits to bring corporate claims against third par-
ties.' In light of the possibility of shareholder derivative liti-
gation, one may fairly ask whether the board "domination"
necessary to establish legal "disability" really exists in the
corporate context."
A student commentator has suggested one answer: the
11 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984). Of course, the
distinction between action and inaction is a matter of degree. Some degree of
deference is surely appropriate, for example, where oversight requires the exercise
of discretion by directors. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note
120, § 4.01(c) cmt. c, at 175. See also Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment
Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477,
1485-86 (1984) (criticizing the distinction between action and inaction on the
ground that this distinction overemphasizes the board's decision-making function).
1 See, e.g., Hecht v. Resolution Trust Corp., 635 A.2d 394, 407 (Md. 1994) ("A
director or officer may not act alone for the corporation without authority from the
board.").
1" On the origins of the derivative suit, see generally Bert S. Prunty, Jr., The
Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980
(1957).
'" DEMOTT, supra note 176, § 1:01, at 1 ("[Dlerivative suits may also assert, on
the corporation's behalf, claims against third parties.").
1 Unfortunately, few courts have addressed this issue. See Baughman, supra
note 18, at 1095-96 n. 142 and accompanying text.
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demand requirement and the specificity of pleading necessary
to establish a demand futility exception (and thereby overcome
friendly disposition of the derivative suit by director commit-
tees) make the derivative remedy impractical in many cas-
es."s While this observation is undoubtedly true, opponents
of adverse domination might well respond that the derivative
suit adequately protects a corporation's interests because these
procedural barriers permit the airing, if not the trial, of corpo-
rate grievances, and are in any event subject to judicial review.
But there are still other reasons why a shareholder deriva-
tive suit is a poor substitute for corporate litigation brought by
a disinterested board of directors. For one thing, information is
a necessary predicate for the derivative remedy. Unless share-
holders know there is a basis for claims against corporate di-
rectors, officers or third parties, they cannot invoke their right
to sue on the corporation's behalf. As discussed in the following
section, which advances a concealment rationale for adverse
domination, a corporation's directors and officers control the
flow of information to shareholders and can thereby influence
the prospect for derivative suits. Moreover, assuming a share-
holder has information sufficient to pursue a derivative suit,
she owes neither the corporation nor her fellow shareholders
any obligation to do so."8 That is, shareholder derivative liti-
gation can compensate for the board's failure to sue on claims
that implicate its members only to the extent that
shareholders have adequate incentives to bring such claims, a
fact issue whose outcome can complicate the adverse domina-
tion inquiry considerably."s
Courts, perhaps implicitly recognizing the obstacles to
derivative suits, have not been easily persuaded that this
shareholder litigation avenue overcomes adverse domination
problems. Indeed, most courts have concluded that, for limita-
Baughman, supra note 18, at 1095-99.
*" As the Supreme Court noted in Cohen v. Benefica Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541 (1949), a shareholder who files a derivative suit is a 'volunteer champi-
on" Id. at 549. A shareholder has no 'obligation to institute a derivative action
even if it is in the best interest of the corporation" RTC v. Fleischer, 890 F.
Supp. 972, 978 (D. Kan. 1995) (collecting cases).
" C.f Clark v. Milam, 872 F.Supp. 307, 315 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (fact issues on
shareholder knowledge and incentives in prior derivative litigation precluded sum-
mary judgment on whether such litigation ended adverse domination tolling).
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tions purposes, possible derivative remedies are not a mean-
ingful substitute for litigation brought by a disinterested
board.'89 Where all shareholders are made aware of the basis
for corporate claims, however, courts have concluded that the
potential for a derivative remedy cures disability problems and




The most serious problem with the disability rationale for
adverse domination is the issue of judicial authority. That is,
even if a court is persuaded by the foregoing "disability" argu-
ments, the disability tolling exceptions that limitations law has
traditionally recognized (e.g., minority, mental incompetence)
are typically specified by statute. 9' No statute carves out a
similar "disability" tolling exception for corporations. Moreover,
there is a related policy dimension to the authority problem: if
courts provide relief for problems not solved by statutes, the
legislature will have no incentive to do so. It is not surprising,
therefore, that most of the courts that have rejected the dis-
ability rationale for adverse domination have done so not on its
merits, but on the ground that judicial authority to toll limita-
tions for corporate claims is limited to the traditional fraud
and fraudulent concealment tolling exceptions. 192 Cases that
18 See, e.g., Fleischer, 890 F. Supp. at 978 (the potential for shareholder deriva-
tive suits does not end adverse domination); Hecht v. RTC, 635 A.2d at 407-08
(same). See also FDIC v. Hudson, 673 F. Supp. 1039, 1042-43 (D. Kan. 1987) ("A
stockholder's failure to use due diligence in discovering [director] wrongdoing may-
be excused since a fiduciary duty exists between the members of a board and the
stockholders.") (citing FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F. Supp. 1184, 1194-95 (D. Md.
1984)).
The question is somewhat closer when one or more disinterested directors
know of potential corporate claims against their fellow corporate fiduciaries. Unlike
shareholders, directors are obligated to protect the corporation's welfare, and some
jurisdictions recognize the right of a director to sue derivatively on the
corporation's behalf. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120,
§ 7.02 cmt. h. The Article discusses this issue in more detail in Part III.B.4.
19 Court decisions support this distinction. See, e.g., White v. FDIC, 122 F.2d
770, 775 (4th Cir. 1941); United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co.,
870 P.2d 880, 890 (Utah 1993).
... See 2 CORMAN, supra note 5, §§ 10.2, 10.4 & 10.5.
" See, e.g., RTC v. Armbruster, 52 F.3d 748, 751-52 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding
that Arkansas does not recognize adverse domination but does toll limitations
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embrace the disability rationale for adverse domination have
provided no clear answer to this objection.'
Nonetheless, one can construct a case for "authority" based
on courts' long-standing role as enforcers of corporate directors'
and officers' fiduciary obligations. Courts' power to enforce
such duties is rooted more firmly in tradition and precedent
than in express statutory provisions. For example, aside from
references to "good faith" and "best interests of the corpora-
tion," nowhere do modern corporate governance codes expressly
confer power on courts to enforce corporate fiduciaries' duty of
loyalty obligations."g Yet, courts have recognized such duties
for centuries, and continue to do so despite statutes that osten-
sibly limit their scope."9
Moreover, most state legislatures have not even bothered
to enact a limitations provision that specifically covers corpo-
rate fiduciary claims.9 Thus, courts in corporate litigation
must define "accrual" under generally applicable limitations
provisions. One could argue that courts should perform this
task mindful of the disability problems that arise from
directors' obligations of loyalty to the corporation (the "adversi-
ty" problem) and directors' practical power to control a
corporation's decisions (the "domination" problem).
based on fraudulent concealment); RTC v. Artley, 28 F.3d 1099, 1102 n.4 (11th
Cir. 1994) (concluding that Georgia does not recognize adverse domination but does
toll limitations for fraud claims); RTC v. Everhart, 37 F.3d 151, 155 (4th Cir.
1994) (concluding that Virginia does not recognize adverse domination but does toll
limitations where there is "intentional concealment by the directors of the wrongful
conduct"); FDIC v. Cocke, 7 F.3d 396, 402 (4th Cir. 1993) (same as Everhart); RTC
v. Wood, 870 F. Supp. 797, 811-12 (W.D. Tenn. 1994) (Tennessee does not recog-
nize adverse domination but does toll limitations based on fraudulent concealment).
Consider, for example, the following passage from RTC v. Fiala, 870 F.
Supp. 962 (E.D. Mo. 1994):
Defendants argue that the examples of Missouri statutes that pro-
vide for tolling do not support the adoption of adverse domination be-
cause the such tolling statutes represent special legislative exceptions.
The Court is not persuaded by this argument because Missouri courts
provide for tolling the statute of limitations in situations involving fraud.
In addition, where the legislature has already acted to create a special
situation where tolling applies, the courts need not do so. However, that
is not to say that the courts would not have recognized such an applica-
tion of tolling at some point in the future.
I& at 974.
*" See, eg., MBCA § 8.30(a).
See supra note 175.
See infra Part V.B.1.
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Perhaps factual patterns speak most clearly to the need
for a disability tolling theory of some kind. In the hundreds of
reported D & 0 decisions arising out of the bank and thrift
crisis, it is difficult, if not impossible to find any examples
where directors and officers of failing banks and thrifts took
action to police their own alleged misconduct. While a few
shareholder derivative actions were filed, most were pursued
only after the institutions' insolvency was brought to light by
federal regulators.'97
3. Concealment Arguments
Courts have also frequently cited the potential for "con-
cealment" of incriminating information by controlling directors
as a justification for adverse domination tolling. 9 ' One sees
the concealment rationale for adverse domination running
through judicial decisions in a variety of ways,'99 but perhaps
the most powerful "concealment" argument is that the board of
directors can prevent the release of information that might
otherwise permit representatives of the corporation to protect
its rights, through derivative litigation or otherwise."0 As
19 See, e.g., Burns v. International Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1422, 1423 (9th Cir.
1991) (describing derivative suits filed following bank insolvency).
1. See, e.g., FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1309 (5th Cir. 1993) (adverse domi-
nation rests on a "presumption' that a culpable majority of the board will conceal
its wrongdoing); FDIC v. Hudson, 673 F. Supp. 1039, 1042 (D. Kan. 1987) (justify-
ing adverse domination on the ground that "control of the [corporation] includes
the power to conceal incriminating information" (citing FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F.
Supp. 1184, 1194 (D. Md. 1984))).
1' For example, courts that apply the majority disinterested director version of
adverse domination as a presumption in favor of tolling have defended it on the
ground that "[defendant directors] have greater access to relevant information
[because of their] control of corporate records." RTC v. Grant, 901 P.2d 807, 818
(Okla. 1995). In a similar vein, many decisions adopting adverse domination sug-
gest that tolling is an appropriate sanction for corporate directors' failure to dis-
close or police their own misconduct. See, e.g., RTC v. Scaletty, 810 F. Supp. 1505,
1513 (D. Kan. 1992) ("The principle of adverse domination is ultimately based on
the principle of silence: that the defendant directors responsible for damage to the
corporation have remained silent, rather than protecting the interest of the corpo-
ration.'); Ventress v. Wallace, 71 So. 636, 640-41 (Miss. 1916) ("As a part of their
duties, [the defendant directors] alone could determine the propriety of any suit at
law or equity, and were alone charged with the authority to institute such
suits .... It is true that the stockholders have their annual or periodic meet-
ing . . . but at these meetings they looked to the directors, their agents, for a
true and correct account of their stewardship . . .").
2" See, e.g., Hecht v. RTC, 635 A.2d 394, 407-08 (Md. 1994) ("[Wjhere directors
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such, this justification for adverse domination reinforces the
disability rationale. Indeed, the predominant theme in the first
adverse domination decision of the modern era, FDIC v.
Bird,20' is that adverse domination is consistent with current
trends in corporate law that protect shareholders through
duties of disclosure for corporate management.m
It should be noted, however, that the concealment ratio-
nale for adverse domination is a legal fiction. That is, adverse
domination does not depend on a showing of affirmative efforts
by directors to conceal information (which might constitute
fraudulent concealment) or any other fraudulent acts on the
part of directors. As the Maryland Court of Appeals noted
when explaining "concealment" as a justification for adverse
domination: "It is the fact of [corporate directors] control over
information, not necessarily any fraudulent activity, that
makes [adverse domination] necessary."'
4. Concealment Counter-Arguments
To the extent that the adverse domination theory tolls
limitations in situations that would not be encompassed by the
traditional fraud and fraudulent concealment tolling excep-
tions, one can again object to the theory on grounds of authori-
ty. In most states, the legislature has expressly approved toll-
ing where fraud or fraudulent concealment is shown.' One
could argue that, by passing such statutes, the legislature has
expressly foreclosed courts' power to toll limitations on broader
grounds.
One possible response is that the concealment rationale for
adverse domination fits comfortably within the traditional
control all information and resources, it may be extremely difficult, if not impo3i-
ble, for shareholders to gain access to the information and resources necessary to
bring suit.").
" 516 F. Supp. 647 (D.P.R. 1981). This case is discussed in the text accompa-
nying notes 44-48, supra.
22 Id. at 651-52.
213 Hecht, 635 A2d at 408.
2 See supra note 146.
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fraud and fraudulent concealment tolling exceptions if one
makes certain assumptions about corporate fiduciaries' dis-
closure obligations. Under both common law fraud and corpo-
rate law principles, silence is "fraudulent" when there is a duty
to speak."°5 Applying this well-settled rule, if corporate direc-
tors or officers have an affirmative obligation to reveal their
wrongdoing to shareholders, it is "fraudulent" for them to re-
frain from doing so. One could then support tolling limitations
for claims of wrongdoing against corporate fiduciaries under
the traditional fraud and fraudulent concealment tolling excep-
tions."6
But the validity of the major premise in the aforemen-
tioned syllogism, which depends on the parameters of corpo-
rate directors' and officers' duty of disclosure, is unclear. The
traditional view under state corporate law has been that fidu-
ciaries must disclose all relevant information to shareholders,
but only when seeking shareholder action.0 7 Other authority
suggests that corporate fiduciaries must disclose such informa-
tion "whether or not... seeking shareholder action."208 It is
likewise unclear whether corporate fiduciaries must disclose
their wrongdoing in all cases under the securities laws.0 9
2"0 See, e.g., Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex. 1986)
(when the particular circumstances impose upon a person the duty to speak and
he deliberately remains silent, his silence is equivalent to a false representation).
C.f. Chiarella v. US, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (characterizing silence as a basis for
fraud liability under insider trading rules, but only where trader owes an indepen-
dent legal duty (e.g., a fiduciary duty) to disclose the information).
" Some courts have been willing to take this step, concluding that fraudulent
concealment principles justify the adverse domination theory because no affirmative
concealment is required where the defendant has a fiduciary relationship with
plaintiff. See, e.g., RTC v. Fiala, 870 F. Supp. 962, 974 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
207 See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 88, at 891 ("The duty to disclose arises
traditionally when a fiduciary (generally, the corporation's management . . . ) com-
municates to the shareholders, soliciting shareholder action."). See also BRANSON,
supra note 67, § 10.07. Otherwise, shareholder informational rights are limited to
public corporate records and statutory avenues that provide access to certain inter-
nal corporate documentation. See, e.g., MBCA §§ 16.01-16.22.
208 See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 88, at 891.
20 See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 776-77 (9th Cir. 1981) ("We
draw a sharp distinction . . . between allegations of conduct involving breach of
trust or self-dealing-the non-disclosure of which is presumptively material-and
allegations of simple breach of fiduciary duty/waste of corporate assets--the non-
disclosure of which is never material for § 14(a) purposes.").
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Thus, whether adverse domination tolling is justified as part of
the traditional fraud or fraudulent concealment tolling excep-
tions depends in part on unsettled disclosure rules of corporate
and securities law. Indeed, courts that are willing to recognize
adverse domination on the basis of "concealment" may indirect-
ly create a new flank for those in the vanguard of the disclo-
sure movement.
And there is yet another "fiduciary" aspect to the conceal-
ment justification for adverse domination. If applicable, a con-
cealment tolling exception should simply trigger use of the
discovery rule to define accrual of a corporation's claim."' As
explained below, the "notice" requirements of the discovery
rule, as applied in the corporate fiduciary context, provide a
separate and distinct explanation for the adverse domination
theory.
5. Discovery and Notice Arguments
Courts have adopted the adverse domination theory not
only on the basis of the disability and concealment rationales,
but also on the ground that, so long as wrongdoing directors or
officers remain in control of a corporate entity, the corporation
has no "notice" of any claims that implicate them.2 ' Lack of
notice is important, of course, only if the discovery rule, rather
than the occurrence rule, defines accrual of the corporation's
claim. And many courts have concluded that the discovery rule
does apply to claims that implicate corporate fiduciaries, inde-
pendent of any "concealment" rationale that might otherwise
support its use."
210 Recall that the fraudulent concealment tolling exception does not suspend
limitations indefinitely. Instead, it permits the court to define accrual using the
discovery rule, ie., to ask when the corporation knew or should have known of its
claims. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., RTC v. Scaletty, 891 P.2d 1110, 1116 (Kan. 1995) (adverse domina-
tion theory determines when a corporation can "reasonably ascertain" injury caused
by those in control of the corporation).
22 See, eg., RTC v. Farmer, 865 F. Supp. 1143, 1157 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (ITMhe
adverse domination doctrine [is] in accord with the essence of Pennsylvania's dis-
covery rule."); RTC v. O'Bear, 840 F. Supp. 1270, 1284 (NfD. Ind. 1993) (adopting
adverse domination theory as part of Indiana's discovery rule); FSLIC v. Williams,
599 F. Supp. 1184, 1193-95 (D. Md. 1984) (adopting adverse domination as consis-
tent with Maryland discovery rule); Hecht v. RTC, 635 A.2d 394, 401 ( M d .
1994) (finding adverse domination relevant to determination of 'accrual" of cause
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This expanded application of the discovery rule is consis-
tent with the tendency of modem courts to extend discovery
rule tolling to any case where plaintiff is "blamelessly igno-
rant" of her claim.213 The incorporeal nature of a corpora-
tion-its inherent inability to act except through directors' and
officers' and other representatives as agents-arguably renders
the corporation "blamelessly ignorant" of claims that implicate
its directors and officers, at least while they control the institu-
tion. Indeed, one commentator argues that recent widespread
acceptance of the adverse domination theory recognizes that
there is an "inherently unknowable... injury" when a corpo-
ration is controlled by those who are alleged to have injured
it.
214
The connections between the discovery rule and adverse
domination are most readily apparent when courts must iden-
tify the point at which a corporation "discovers" a litigation
claim. This issue is determined not by limitations law, but by
corporate fiduciary law, or, more specifically, fiduciary princi-
ples derived from agency law. The general "imputed notice"
rule from agency law is that a principal is bound by the knowl-
edge of its agent.215 Yet agency law expressly excepts out
from this general imputation rule situations where the agent's
interests are "adverse" to the principal.16 In the corporate
setting, this exception means that, as between the corporation
and its fiduciaries, the fiduciaries' knowledge of claims that
implicate themselves in wrongdoing are not imputed to the
1994) (finding adverse domination relevant to determination of "accrual" of cause
of action under discovery rule); RTC v. Grant, 901 P.2d 807, 813 (Okla. 1995)
("[The discovery rule], much like the doctrine of adverse domination, arises from
the inability of the injured, despite the exercise of due diligence, to know of the
injury or its cause."); Clark v: Milam, 452 S.E.2d 714, 719 (W. Va. 1994) (recogniz-
ing adverse domination theory as a "subspecies" of the discovery rule). C.f FDIC
v. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833 F. Supp. 1545, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (not adopting
adverse domination outright, but reaching similar result by applying discovery
rule).
' Heriot, supra note 100, at 954.
214 Baughman, supra note 18, at 1092-1095.
215 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 272 (1957) (agent's knowledge may
determine principal's liability). These same rules apply to corporate agents. See 3A
FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS, supra note 38, § 787.
216 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 279 (1957) ("[A principal is] not
affected by the knowledge of an agent as to matters ... in which the agent deals
with the principal ... as ... an adverse party .... ).
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corporation, for the fiduciaries have an inherent conflict of
interest that makes them "adverse" to the corporation with
respect to such claims."7 Thus, many courts have concluded
that the adverse domination theory is justified in the corporate
context based on a combination of the discovery rule and the
adverse interest exception to imputed notice.1 8
6. Discovery and Notice Counter-Arguments
In one sense, the "discovery and notice" rationale for ad-
verse domination is the least susceptible to challenge on
grounds of judicial authority, at least in jurisdictions where
use of the discovery rule is already authorized by legislation or
judicial decision. In another sense, however, the discovery and
notice rationale for the adverse domination theory still raises
questions. If the discovery rule applies to a corporation's claims
against its directors or officers, one would expect courts to find
"notice" of the claim as soon as any disinterested representa-
tive of the corporation became aware of it."W But courts typi-
cally require a bit more under the adverse domination theory.
Courts applying the majority disinterested director version
of adverse domination require a change in control of the board
of directors before notice will be imputed. As the Maryland
I As I have explained elsewhere, the adverse interest exception to imputed
notice principles is an application of corporate fiduciaries' duty of loyalty to the
institution. See Dor6, supra note 30, at 171-203.
A slightly different exception applies where third parties seek to impute
knowledge to a principal based on the knowledge of an agent whose interests are
adverse to the principal: "[A] principal is not affected by the knowledge of an
agent [where] the agent secretly is acting adversely to the principal and entirely
for his own or another's purposes .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282
(1957) The "complete" adversity requirement in this context protects the interests
of third parties where the agent acts with 'mixed motives," only some of which
are adverse to the principal. See Dora, supra note 30, at 174. See also Part V.A.2.
(explaining special problems that arise when imputation principles are applied in
the context of corporate litigation against third parties).
See, eg., RTC v. Chapman, 895 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (CJD. MlL 1995) (a
'Il]ogical application" of the Illinois discovery rule and the adverse interest excep-
tion "leads to recognition of the adverse domination doctrine); RTC v. Farmer, 865
F. Supp. 1143, 1155 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (finding adverse domination consistent with
Pennsylvania discovery rule and adverse interest exception); In re Blackburn, 209
B.&. 4, 10-11 (Bankr. IMLD. Fla. 1997) (adverse interest exception justifies adverse
domination).
2"2 See, e.g., 3A FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS, supra note 38, § 790.
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Court of Appeals expressed:
Because, in most cases, defendants' control of the corporation will
make it impossible for the corporate plaintiff independently to ac-
quire the knowledge and resources necessary to bring suit, actual
notice of a claim will not be possible until the corporate plaintiff is
no longer under the control of the defendant board members....
[Thus,] the adverse domination theory] goes beyond principles of
agency law which provide that the knowledge of the agent will not
be imputed to the principal if the agent acts adversely to the princi-
pal.o
The single disinterested director version of adverse domi-
nation adds a similarly pragmatic spin to the notice question,
requiring not only a finding of notice to a disinterested direc-
tor, but also that the director was "motivated and willing to
sue" on the corporation's behalf.221 Thus, in adverse domina-
tion cases, the question of corporate "notice" under discovery
rule principles becomes substantially the same as whether the
corporation was "disabled" from filing suit!
There are potential authority objections to such an ex-
panded notice analysis--essentially the same objections that
apply to the disability and concealment rationales for adverse
domination. As with those rationales, the answer, if one exists,
must be that courts are authorized to apply the corporate "no-
tice" analysis in a manner consistent with corporate directors'
duty of loyalty obligations and the practical realities associated
with their control over the corporation. Whether one finds this
analysis persuasive depends largely on one's view of corporate
law and the role of fiduciary duties.222
B. Implications of Doctrinal Rationales
The foregoing doctrinal analysis of adverse domination
tolling standards is somewhat artificial, because it separates
the various rationales for the theory for discussion purposes.
' See, e.g., RTC v. Scaletty, 891 P.2d 1110, 1112-14 (Kan. 1995) (citing
both problems of corporate notice under discovery rule and practical inability to
sue as justifications for adverse domination); Hecht v. RTC, 635 A.2d 394 (Md.
1994) (same).
21 See, e.g., Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Bryan, 902 F.2d 1520, 1523-24
(10th Cir. 1990).
' See supra Part II.B.2.
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While a court might rely on one rationale to the exclusion of
others, courts typically embrace one or more in combina-
tion.' Indeed, the separate rationales' common dependence
on fiduciary duties comes close to establishing a "continuing
wrong" accrual rule for corporate fiduciary claims.'
The multiple rationales for adverse domination also make
it somewhat difficult to oppose the tolling theory. Its defenders
can shore up weaknesses in the disability rationale (e.g., the
possibility of derivative litigation) based on insufficient corpo-
rate notice of potential claims. They can buttress weaknesses
in the notice rationale (e.g., why does notice to a single disin-
terested corporate representative not always defeat adverse
domination) with disability problems associated with majority
control. Nonetheless, the various rationales courts have used to
support the adverse domination theory have potentially differ-
ing implications for at least some of the adverse domination
issues that have divided the courts.
1. Recognition of the Adverse Domination Theory
As described in Part I of the Article, there is a recent but
growing judicial trend that refuses to recognize the adverse
domination tolling theory. Most of these decisions have focused
not so much on the merits of adverse domination arguments as
on judicial authority concerns.' Yet, these same courts uni-
versally acknowledge that tolling under the discovery rule is
appropriate where the corporation's claims against corporate
fiduciaries allege fraud or fraudulent concealment.' Indeed,
the approach courts have used to define corporate "discovery"
' See, e.g., RTC v. Fiala, 870 F. Supp. 962, 974 (E.D. Mlo. 1994); Scaletty, 891
P.2d at 1112, 1115; Hecht, 635 A.2d at 405, 408.
'As Chancellor Allen has explained, delayed accrual under a "continuing
wrong" theory is generally limited to extraordinary situations, such as a nuisance
that continues for many years. In such a case plaintiff can prove the elements of
her cause of action with reference to events occurring entirely within the limita-
tions period. See Kahn v. Seaboard Corp., 625 A.2d 269, 271 (Del Ch. 1993). A
corporate fiduciary argument might run along similar lines: that directors! failure
to act on or disclose their breaches of fiduciary duty effectively continues the origi-
nal breach of fiducary obligation. Chancellor Allen expressly rejected such an argu-
ment in Kahn, however. See id.
See supra notes 191-193 and accompanying text.
See supra note 192.
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in fraud and fraudulent concealment cases closely resembles, if
it is not identical to, the adverse domination theory. 7 Thus,
most of the recent decisions that "decline to adopt" adverse
domination as a tolling theory may more appropriately be
analyzed below, along with other decisions that restrict the
categories of claims to which adverse domination applies.
2. The Categories of Claims to Which the Adverse
Domination Theory Applies
Recall that courts that accept the adverse domination
theory disagree whether it should toll limitations: (i) only
where corporate fiduciaries are alleged to have engaged in
fraud or fraudulent concealment; (ii) also where corporate
fiduciaries are alleged to have committed intentionally wrong-
ful acts that are less serious than fraud, such as self dealing;
or (iii) also where corporate fiduciaries are alleged to have
acted recklessly or negligently.2 ' Doctrinal analysis helps ex-
plain some, but not all, of the conflicting positions courts have
taken.
Consider courts that view corporate "disability" as the
basis for adverse domination. One might take the position, as
some courts have, that the tolling theory should be applicable
to any claim that implicates controlling corporate directors, be-
cause a corporation is no less "disabled" by directors' conflict of
interest and power of control with respect to negligence claims
than it is with respect to claims for more serious miscon-
duct.' These courts have not drawn distinctions, often seen
in the demand futility context, that implicitly tie the question
of directors' conflict of interest to the seriousness of their al-
leged misconduct." However, at least one court that has ad-
See supra Part II.C.2. (describing early caselaw approaches to "notice" issue
as courts applied the discovery rule to corporate claims alleging fraud or fraudu-
lent concealment). It is hard to see any real distinction between these cases and
those such as RTC v. Grant, 901 P.2d 807, 814-19 (Okla. 1995), where the court
expressly adopted adverse domination but restricted its application to claims alleg-
ing "fraudulent conduct" by corporate directors.
See supra Part I.D.
See, e.g., RTC v. Fiala, 870 F. Supp. 962, 974 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (collecting
cases).
230 For example, Delaware courts excuse demand if "plaintiff has alleged with
particularity facts that, taken as true, would support a reasonable doubt that the
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vanced a disability rationale for adverse domination declined to
apply the tolling theory to claims less serious than fraud or
fraudulent concealment."'
If the "discovery and notice" rationale provides the theoret-
ical underpinnings for adverse domination tolling, the claims
to which the theory applies should track the scope of the dis-
covery rule. To some extent, the cases reflect a pattern in this
regard. Where legislatures have authorized courts to apply the
discovery rule to all civil cases, or broad application of the
discovery rule is sanctioned by precedent, judges have been
comfortable extending adverse domination tolling to all corpo-
rate claims, no matter what their basis.' In jurisdictions
that have declined to extend the discovery rule beyond the
fraud and fraudulent concealment categories, courts have con-
cluded that the adverse domination theory should be similarly
confined.' Unfortunately, in many states the parameters of
the discovery rule are unclear and are developed piecemeal by
judicial decision. Courts in these jurisdictions must confront
the policy question of whether the discovery rule should be ex-
tended to claims that implicate corporate fiduciaries, a ques-
tion the discovery and notice rationale for adverse domination
does not answer.
The concealment rationale suggests the potentially nar-
rowest scope for adverse domination tolling. From a judicial
authority perspective, the most defensible position is to toll
limitations only under the legislatively authorized fraud and
fraudulent concealment tolling exceptions, and to reject the
adverse domination theory's expansive approach to the "discov-
challenged transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business judgmenL
See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 7.03 cmt. a, at 54.
221 See, e.g., Grant, 901 P.2d at 814.
See, e.g., RTC v. Scaletty, 891 P.2d 1110, 1117 (Kan. 1995) (reasoning ad-
verse domination tolling was consistent with Kansas *accruanl statute that autho-
rized tolling of limitations for any civil claim until it is "reasonably ascertainable °
and that the court had no authority to 'pick and choose among cloim to which
this statute applied); Hecht v. RTC, 635 A.2d 394, 399 (bid. 1994) (reasoning in
part that adverse domination telling was an application of the discovery rule,
which, by court decision 'applie[d] generally in all civil actions').
See, eg., RTC v. Armbruster, 52 F.3d 748, 751-53 (8th Cir. 1995) (refusing
to apply adverse domination to negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims,
reasoning that Arkansas applies discovery principles only in cases of fraudulent
concealment).
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ery and notice" issue these exceptions raise.2' A court with a
slightly more generous view of its authority might use adverse
domination standards as the test for "notice" or "discovery" of
corporate fiduciary claims under the fraud and fraudulent
concealment tolling exceptionsY5 A court that takes a broad
view of corporate fiduciaries' duty of disclosure might expand
the scope for adverse domination tolling beyond these catego-
ries, but it is difficult to predict how far that logic might take
the court. 6 Perhaps the best that can be said is that the the-
oretical underpinnings of the concealment rationale-the ten-
dency of directors to conceal their own wrongdoing and the
legal support for their obligation to disclose it-increase in
strength with the seriousness of the misconduct at issue.
3. Claims Against Third Parties
Recall that courts also disagree whether adverse domina-
tion should toll limitations for a corporation's claims against
third parties, a question that has arisen most frequently in
connection with malpractice claims against lawyers, accoun-
tants and other experts who advise corporations. 7 The ma-
jority view is that adverse domination applies where the
corporation's claim against the third party might implicate
controlling corporate fiduciaries in wrongdoing."8 These
courts reason that, in such situations, corporate fiduciaries are
no more likely to pursue the third party claim than they would
be to pursue the related D & 0 action, so that the "disability"
and "concealment" rationales for adverse domination apply."9
Indeed, since one can defend adverse domination as an applica-
tion of the discovery rule in the corporate context, and the
discovery rule generally applies in malpractice actions, the
adverse domination theory should arguably apply to any such
corporate claims against third parties' 4 The courts that have
" See supra Part IH.A.6.
See, e.g., Grant, 901 P.2d 807.
2' See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.D.
See, e.g., RTC v. Gardner, 798 F. Supp. 790, 795-96 (D.D.C. 1992).
24 See 2 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 11.1.2.3 ("Today the discovery rule [generally]
applies to malpractice litigation against [medical and] nonmedical profession-
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have offered little support for that position, other than the
assertion that adverse domination is a "narrow doctrine."3- 1
Nonetheless, there are several important distinctions be-
tween D & 0 claims and third party claims that may justify
different tolling rules. First, while one can defend courts' au-
thority to toll limitations for D & 0 claims as an extension of
their power to enforce corporate fiduciary duties, third parties
are technically outside of that jurisdiction.' Moreover, to the
extent adverse domination is intended to punish corporate
fiduciaries' for improper "concealment" or failure to disclose
their wrongdoing, tolling limitations for related claims against
third parties misdirects the penalty.'
In addition, where the discovery rule already applies to
claims against a third party (e.g., in the typical professional
malpractice case), adverse domination tolling gives the corpo-
rate plaintiff two chances to prevail on the issue of discovery.
There can be no corporate discovery of a claim until a disinter-
ested representative of the corporation receives notice of it.'
The imputed notice rules of agency law thus subject third
parties to the risk that corporate agents' knowledge may not
bind the corporation under the adverse interest exception.
Where defendant establishes that a corporation did receive
notice under these principles, the adverse domination theory
nonetheless provides the corporation a second opportunity to
toll limitations if it can show sufficient adverse interest on the
part of those who control the corporation. 6 .
24. See, eg., FDIC v. Shrader & York, 991 F.2d 216, 227 (5th Cir. 1993).
24 In this sense adverse domination tolling may be an example of what one
scholar has labeled the "gatekeeper" liability phenomenon of corporate law. See
generally Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Cost of
Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984).
243 Indeed, for courts that view the adverse domination theory as the test for
corporate "discovery" when the fraud or fraudulent concealment tolling exceptions
apply, adverse domination tolling should not apply to claims against third partie3
unless those third parties have themselves engaged in fraud or fraudulent conceal-
ment.
'"See supra Part I1-.5.
243 See supra Part II.A-5. See also Dor6, supra note 30, at 171-75.
This 'two bites at the apple" problem was present in FDIC v. Shruder &
York, 991 F.2d 216, 226-27 (5th Cir. 1993), where the Fifth Circuit first declined
to extend the adverse domination tolling theory to third parties. Indeed, aimilari-
ties between the adverse domination tolling theory and the "imputed notice" inqui-
ry that the discovery rule requires in the corporate setting have effectively enabled
lower courts in the Fifth Circuit to avoid the limitations established by the
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4. Procedural Issues
The most significant divisions among courts that have
applied the adverse domination tolling theory concern the
proper procedures for its implementation. Recall that the pri-
mary dispute is whether courts should toll limitations until
directors implicated in wrongdoing are replaced by a "disinter-
ested majority" on the board, or whether the corporate plaintiff
should be required to prove "complete domination" of the corpo-
ration during the period for which tolling is sought, i.e., that
there was not a "single disinterested director" on the board to
protect the corporation's rights.
Many of the arguments that support the "disability" ratio-
nale for adverse domination also support the majority disinter-
ested director version of the theory. A decision to bring litiga-
tion typically rests in the hands of a majority of the board,
and, applying well-established duty of loyalty principles, where
directors act subject to a conflict of interest (or, as is more
likely in the case of adverse domination, fail to take any action
at all), their decision should not bind the corporation."
While a disinterested director may have the right to sue
derivatively on behalf of the corporation in some jurisdictions,
that right does not necessarily entail a duty to sue." More-
over, as scholars have argued and courts in at least some juris-
dictions have recognized, "structural bias" on corporate boards
makes it unlikely that individual "disinterested" directors will
support corporate action that may adversely affect their
peers. 9 And, even if disinterested directors want to sue on
to extend the adverse domination tolling theory to third parties. Indeed, similari-
ties between the adverse domination tolling theory and the "imputed notice" inqui-
ry that the discovery rule requires in the corporate setting have effectively enabled
lower courts in the Fifth Circuit to avoid the limitations established by the
Shrader & York decision. See, e.g., Askanase v. Fatjo, 828 F. Supp. 461, 464 (S.D.
Tex. 1993) (recognizing that adverse domination tolling could not apply to third
party claims, but nonetheless tolling limitations on the theory that there was no
corporate "discovery" of the claims).
24 See supra Part IILA.1.
24 See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 7.02 cmt. h.
2" See, e.g., James D. Cox & Harry Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psy.
chological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 48 n.3, 83, 103-04 (1985); Will v. Engebretson & Co., 261 Cal.
Rptr. 868, 874 (Ct. App. 1989); Miller v. Register and Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336
N.W.2d 709, 716 (Iowa 1983).
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policy, coverage exclusions may compel the directors to refrain
from doing so."0 Considering this state of affairs, one can
make a strong case that "disability" exists, at least until an
independent board majority is in place.
On the other hand, if courts that endorse the "conceal-
ment" or "discovery and notice" rationales for adverse domina-
tion apply imputed notice principles from agency law along
traditional lines, notice to a single disinterested director should
be sufficient for corporate discovery of its litigation claims.
Since most courts have conflated the disability, concealment
and discovery rationales for adverse domination, however, or
have applied "notice" principles along the same lines as disabil-
ity analysis, procedural distinctions that logically attend these
rationales for adverse domination may be moot. 2
In International Railways v. United Fruit Co.,' the case
most often cited as authority for the "complete domination"
version of adverse domination, Judge Friendly offered an addi-
tional reason for use of the single disinterested director test:
courts should set a high threshold before overriding repose
that the legislature has conferred with statutes of limita-
tion.' But courts have ignored a distinction that makes the
United Fruit case unique: the facts giving rise to the
corporation's claims were known to all directors as well as all
shareholders-there was no question of concealment. The only
I In many cases D & 0 insurance provides the only vehicle for meaningful re-
covery of damages from defendant directors and officers. Modern D & 0 policies
typically eliminate coverage for claims commenced with the cooperation of the
corporation or any insured officer. See, eg., MNelvin R. Goldman et al, Directors'
and Officers Insurance: An Analysis of Current Issues, in PLI SECURITIES LITIGA-
TION 1992: STRATEGIES AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS (PLI Order No. H4-5138) (de-
scribing the 'insured vs. insured exclusion7 and the "derivative action exclusion').
2" See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
2 See supra Part M.A.6.
2 373 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1967).
Id at 416 n.11 ("We here enforce the important policy of the statute of limi-
tations in protecting a defendant from stale claims; a court should require a clear
showing before applying a judicially created exception.").
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question was whether the corporation was able to sue on the
claims during the period of alleged dominationY5 Since there
were no disclosure or notice problems (which are separate
rationales for adverse domination), and a potential derivative
litigation remedy existed, United Fruit's high threshold for
adverse domination is understandable. 6
While, in this writer's view, the case for the majority disin-
terested director version of adverse domination is more persua-
sive than that for the single disinterested director approach,
the modern judicial trend to treat both. versions of adverse
domination as "presumptions" makes distinctions between
them less important. As will be explained in Part IV, under
either version of the adverse domination theory, the merits of
the limitations defense will not likely be resolved prior to trial.
In summary, the case for adverse domination tolling out-
lined in this Part of the Article is quite strong, provided one
also favors strong fiduciary duties on the part of corporate
directors and officers. The link to fiduciary duties is necessary
because, whatever the rationale for the adverse domination
theory, an expansive view of fiduciary obligation answers the
obvious judicial authority objections the theory raises. That is,
one can defend adverse domination tolling (i) as a recognition
that a corporation is, as a legal and practical matter, disabled
from pursuing claims against directors and officers while they
control the corporation; or (ii) as a means of determining a
corporation's "notice" of claims that implicate its directors and
officers, whether the notice issue arises under a "concealment"
tolling exception or as part of a more general application of the
discovery rule. These separate rationales, all rooted to varying
degrees in corporate fiduciary duty analysis, help explain divi-
2 Id. at 414.
" Indeed, these assumptions are signaled by the rule announced in the case:
"[The adverse domination tolling] principle must mean at least that once the facts
giving rise to possible liability are known, the plaintiff must effectively negate the
possibility that an informed stockholder or director could have induced the corpora-
tion to sue." Id. (emphasis added). A better approach to facts such as those pre-
sented in United Fruit is that disclosure to shareholders triggers the possibility of
a derivative remedy and therefore ends any possibility of tolling. See infra Part
V.A.3.
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sions that have developed among the courts concerning the
adverse domination tolling theory.
For the same reason, doctrinal analysis of adverse domina-
tion tolling is not completely satisfying. A particular courtfs
receptivity to the various rationales for the theory, as well as
its application of those rationales, will inevitably vary with the
court's concerns about judicial authority and with its views on
the importance of fiduciary duty enforcement. Because each of
the rationales for adverse domination tolling standards are
rooted in the soil of open-ended fiduciary duties, those seeking
clear and consistent parameters for the theory's application
should perhaps expect no more.
But there is a further reason doctrinal analysis comes up
short. How does one explain the seeming "pendulum swing" in
limitations decisions, i.e., that courts found adverse domination
tolling analysis persuasive and applied it expansively in the
1980s and early 1990s, yet have recently become much more
discriminatinge Have the later courts put their doctrinal
compass aside and simply imposed arbitrary and politically
motivated restrictions on the scope of adverse domination toll-
ing? Part IV offers an alternative explanation, one rooted
in the fundamental tensions between rules and standards in
both limitations law and corporate law.
IV. THE ADVERSE DOMINATION TOLLING THEORY AND THE
SEARCH FOR MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN RuLEs AND
STANDARDS
One difficulty with doctrinal analysis is that legal doctrine
sometimes assumes a life of its own and thereby impedes ef-
forts to solve the problem it was intended to address in the
first place. 9 Remember that the "disability," "concealment,"
and "discovery and notice" rationales for adverse domination
all reflect courts' desire, if not need, for a degree of flexibility
in resolving limitations problems in corporate cases. The use of
" See supra Part I.D.
See supra Part I.E.
See Johnson, supra note 26, at 676.
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fact-based tolling standards, such as adverse domination, not
only enables courts to achieve an equitable resolution of limita-
tions problems that mechanical application of statutes of limi-
tation would not permit, but also resolves limitations issues in
a manner more congruent with the flexible legal traditions of
corporate fiduciary duty enforcement.
This Part of the Article examines the consequences of such
flexibility in terms of limitations policy. It argues that because
adverse domination tolling standards tend to postpone resolu-
tion of limitations issues until trial, they largely defeat the
rule-based statute of limitations' ability to provide repose. This
tendency contrasts with prevailing trends in both limitations
law and corporate law that gravitate to a compromise "middle
ground" position on the rules/standards continuum. This Part
argues that judicial adoption of the adverse domination theory,
and more recent retrenchment from broad application of its
tolling standards, is best understood not in doctrinal terms but
as the courts' attempt to find that same middle ground for
limitations analysis in corporate cases.
A. Adverse Domination Standards Postpone Resolution of
Limitations Issues Until Trial
Considered from the historical and policy perspectives
outlined in Part II of the Article, adverse domination tolling
standards seem but an extension of courts' practice of temper-
ing rule-based statutes of limitation in extraordinary cases.
Part III has outlined the doctrinal rationales for doing so.
There is an important distinction between adverse domination
tolling standards and others that preceded them, however.
Because adverse domination tolling standards are rooted in
fiduciary duties, the factual inquiry required to apply them is
both open-ended and complex. To decide when a corporation's
cause of action "accrued" under the theory, the court essen-
tially must determine when the corporation was in a meaning-
ful position to protect its rights. This question is difficult to
resolve short of trial no matter which of the various rationales
for adverse domination the court adopts, and no matter which
of the competing procedural versions of the tolling theory the
court applies.
By way of comparison, consider conventional "disability"
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factual questions unrelated to the merits of the litigation.
These fact issues, e.g., plaintiffs status as a minor or as an
incarcerated person, can easily be resolved prior to trial.'
The adverse domination "disability" inquiry, in contrast, in-
volves at least three sets of variables: (i) plaintiffs allegations
of wrongdoing; (ii) the makeup of the board of directors and its
various members' level of "disinterest" with respect to
plaintiffs allegations; and (iii) the ability of "interested" board
members to exert control over the corporation. One's intuition
is that the stronger the corporate plaintiffs claims are and the
more board members the claims implicate, the stronger the
case for "disability," and hence tolling. But where along the
continuum between pleading and ultimate proof on the merits
does one draw the line?
Precedent from derivative litigation, where courts have
long been required to make similar determinations of "demand
futility," reflect the difficulty of the task."' While some
courts allow plaintiff to avoid the demand requirement simply
by naming all of the corporation's directors as defendants,
most courts require more by way of pleading.' The Dela-
ware pleading standards are particularly complex, tying de-
mand futility to the business judgment rule's protection of the
"6 Most statutes that toll limitations based on disability list minority, incarcem-
tion and mental disability as the triggering categories. See 2 CORMAN, supra note
5 §§ 10.2, 10.4 & 10.5. While a determination of plaintiffs mental capacity may
require a complex inquiry, it is an issue that will likely be separate from the
merits of the litigation in most cases, and therefore can be resolved prior to trial.
261 Though facially apt, the demand futility cases are not completely analogous.
One might argue that since the adverse domination theory overcome3 corporate
fiduciaries' substantive rights of repose, not mere procedural hurdles in corporate
litigation, it should entail a stronger conflict of interest showing than that re-
quired for demand futility. See International Rys. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d
408, 416 n.11 (2d Cir. 1967) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that the court should
find adverse domination to exist when demand would be excused under New York
law).
I See, e.g., Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025, 1033 (2d Cir. 1982); Joy v.
North, 692 F.2d 880, 887-88 (2d Cir. 1982).
1 The 'traditional" approach is to excuse demand where there are allegations
of wrongdoing that somehow implicate a majority of the board of directors. PRINCI-
PLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 7.04, cmt. d. (citing 13 WIL-
LIAM FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 5965
(Perm. Ed. 1980)). Other courts excuse demand 'only if a majority of the board
was interested or knowingly participated in a manner that amounted to aiding
and abetting the wrong." I& (citing Weiss v. Temporary Invest Fund, 692 F.2d
928 (3d Cir. 1982)).
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mand futility to the business judgment rule's protection of the
board decision plaintiff seeks to challenge.2 Despite the ef-
forts of many courts and scholars to achieve a workable plead-
ing formulation, none has proved completely satisfactory. Like
determinations of corporate "disability" under the adverse
domination theory, the demand futility inquiry is inevitably
bound to the merits of the litigation itself, e.g., whether one or
more directors actually engaged in the misconduct that plain-
tiff complains of. 65 This problem has led the American Law
Institute to suggest that the inquiry be abandoned and led
others to suggest that demand futility standards be placed on a
different footing.266
Nor do the "concealment" or "discovery and notice" justifi-
cations for adverse domination simplify its standards to any
great degree, for the outcome of the "notice" inquiry as applied
by most courts in adverse domination cases hinges on these
same questions of conflict of interest and control.2 7 The prob-
lem reaches its zenith where courts apply the adverse domina-
tion theory to toll limitations for claims that implicate corpo-
rate fiduciaries in negligence. No matter how many or how few
corporate directors are implicated in claims by the corporation,
could it not always be contended that the remaining directors
were themselves negligent (and hence interested for purposes
of the adverse domination inquiry) for failure to discover and
prosecute their fellow board members' misconduct?2"
Given the fact-intensive nature of the issues adverse domi-
nation tolling standards raise, most courts have reserved them
for trial. Indeed, in the view of one court: "The [adverse domi-
nation] tolling issue cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss,
nor can it be resolved on the basis of affidavits submitted in
support of a motion for summary judgment."26 ' Although that
24 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
2 DEMOTr, supra note 176, § 5.13, at 50 ("The difficulty... is that the court
is compelled to adjudicate factual issues determinative of substantive liability in
the context of a dispute over pleading.").
26 See PRINcIPLEs OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 7.03 (recom-
mending universal demand requirement except in cases of "irreparable injury"). See
also DEMO'-r, supra note 176, § 5.13, at 50 (expressing support for Third Circuit
demand futility test that asks "whether a demand on the directors would be likely
to prod them to correct a wrong").
2 7 See supra Part III-.A6.
" Cf FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303, 1312 (5th Cir. 1993).
269 In re MacGregor, 199 B.R. 502, 516 (Bankr. N.J. 1995). Published pre-trial
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view may be overbroad, the tendency of modern courts to treat
the competing "majority disinterested director" and "single
disinterested director" formulations of adverse domination as
presumptions for and against tolling creates similar problems,
because in either case the presumption can be rebutted at
trial.7
B. Implications for the Statute of Limitations Defense
To the extent that adverse domination tolling standards
inevitably postpone resolution of limitations issues until trial,
they raise a number of serious policy concerns. First, from the
perspective of individuals who may be subjected to corporate
litigation claims, the tolling theory substantially defeats any
prospects for repose. Unless there has been a complete change
of control of a corporation, the corporation's directors and offi-
cers, and even its professional advisers, can never be certain
that the statute of limitations has extinguished the sparks of
all potential corporate claims against them." So long as the
corporate plaintiff can make credible allegations of director
involvement or conflict of interest with respect to the claims it
brings (which may amount to no more than a failure on the
part of some directors to discover and prosecute the claims), a
successful limitations defense is not assured, no matter how
much time has elapsed from the occurrence of the alleged mis-
conduct.
This concern highlights a related objection to the adverse
domination theory. If, under adverse domination tolling stan-
dards, the outcome of the limitations defense depends on an-
swers to fact questions that are typically decided along with
the merits of plaintiffs claims at trial, does the limitations
defense "bar litigation" of stale claims in any meaningful
decisions in some of the early adverse domination cases (e.g., opinions denying
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment based on limitations) appear to final-
ly decide the issue of limitations in the plaintiff corporation's favor. See, e.g., FDIC
v. Howse, 736 F. Supp. 1437, 1441-42 (S.D. Tex. 1990); FSLIC v. Williams, 599 F.
Supp. 1184, 1195 (D. Md. 1984). However, nothing in these opinions expressly lim-
its defendants' ability to prevail on the limitations defense at trial by disproving
the factual allegations on which pre-trial adverse domination rulings depended.
270 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Baughman, supra note 18, at 1112-13 (providing illustration of this
problem).
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sense? After all, most civil lawsuits are resolved through set-
tlement prior to trial.272 Thus, the fact-intensive nature of the
adverse domination tolling theory may transform the limita-
tions defense from a right to be free of stale claims into a mere
bargaining chip for settlement.27 The FDIC took full advan-
tage of this situation in failed bank and thrift litigation, dis-
posing of most of its claims through settlement, but only if it
first prevailed on dispositive pre-trial defense motions based on
limitations and related issues.274
Adverse domination tolling standards may also make it
more difficult for defendants9 to insure against potential corpo-
rate claims. D & 0 insurers have consistently implemented
policy exclusions where corporate litigation developments
posed excessive underwriting risks.275 To the extent that ad-
verse domination tolling standards extend the life of corporate
claims beyond what insurers conclude are reasonable bounds,
there is no reason to expect them to treat those claims any
differently. Indeed, existing D & 0 insurance exclusions may
already bar coverage of many claims for which adverse domi-
nation might otherwise toll limitations.27
See, e.g., Marc Galanter and Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle. • Judicial Promo-
tion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994) (citing
study showing over two-thirds of cases settle before any dispositive decision in the
case).
2 Of course, since settling parties presumably bargain "in the shadow of the
law," this objection also applies to any limitations defense that raises factual is-
sues. Yet because adverse domination tolling standards are so closely linked with
the merits of the corporate plaintiffs claims, the objection applies with greater
force. That is, if the trial on the merits goes forward along with limitations issues,
defendants face considerably greater risks than if the limitations issue were tried
in isolation.
"' See, e.g., Villa, supra note 86 (describing FDIC's investigation, decision to
sue and settlement procedures in failed bank and thrift cases).
"' See generally Goldman, supra note 250 (describing development of various D
& 0 policy exclusions).
' Like other insurers, D & 0 carriers have moved away from "occurrence"
based policies to "claims made" based policies over the past 20 years or so. De-
spite their label, many "claims made" policies do not cover all claims made in a
policy year, but only those that are so made and that are based on conduct that
occurred within a defined time window, typically the point at which the carrier
commenced coverage. Thomas W. Hyland et al., Directors and Officers Liability
Insurance: An Overview and Current Issues, Part (A), in 10TH ANNUAL INSURANCE,
EXCESS AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 1993 (PLI Litg. Course Handbook
Series No. H4-5148, 1993). There is a similar trend to impose time limits on
"claims made" D & 0 coverage with "prior act" exclusions. See Goldman, supra
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Finally, because adverse domination tolling standards
prevent pre-trial disposition of claims based on the limitations
defense in so many corporate cases, they also interfere with
the "social dimension" of statutes of limitation. Recall that one
of the purposes behind the limitations defense is to promote an
efficient judicial system for all litigants by relieving courts of
the burden of litigating claims where the fact-finding task is
likely to be impaired by stale evidence.' Adverse domination
tolling standards defeat this goal to the extent they require
full-blown litigation of cases that are ultimately determined to
be time-barred.
C. Reprise: The Rules/Standards Debate in Limitations Law
and Corporate Law
Part II of the Article described the rules/standards ten-
sions that are endemic in both limitations law and corporate
law. Returning to this theme, one can readily appreciate that
all of the foregoing policy objections to the adverse domination
tolling theory stem from its substitution of fact-based stan-
dards for a bright-line limitations rule. As has been shown,
such standards are the inevitable byproduct of the adverse
domination theory's roots in open-ended corporate law fiducia-
ry duty principles. And because adverse domination standards
cannot be applied with the precision of a bright-line rule, the
tolling theory offers few prospects for a middle ground compro-
mise between rules/standards modes of decision-making. None-
theless, there is a strong tendency towards just such compro-
mises in both limitations law and corporate law.
1. Limitations Law Developments
Consider, for example, modem discovery rule jurispru-
dence. Courts first applied this modified definition of accrual
outside the fraud and fraudulent concealment context in cases
where defendant doctor left a foreign object in plaintiff pa-
tient. 8 In those cases, although the statute of limitations
note 250, § HI(F)(3).
27 See supra note 24.
"s 2 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 11.1.2.1, at 136-39.
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had expired if accrual was measured on an "occurrence" basis,
the discovery rule provided a somewhat plausible tolling alter-
native that did not stray very far from a "rule-based" system of
limitations. Plaintiffs discovery of defendant's fault in causing
the injury typically occurred at a point that could be identified
with some certainty. But the discovery rule has not been limit-
ed to "foreign object" cases. Indeed, it has been applied in an
ever-widening variety of situations where plaintiff is "blame-
lessly ignorant" of one or more aspects of the claim, 9 rang-
ing from malpractice and toxic tort claims, to claims for "title
[to real property], defamation of character, products liabili-
ty,.., and construction contracts." °
As Professor Gail Heriot has explained, this expansion of
the discovery rule in recent decades led to an "obvious" ques-
tion: "Just what is it that has to be discovered in order to trig-
ger the rule?"28' Plaintiff might be aware of the injury but
not that defendant caused it, or aware of defendant's conduct
but not that it was wrongful. If the discovery rule is intended
give plaintiff a "reasonable opportunity" to file suit within the
legislatively-prescribed time period, one might logically post-
pone accrual "until plaintiff is in possession of sufficient facts
to give notice of each element of the cause of action."282 Some
courts have taken precisely this step in medical malpractice
cases, deciding that "the cause of action accrues, and the stat-
ute of limitations runs, from the time the plaintiff first knows
or should know that the injury is caused by the negligence of
the defendant."28
Like the adverse domination theory, these more open-end-
ed versions of the discovery rule link the limitations issue
closely to the merits of the litigation and make the issue diffi-
cult to resolve short of trial. If defendant cannot prevail on the
limitations issue at the outset of litigation (i.e., by motion to
dismiss or by motion for summary judgment), he must defend
against plaintiffs claim, and the court must try it, because the
claim might ultimately be found not to be time-barred. Propo-
nents of bright-line rules argue that such open-ended tolling
" Heriot, supra note 100, at 958.
2 CORMAN, supra note 5, at §11.1.2.2, at 139-40.
2" Heriot, supra note 100, at 956.
Heriot, supra note 100, at 956.
2 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 11.1.4, at 146.
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principles do not provide any true measure of repose to defen-
dants, nor do they alleviate courts of the necessity of litigating
stale claims.'
Some courts, though perhaps not a majority, have been
receptive to these concerns and have declined to extend the
discovery rule to its logical conclusions. In United States v.
Kubrick,' for example, the Supreme Court decided that un-
der the Federal Tort Claims Act,' the statute of limitations
begins to run once a plaintiff is aware of the injury and its
cause, regardless of whether plaintiff has or should have had
evidence of defendant's wrongdoing in connection with the
injury.' As the Court explained: "[Discovery rule standards
that hinge on plaintiffs knowledge of a breach of legal duty]
would go far to eliminate the statute of limitations as a de-
fense separate from the denial of breach of duty."'
The lesson of the discovery rule experiment, as evidenced
by Kubrick, is that while limitations tolling standards can
restore a measure of equity to rule-based statutes of limitation,
if the standards are too open-ended, they defeat the purpose of
the limitations defense.' Another "middle ground" may be
Heriot, supra note 100, at 96L Indeed, even supporters of the discovery rule
have acknowledged that its application can be problematic in some circumstances.
For example, Professor Michael Green has noted that when the discovery rule is
applied in toxic substances litigation, which typically involves an extended chronol-
ogy of causation, resolution of issues concerning plaintiffs knowledge can dramat-
ically enlarge the scope of legitimate disagreement and, therefore, litigation:
Extensive discovery proceedings, contested factual hearings, and ultimate
submission of this issue to the jury become necessary conditions for reso-
lution. No longer can the statute of limitations issue be decided at an
early stage, thus obviating the need for the parties to prepare for and
litigate the merits as welL Not only does the statute of limitations fail to
reduce the resources poured into litigating the merits, but the judicial
and party resources expended to resolve the protracted disputes over its
application, like all procedural wrangling, in no way contribute to the
resolution of the merits of the case.
Green, supra note 28, at 983-84.
444 U.S. 111 (1979).
28 U.S.C. §§ 26711-80 (1994).
Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 116. While Kubrick may not represent a majority view,
it "has been applied beyond the Federal Tort Claims Act in a wide variety of legal
settings." 2 CORMAN, LI=iTATIONS, supra note 5, § 11.1.4, at 146.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 125.
Id. at 123 ([The expansive discovery standard requested by plaintiff "would
undermine the purpose of the limitations statute ... "). Indeed, other recent
precedent on limitations reflects the Supreme Court's recognition that clear and
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desirable, even if courts must define it with arbitrary bound-
aries. In the words of Professor Heriot:
Kubrick and the cases that follow it attempt to halt the progress of
the discovery rule. They draw an arbitrary line and refuse to go
further. The particular line they draw may be difficult to defend....
Nevertheless, the line preserves some of the rulelike qualities of the
statute of limitations."
Legislatures have taken a similar "arbitrary" middle
ground approach by softening the impact of discovery rules
with statutes of repose. Unlike a statute of limitations, a stat-
ute of repose "is typically an absolute time limit beyond which
liability no longer exists and is not tolled for any reason be-
cause to do so would upset the economic balance struck by the
legislative body."291 Legislatures originally adopted statutes
of repose to bar claims for defective design or construction of
buildings once a designated number of years elapsed from the
structure's completion,292 but now use them more generally to
establish an outer time limit on claims to which the discovery
rule applies.293
Unfortunately, courts applying judicially-sanctioned dis-
covery rules are rarely in a position to establish such a two-
tiered approach.2"4 Instead, as in Kubrick, where courts find
easily applied limitations rules facilitate litigation for both plaintiffs and defen-
dants, as well as the courts who must hear their controversies. See, e.g., Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (adopting a
uniform federal limitations rule for Rule 10b-5 claims); Agency Holding Corp. v.
Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) (adopting a uniform federal
limitations rule for RICO claims); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (holding
that all § 1983 claims should be characterized the same way for limitations pur-
poses).
"o Heriot, supra note 100, at 958.
" First United Methodist Church v. United Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866
(4th Cir. 1989).
2 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250 (Michie 1950).
See 2 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 11.2 at 170-71.
An interesting but rare example of a court creating" such a rule is Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991). In Lampf,
the Court adopted a uniform federal statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 claims
that parallels the 1-year from discovery, 3-years from occurrence repose rule that
Congress expressly provided for certain similar securities law claims. The Lampf
decision can perhaps be best understood as an effort to provide badly needed uni-
formity in limitations standards for Rule 10b-5 claims. See Harold S. Bloomenthal,
The Statute of Limitations and Rule 10b-5 Claims: A Study in Judicial Lassitude,
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the cost of tolling standards too high relative to the need for
the repose and clarity that bright-line limitations rules can
provide, they draw seemingly arbitrary boundaries that cir-
cumnscribe the use of tolling standards. The same forces may be
at work in adverse domination cases.
2. Corporate Law Developments
While the advent of the discovery rule has enabled courts
to apply statutes of limitation more as standards than bright-
line rules, the movement in corporate law has been in the
opposite direction. Recall that bright-line rules have grown
increasingly important in corporate law over the course of this
century. s5 As in the limitations area, however, there is evi-
dence that corporate law gravitates toward a middle ground
between rules/standards extremes.
Consider recent legislative enactments permitting limita-
tions on director and officer liability for fiduciary duty viola-
tions. Statutes in most states now allow corporations to limit
their directors' and officers' monetary liability for certain viola-
tions of the duty of care, but do not permit complete elimina-
tion of fiduciary duty liability." In many jurisdictions, the
limitation on liability may not encompass breaches of the duty
of loyalty, bad faith acts or omissions, acts or omissions involv-
ing intentional misconduct or knowing violations of law, or
transactions from which the fiduciary derives an improper
personal benefit. 7 It is difficult to reconcile such a "middle
ground" position with either traditional views of corporate law,
which place a high premium on fiduciary duty enforcement, or
with contractual paradigms, which view corporations as volun-
tary economic relationships. Nonetheless, such liability limita-
tions can be understood as a compromise position that pre-
serves some degree of judicial review of corporate fiduciaries'
60 U. COLO. L. REV. 235 (1989). Interestingly, one commentator argues that the
Lampf decision should not be construed to provide repose for defendants who have
fraudulently concealed their lob-5 violations. See Johnson, supra note 26.
See supra Part ILB.3.
For a representative sample of such statutes, see the ALI's PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 7.19, Reporters Note (4), at 897. For
a survey and analysis of this legislation see Hanks, supra note 132.
2" See, eg., DEL GEN. CORP. L. § 102(b)(7) (1991).
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conduct while eliminating the disproportionate monetary lia-
bility with which corporate litigation often threatens them.29
Consider also caselaw developments in connection with the
duty of loyalty. One could take a strict rules-based approach to
enforcement that either (i) bans all conflict of interest transac-
tions, or (ii) permits all such transactions where procedural
safeguards attend the approval process. But either approach
would necessarily be over- or under-inclusive.299 The courts
have gravitated to a middle ground between these two ex-
tremes, which recognizes that bright-line procedural safe-
guards can alleviate many concerns about conflict of interest
transactions, but also that limited judicial review serves as an
appropriate safeguard against potential abuse."'°
Courts have also taken a middle-ground approach when
interpreting corporate statutes. For example, judicial "veil
piercing" doctrine in every state qualifies statutory language
that literally immunizes shareholders from liability for corpo-
rate obligations."0' Even in Delaware, considered by many to
be the most "pro-management" corporate law jurisdiction,
courts are reluctant to embrace an entirely permissive ap-
proach to statutory interpretation. One line of Delaware cases
suggests that courts will not second-guess the purpose behind
" See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on
Steering Between Scylla and Charbidis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789 (1984).
' The duty of loyalty might be enforced, as some have argued it was during
the 19th century, with a rule that conflict of interest transactions are always
invalid. See Marsh, supra note 175. Such a rule would eliminate managerial abus-
es that conflict of interest transactions may entail, but would also forbid conflict of
interest transactions that might be beneficial to the corporation. The duty of loyal-
ty could also be rule-based at the other extreme, with conflict of interest
transactions defined quite precisely, along with procedural approval avenues to
eliminate the possibility of judicial review. See, e.g., MBCA §§ 8.60-8.63. The prob-
lem with such an approach is that the rules might be so precise as to be
underinclusive, either with respect to the definition of "conflict of interest" or nec-
essary procedural safeguards.
30 In Delaware, for example, courts have subjected conflict of interest transac-
tions to "fairness" review, despite statutory rules that arguably preempt such stan-
dards where disinterested directors or shareholders have approved the matter. See,
e.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 222 (Del. 1976) (holding that statutory
approval mechanisms merely remove an " 'interested director' cloud" from conflict
of interest transactions, which remain subject to judicial scrutiny). Accord
Weatherhead v. Griffin, 851 P.2d 993, 999-1000 (Idaho App. 1992). See generally
BRANSON, supra note 67,.§ 8.01, at 393.
... See, e.g., MBCA § 6.22.
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actions that corporate statutes permit. 2 But other Delaware
authority supports the proposition that "inequitable action [by
corporate directors] does not become permissible simply be-
cause it is legally possible."0 3
A potential unifying theme among these disparate deci-
sions is that courts serve as a backstop that, through open-
ended standards for corporate fiduciaries' conduct, can punish
and deter undesirable activities that statutory rules might
otherwise permit. Professor John Coffee, a scholar who has
defended "middle ground" approaches on a variety of corporate
law issues, has most clearly articulated this view. Professor
Coffee argues that both traditional and contract paradigms of
corporate law are "correct" in the sense that the American
system supports each viewpoint, but only to a degree. That is,
the institution of judicial review of fiduciaries' actions compen-
sates for the otherwise permissive nature of American statuto-
ry corporate law, but one would not be desirable (or, judging
from comparative corporate legal systems, realistically possi-
ble) without the other.3 The American Law Institute's re-
cent defense of the derivative litigation remedy in the Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance echoes similar themes.
D. Adverse Domination Developments and the Search for
Middle Ground
One can identify a similar pattern in adverse domination
developments. The theory was born out of a perceived need to
soften the impact of bright-line limitations rules in corporate
cases. Yet, as application of adverse domination tolling stan-
dards in recent failed bank and thrift cases have shown, the
theory does so by moving bright-line limitations rules to the
' See, e.g., Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 182 A.2d 22 (Del. Ch. 1962)
(There is [Delaware] authority... that the various sections of the Delaware
Corporation Law conferring authority for corporate action are independent of each
other and that a given result may be accomplished by proceeding under one sec-
tion which is not possible, or is even forbidden under another.").
Schnell v. Chris Craft Industries, 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del 1971). See general-
ly Douglas M. Branson, The Chancellor's Foot in Ddaware: SchneU and its Prosge-
ny, 14 J. CORP. L. 515 (1989).
Coffee, supra note 133.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, Introductory Note
to Part VII, at 4-6.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
extreme "standards" end of the rules/standards continuum.
Recent judicial decisions refusing to adopt the adverse domina-
tion theory or narrowly restricting its application are perhaps
best understood as an attempt to restore balance to this equa-
tion.
For example, when courts decline to apply adverse domi-
nation tolling standards except in extreme situations, i.e.,
where the corporate plaintiffs claims implicate controlling
directors in fraud or fraudulent concealment, courts leave a
large segment of corporate fiduciary breaches (e.g., due care
claims, duty of loyalty claims or other intentional misconduct
falling short of fraud) in the realm of bright-line statutes of
limitation. Even where courts draw the lines for application of
adverse domination a bit more generously, e.g., to include duty
of loyalty violations, courts still preserve more of the "rule-like"
character of statutes of limitation than would be possible if the
theory applied to all claims.
And as courts require more serious corporate fiduciary
misconduct before adverse domination tolling can apply, they
also make the theory's tolling standards themselves more rule-
like. That is, as the categories of conduct that trigger tolling
move from negligence-based claims to claims involving duty of
loyalty violations (e.g., self dealing) or intentionally wrongful
acts such as fraud, there is also a shift in the type of miscon-
duct the plaintiff corporation must be able to identify to
achieve tolling. No longer can the corporation invoke adverse
domination based on allegedly actionable omissions by corpo-
rate fiduciaries; rather, it is required to allege that one or more
corporate fiduciaries have been active participants in
wrongdoing."6 As such it becomes more difficult for the cor-
" As the Fifth Circuit observed in FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303 (5th Cir.
1993), if the adverse domination theory tolls limitations for negligence claims
against corporate fiduciaries, plaintiff corporations can easily avoid the statute of
limitations defense by arguing that corporate fiduciaries who failed to police al-
leged misconduct by their counterparts were themselves "negligent" and therefore
also culpable directors for purposes of adverse domination. Id. at 1312. The easier
it is to raise fact issues about possible director "interest," the easier it will be to
postpone resolution of the adverse domination question-and hence the validity of
the limitations defense-until trial. Indeed, as the Fifth Circuit later determined in
a separate case, because distinctions between negligence and gross negligence are
so subtle, and relate to matters of degree rather than kind, the same objections
apply to use of adverse domination tolling for gross negligence claims. RTC v.
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poration to satisfy the threshold pleading and proof require-
ments and courts can more frequently resolve limitations is-
sues short of a trial on the merits.0 7
This tendency is perhaps most apparent in the Fifth
Circuit's interpretation of adverse domination tolling standards
under Texas law. When the court declined to apply the theory
to negligence claims or to corporate claims against third par-
ties,"' the court limited the scope of adverse domination toll-
ing standards and concomitantly enlarged the scope of bright-
line limitations rules. But the court did not abandon the ad-
verse domination theory. While many courts confined its toll-
ing standards to the fraud and fraudulent concealment con-
text,0 9 the Fifth Circuit recognized a potentially broader
scope for the theory's application, i.e., that it should toll limita-
tions for claims implicating directors in duty of loyalty viola-
tions or other intentionally wrongful conduct31 0
The Fifth Circuit has also made adverse domination tolling
standards more rule-like through procedural restrictions on
their application. For example, to establish adverse domination
under Texas law (as construed in the Fifth Circuit), the cor-
porate plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove at trial that a
majority of directors were actively involved in self dealing or
more serious misconduct. The corporation cannot establish
adverse domination in any other way, i.e., by showing conflicts
of interest on the part of allegedly disinterested directors or by
showing that a minority of the board engaged in wrongdoing
and, despite their minority status, dominated the remaining
directors and thereby dominated the corporate entity.31 A
Acton, 49 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (5th Cir. 1995).
1 The only situation in which this may not be true is when the corporation is
insolvent or nearly so, and the plaintiff corporation's claim is for a duty of loyalty
violation that is triggered by corporate managements failure to recognize the re-
quired shift in their allegiance from shareholders to creditors. Such claims may
punish corporate fiduciaries for what amounts to inattention to the financial condi-
tion of the corporation. While such claims are not 'self dealing" claim in the
conventional duty of loyalty sense, they do involve duty of loyalty violations. See
Dord, supra note 30, at 198-203.
"' See, eg., Dawson, 4 F.3d at 1312 (adverse domination does not apply to
claims of directorial negligence); FDIC v. Shrader & York, 991 F.2d 216, 226-27
(5th Cir. 1993) (adverse domination does not apply to corporate claims against
third parties).
See, eg., FDIC v. Cocke, 7 F.3d 396, 402 (4th Cir. 1993).
310 Acton, 49 F.3d at 1090-91.
See RTC v. Henderson, 61 F.3d 421, 427-28 (5th Cir. 1995) (numerical ma-
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federal district court explained this restriction in terms that
recognize the importance of bright-line rules:
As for the policy rationale, while it may seem counterintuitive for a
state to adopt an adverse domination rule with the intent of elevat-
ing substance over form, only to erect another formal barrier that
ignores substance and thereby precludes invocation of the tolling
principle, there is a countervailing interest. '[S]tatutes of limitations
are themselves expressions of important legislative policies.'...
Texas recognizes that limitations periods afford plaintiffs a reason-
able time to present their claims, and protect defendants and the
courts from the obligation 'to deal with cases in which the search for
truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence' caused by
lost witnesses and documents and fading memories.... Statutes of
limitations 'should not be judicially abrogated without due consider-
ation of those policies. ... "
In sum, the lines courts have drawn in recent years that
circumscribe application of adverse domination tolling stan-
dards are not necessarily defensible in terms of the theory's
internal logic. Rather, as in the Kubrick line of cases that limit
the scope of the discovery rule, these lines may be understood
as an attempt to effect a compromise that preserves open-end-
ed standards for fiduciary enforcement in serious cases, as well
as a substantial measure of bright-line rules from limitations
law that can better effect policy goals.
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Part IV has shown that both limitations law and corporate
law, as well as in some recent adverse domination cases, favors
a middle ground compromise between rules and standards.
This Part of the Article tries to identify what may be the most
defensible middle ground approaches for resolving limitations
problems where corporate claims implicate controlling corpo-
rate fiduciaries in wrongdoing. It considers potential judicial
jority of board of directors must be alleged to have engaged in wrongdoing or
fraud for adverse domination tolling to apply).
3 1 RTC v. Bright, 872 F. Supp. 1551, 1562 (N.D. Tex. 1995). As the quotation
suggests, the Fifth Circuit's restrictions on the use of adverse domination tolling
theories not only foster repose goals for potential defendants facing corporate
claims, but also the judicial system's larger stake in those values. It is surely no
accident that the federal circuit that faced the greatest number of cases arising
out of the bank and thrift crisis substantially eased its workload through restric-
tions on use of the adverse domination theory.
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and legislative reforms that might accommodate the goals of
limitations policy and fiduciary duty enforcement better than
the lines the courts have drawn thus far.
A. Potential Judicial Reforms
1. Claims Limitations
The Fifth Circuit has already embarked on what may be
the most sensible judicial reform measure: limiting application
of adverse domination tolling standards to cases where the
claims against corporate fiduciaries allege wrongdoing that is
more serious than negligence or gross negligence. Indeed,
drawing adverse domination boundaries as the court apparent-
ly did in RTC v. Acton, 15 to include not only claims of fraud
but also duty of loyalty violations (e.g., self dealing) and other
intentional misconduct short of fraud, not only furthers limita-
tions policies, but also echoes policy choices that corporate law
has made on its own in director exculpation statutes and deriv-
ative litigation.314 Moreover, applying the adverse domination
theory only in cases alleging such fiduciary misconduct is also
consistent with prevailing views on the scope of the disclosure
obligations of corporate fiduciaries."
' 49 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (5th Cir. 1995).
314 The balance that corporate law has struck in statutes permitting corporate
fiduciaries to limit their monetary liability to the corporation through charter
amendments is instructive. While these statutes do not protect directors against
fraud or fraudulent concealment claims, nor do they insulate them from all con-
duct outside of those categories. As already noted, charter amendment statutes
generally do not permit exculpation for violations of the duty of loyalty (e.g., self
dealing), intentional misconduct or knowing violations of the law. See supra note
297 and accompanying text. The American Law Institutes recommended reforms
for derivative litigation contemplate a similar scope for fiduciary duty liability. The
reforms include a proposed sliding scale of judicial review of director responses to,
derivative litigation, with duty of care claims at one end and claims involving self
dealing or knowing and culpable violations of law at the other. See PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 7.10, cmt c. Cf. Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805 (DeL 1984) (tying demand futility issue in derivative litigation to avail-
ability of business judgment rule protection for challenged board decision).
" For example, while the precise parameters of corporate fiduciaries' duty of
disclosure is not entirely clear, there appears to be some consensus that corporate
fiduciaries must disclose all material information when seeking shareholder action.
See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text. The courts have construed the
"materiality" concept to require disclosure of matters that involve self dealing or
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
There is one potential objection to eliminating adverse
domination tolling for negligence and gross negligence claims.
A contractarian might argue that whether adverse domination
tolling principles apply to such claims is less important than
whether the corporation and its fiduciaries can contract around
applicable limitations and tolling rules. And such "contracts"
are possible, at least to some degree. That is, in most jurisdic-
tions, corporations and their fiduciaries can use charter provi-
sions to insulate their fiduciaries from monetary liability for
negligence and gross negligence claims, thus mooting the limi-
tations issue for such claims from the fiduciaries' perspec-
tive. 16 It is less clear whether a contractual modification
running in the other direction (i.e., an agreement by directors
not to assert the limitations defense or to lengthen the statute
of limitations) would be permissible. 11 Thus, adverse domi-
nation standards may effectively provide a default rule of toll-
ing for negligence and gross negligence claims that should
apply to corporations and fiduciaries who do not "opt out" of
that scheme through the charter amendment process.
Yet, this objection ignores the fact that limitations rules
are not crafted solely for the benefit of litigants. Statutes of
limitation also promote larger societal interests in a speedy
and efficient judicial system, values that tolling principles may
318hre smimproperly compromise. Moreover, there are some corpora-
tions, particularly those not chartered under general corporate
codes, for which the charter amendment option may not avail-
able, thus making tolling vel non (depending on position the
more serious misconduct, since they reflect on the integrity of management. See,
e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Since self-dealing
presents opportunities for abuse of a corporate position of trust, the circumstances
surrounding corporate transactions in which directors have a personal interest are
directly relevant to a determination of whether they are qualified to exercise stew-
ardship of the company."); Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 778 (9th Cir. 1981)
("We draw a sharp distinction ... between allegations of conduct involving breach
of trust or self-dealing-the non-disclosure of which is presumptively material-and
allegations of simple breach of fiduciary duty/waste of corporate assets-the non-
disclosure of which is never material for § 14(a) purposes ... .
3' See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
317 "[Mlost courts view an advance contractual agreement of waiver [of the stat-
ute of limitations defense] to be legally invalid and violative of the policy that
statutes of limitations are generally beneficial to the public as well as to the indi-
vidual." 1 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 3.2.1 at 174.
318 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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court takes on negligence and gross negligence claims) a man-
datory rule.' 9
2. Third-Party Claims
The courts remain divided on the issue of adverse domina-
tion tolling for corporate claims against third parties, and
there are as yet no signs of judicial compromise. However,
there is a possible middle ground position courts might consid-
er. As outlined below, fundamental agency law "imputation"
rules may justify use of the adverse domination theory in cases
where the corporation pursues claims against third parties, at
least where those claims also implicate controlling corporate
fiduciaries in a breach of their duty of loyalty or more serious
misconduct. The argument requires a basic review of responde-
at superior principles of agency and corporate law.
As in all principal-agent relationships, the directors and
officers of a corporation are responsible to the corporation for
any breaches of duty they commit."'9 For example, unless a
corporation has adopted a charter amendment limiting director
liability, the corporation can recover from a grossly negligent
director for the damages her misconduct causes."L The direc-
tor, not the corporation, is responsible for those losses. But the
same rule does not apply when third parties are harmed by
corporate fiduciaries' misconduct. Under generally applicable
agency and corporate law principles, an agent's negligence
" Some jurisdictions allow specially chartered corporations, like financial insti-
tutions, to limit the duty of care liability of their fiduciaries. See Dord, supra note
30, at 182 n. 202 (collecting statutes). However, it is not clear that this option is
available in all states or for all specially chartered corporations. See Matthew M.
Kristufek, Trying Not to Get Burned by FIRREA: The Attempts to Shield Directors
or Officers of Financial Institutions From Personal Liability, nn. 32 & 38 (unpub-
lished manuscript dated 126 on file with author) (listing states that permit char-
ter amendment shields for financial institution directors). Federal law provides a
minimum gross negligence liability standard for directors and officers of financial
institutions in any event. 12 U.S.C. §1821(k) (1994). See generally Atherton v.
FDIC, 117 S.Ct. 666 (1997).
32 Directors of a corporation are not agents in a technical legal sense, of
course, since they occupy a sui generis legal position. They are appointed by
shareholders, but are not subject to control by shareholders in the management of
the corporation. Cf. MBCA § 8.01(b) ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or
under the authority of... its board of directors....7.
See, eg., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,8 (D&l. 1985).
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maybe "imputed" to the corporation, which can then be made
to pay third parties for the resulting losses.2 2 Thus, the
director's gross negligence in the previous example would be
imputed to the corporation if the corporation sued a third party
on a related claim, and that third party raised a contributory
(or comparative) negligence defense against the corpora-
tion."
If a corporate fiduciary's misconduct violates her duty of
loyalty to the corporation, however, exceptions to general im-
putation rules of agency and corporate law may apply. Where
the fiduciary's interests are "completely adverse" to those of
her corporation, her knowledge and conduct are not imputed to
the corporation, even where third party interests are affect-
ed.3" Of course, the "complete adversity" requirement of the
exception means that its parameters are not precisely cotermi-
nous with duty of loyalty violations, which can arise from any
conflict of interest situation.3" Nonetheless, where a corpo-
rate fiduciary's actions are completely adverse to her corpora-
tion, she has necessarily breached her duty of loyalty. Thus, for
at least some duty of loyalty violations by corporate fiduciaries,
and for all more serious misconduct, the adverse interest impu-
tation exception supports application of adverse domination
tolling principles to related third party claims.326
Recall that the adverse domination theory is itself rooted
in duty of loyalty concerns-that corporate fiduciaries do not
want the corporation to sue them for any breach of duty they
may have committed, whether the breach was mere negligence
" See Dor6, supra note 30, at 172-73. Of course the corporate fiduciary, as
agent, is also responsible to the third party. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGEN-
CY ch. 11, Topic 3 (1958). However, as in any respondeat superior situation, the
corporation must bear the third party's loss if the agent does not or cannot cover
it.
323 See Dor6, supra note 30, at 196. The classic example would be a malpractice
claim by the corporation against its lawyers or accountants for failing to prevent
or detect negligent mismanagement by corporate directors. The lawyers or accoun-
tants might assert the directors' mismanagement as a contributory or comparative
negligence defense to the malpractice claim. See Dor4, supra note 30, at 132-33.
324 See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282 (1957); 3A FLETCHER,
CORPORATIONS, supra note 38, § 787.
" Dor6, supra note 30, at 174.
321 See generally Dor6, supra note 30, at 171-75 (making similar argument with
respect to imputation defenses generally).
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or more serious misconduct."s In terms of imputation theory,
there is "complete adversity" between the fiduciary and the
corporation with respect to all such claims. One might then
argue that the adverse domination theory should logically
suspend limitations on corporate claims against third parties
that implicate corporate fiduciaries in any sort of misconduct.
But that approach bootstraps fiduciary violations for which the
corporation is expected to absorb the risk of harm to third
parties (e.g., negligence-based claims) into "complete adversity"
duty of loyalty violations for purposes of adverse domination
tolling.
A more limited use of adverse domination tolling in con-
nection with third party claims would be more consistent with
underlying agency and corporate law principles. The dividing
line suggested earlier for D & 0 claims, i.e., one that restricts
adverse domination tolling for claims against third parties to
situations where the related corporate fiduciary breach in-
volves conduct that amounts to a violation of the duty of loyal-
ty or more serious misconduct, works fairly well. While not a
precise fit with underlying agency and corporate law imputa-
tion rules,ms this compromise position more closely approxi-
mates the risk allocation principles upon which such rules are
based."
3. Simplifying Factual Determinations
Another set of reforms courts might implement to achieve
better compromises between bright-line limitations rules and
adverse domination tolling standards concerns procedures for
resolving the factual issues upon which adverse domination
tolling standards depend.
See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
See Dor6, supra note 30, at 173-74. This approach would seem particularly
appropriate in jurisdictions that, like the Fifth Circuit, generally restrict applica-
tion of adverse domination tolling to such claims. See, e.g., RTC v. Acton, 49 F.3d
1086, 1090-91 (5th Cir. 1995).
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a. Pleading Standards
Courts might consider whether adverse domination tolling
questions could be resolved on the basis of the pleadings. If the
corporate plaintiff makes sufficiently detailed allegations of
director involvement in wrongdoing or conflict of interest with
respect to the litigation claims at issue, the court might simply
toll limitations and end the matter. Conversely, the court could
refuse to toll where plaintiff cannot plead in sufficient detail
concerning these issues." This reform might work best
where adverse domination tolling standards require allegations
of a fairly specific nature, i.e., that a majority of directors have
actively engaged in self dealing or more serious wrongdoing.
Federal courts used a similar approach for resolving the issue
of demand futility in derivative cases prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services,
Inc.331 Under these standards, the federal courts excused de-
mand only if plaintiff could plead that "a majority of the board
was interested or knowingly participated in a manner that
amounted to aiding and abetting the wrong"
332
The objections to an approach that resolves disputed fact
issues on the basis of pleadings are fairly obvious, and they
have long been voiced in the derivative litigation context. If
pleading standards are too high, plaintiffs may be unable to
meet them without the benefit of discovery. If pleading stan-
dards are too low, plaintiffs can sidestep limitations defenses
through artful pleading. Either way, courts must make prema-
ture factual determinations without the benefit of developed
evidence.333
'o Cf. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984).
31 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90 (1991).
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 7.03, cmt. d. at
56 (citing Weiss v. Temporary Invest. Fund, 692 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1982)). Kamen
held that state law should control the demand futility issue and thus overruled
the "federal" standards Weiss and other courts had established. 500 U.S. at 108-09.
m See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 120, § 7.03, cmt. d.
at 56-57. Accord DEMOTr, supra note 176, § 5.13, at 50.
[Vol. 63: 695
1997] STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND CORPORATE CLAIMS 785
b. Judges as Fact-Finders
Another alternative is to make the judge the fact-finder on
issues relevant to adverse domination tolling. Some jurisdic-
tions have taken this very step when applying the discovery
rule, reasoning that if the court can determine the tolling ques-
tion through factual hearings prior to trial, then limitations
values will be better served.' If the court has determined
that limitations have expired, defendant will not face the risks
of a trial on the merits, nor will the court have to conduct one.
Yet, because adverse domination issues are quite complex, and
are also closely linked to the merits of the corporation's under-
lying claim,' separating trial of the limitations question
from the case on the merits may disserve values of judicial
economy."s
c. Shareholder Notice
Another possible reform goes more directly to the heart of
adverse domination tolling standards. Recall that the goal of
the adverse domination inquiry is to determine the point at
which a corporation is able to pursue litigation against its
fiduciaries in light of the problems of disability, concealment
and notice that their control over the corporation engenders.
But when this inquiry is answered by focusing on the board of
directors' makeup, knowledge and conduct, complex factual
issues result that can make the limitations issue a moot point
if postponed until trial. Thus, courts should consider whether
the inquiry might be conducted using another criteria.
One possibility, drawn from existing Delaware tolling
standards for derivative litigation, is notice to shareholders.
Recall that Delaware courts toll limitations for derivative
claims that allege self dealing or more serious misconduct by
' See, eg., Lopez v. Swyer, 300 A.2d 563, 567 (N.J. 1973) (deciding that in
cases where the discovery rule applies, the court should determine the issue of
plaintiffs "discovery" prior to trial).
See supra Part IVA
In this regard, Delaware courts' experiences in derivative litigation is in-
structive. The multiple hearings required in Delaware derivative procedure may
needlessly postpone judicial consideration of the merits of the case. See Kaplan v.
Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501 (DeL Ci. 1984).
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directors.3 3 7 That is, when a Delaware shareholder plaintiff
complains of such misconduct, the resulting claim may be
timely even if facially time-barred by the statute of limitations
measured on an occurrence basis. To prevail on limitations the
shareholder must plead and prove that he sued within the
limitations period, measured from the point the shareholder
first knew or had reason to know of the facts constituting the
alleged wrong.
3 38
The appeal of such a shareholder notice test lies in the
avoidance of complex issues of director disinterest, knowledge,
ability and motivation to sue with respect to potential corpo-
rate claims.3 9 Indeed, there is precedent for the use of a
shareholder notice standard in the adverse domination context.
In United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater-Park City Co., 0 the
Utah Supreme Court held that disclosure of alleged self deal-
ing transactions in proxy materials made available to all
shareholders ended any tolling that might have otherwise
applied based on alleged adverse domination by members of
the board."4
Of course, some might argue that the issue of sufficiency of
notice will be equally difficult to resolve as board domination.
But limited precedent suggests that this is not the case. For
example, Delaware courts have held that public disclosure to
shareholders is an acceptable substitute for "actual notice."
342
And if the judicial task is to measure the adequacy of public
disclosures by the corporation, the court should be able to
' Kahn v. Seaboard Corp., 625 A.2d 269 (Del. Ch. 1993). See supra Part
H.C.3.
Kahn, 625 A.2d at 276-77.
These issues would remain relevant, of course, where a court was reviewing
a board committee's decision not to pursue claims that implicate corporate fiducia-
ries. The adverse domination tolling theory operates in the absence of such deci-
sions.
3"0 United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880 (Utah
1993).
"4 Id. at 887 ("we conclude that as a matter of law [that] (1) the shareholders,
as a class, were given sufficient information in the proxy statement that was
mailed to them to put them on notice of further inquiry into the fairness of the
restructuring agreements .... ").
' See, e.g., In re USACafes, L.P. Litigation, Civ. A. No. 11146 1993 WL 18769,
18 Del. J. Corp. L. 1204 (Del. Ch. 1993) (stating that shareholders are put on
inquiry notice that ends tolling where public filings disclose the basic facts con-
cerning transactions about which the corporation later complains).
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resolve the limitations issue without a trial. 3 Moreover, the
corporation (or its shareholders if the suit were derivative in
nature) would not need discovery to establish the merits of any
tolling arguments, since the information that controls the out-
come of the issue will by definition be that which the corpo-
ration has already made available.
Finally, so long as adverse domination tolling is limited to
duty of loyalty violations or more serious misconduct by corpo-
rate fiduciaries, determining adverse domination based on
disclosure of these issues to shareholders would also be consis-
tent with current minimum thresholds for directorial disclo-
sure obligations.3
B. Potential Legislative Reforms
Statutes might be a better tool for demarking, in compre-
hensive fashion, a middle ground in which bright-line statutes
of limitation and tolling theories can operate side by side in
the corporate arena. Statutes can draw sharper lines and ad-
dress policy concerns more fully than judicial precedent. In-
deed, statutes of limitation are supposed to embody a legisla-
tive compromise that accommodates not only defendants' de-
sire for repose, but also plaintiffs' need for a reasonable oppor-
tunity to protect their rights. 5 The balance of the Article re-
views statutory limitations provisions that currently apply to
claims in corporate fiduciary litigation and then suggests re-
forms that might make those statutes useful vehicles for mid-
dle ground compromise.3"
' See, e.g., In re Maxmam InciFederated Dev. Shareholders Litig., 1995 WL
376942, 21 Del J. Corp. L. 262 (Del Ch. 1995) (deciding, in the context of a mo-
tion to dismiss, that tolling continued where public disclosures obfuscated pertinent
facts that would otherwise have put shareholders on inquiry notice).
See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
See, eg., 1 COMIAN, supra note 5, § 1.1, at 14 CiTihe legislature is expected
to assess the nature of the subject and the purpose of the enactment and to as-
sure potential litigants a balanced attitude.") (citations omitted); Johnson, supra
note 26 at 631-32 ("[S]tatutes [of limitations] are said to represent a balancing of,
on the one hand, 'the interests in favor of protecting valid claims' and, on the
other hand, 'the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones.' ") (footnotes
citing Supreme Court cases omitted). See also Heriot, supra note 100, at 942-43
(describing compromises that are necessary to create limitations rules).
, Professor Robert W. Hamilton, of the University of Texas Law School, re-
viewed this Article prior to publication and advocated a slightly different approach.
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1. Currently Applicable Limitations Provisions
To date, legislative policy on the issue of limitations for
corporate fiduciary claims has been conspicuous by its absence.
Only three states-Michigan, South Carolina and Tennes-
see-have statutes of limitation that expressly apply to breach
of duty claims against corporate directors and officers.' 4
These statutes impose a one or two year limitations period
measured from discovery (an undefined concept) of the breach
of duty claim, but subject to a three-year outer limit of re-
pose." New York imposes a six year time limit on suits
against corporate directors "to recover damages for waste or for
an injury to property," but includes no express reference to
directors' fiduciary duties, nor any provision concerning discov-
ery or repose."9 California and nine other states have sub-
stantially identical statutes of limitation that cover actions
He pointed out that Congress could have avoided much of the controversy over
adverse domination and other limitations issues in failed bank and thrift litigation
by adopting special limitations provisions that would have applied in the receiver-
ship context. Such relief, Professor Hamilton argues, would have appropriately
compensated for conflicts of interest and other moral hazard problems that
prompted managing owners of financial institutions to take undue risks with in-
sured deposits prior to the institutions' ultimate insolvency and receivership. I
agree with Professor Hamilton about the conflict of interest and moral hazard
problems (see Dor6, supra, note 30, at 184-96), but I am not persuaded that Con-
gressional relief would have been appropriate. My concern is that such relief, to
the extent it changed the time limits for litigation after a financial institution
became insolvent, would have altered the substantive rights of the parties based
upon an event of insolvency, something a receivership proceeding is not supposed
to do. See Dor4, supra note 30, at 145. The statutory relief this Part of the Article
proposes is prospective only, and thus does not alter existing rights. Moreover, the
proposed statutes would apply to all corporate entities, not just financial institu-
tions, and all corporate fiduciary litigation, whether or not it occurs in the context
of receivership.
311 MICH. COmP. LAWS § 450.1541a.(4) (1990) (earlier of two years from discov-
ery or three years from occurrence); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-8-300(e), 33-8-420(e)
(Law Co-op. 1990) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-601 (1995) (earlier of one
year from discovery or three years from occurrence).
" See supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text (discussing differences be-
tween statutes of limitation and statutes of repose).
a' N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(7) (McKinney 1990). A recent decision seems to elim-
inate much of this uncertainty. See Whitney Holdings, Ltd. v. Givotovsky, No. 96
Civ. 8388 1997 WL 790579 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (The legislative history of Sec-
tion 213(7) and principles of statutory construction make clear that Section 213(7)
supplants all other statutes of limitation potentially applicable to a suit on a
corporation's claim against its director, officer or shareholder).
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against "directors, shareholders or members of a corpora-
tion... to recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to en-
force a liability created by law."' 0 However, courts disagree
whether these statutes impose any time limits on common law
breach of fiduciary duty claims against corporate directors and




The dearth of specific statutory limitations rules for corpo-
rate fiduciary claims is somewhat surprising, given modern
trends of codification in corporate law. 2 The omission is
even more striking when one considers that statutes of limita-
tion originated in commercial settings, with their attendant
need for repose.' Perhaps legislatures have intentionally
"[A]ctions against directors, shareholders, or members of a corporation, to
recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to enforce a liability created by
law... must be brought within three years alter the discovery by the aggrieved
party of the facts upon which the penalty or forfeiture attached, or the liability
was created." CAL. Civ. PROC. § 359 (West 1982). The states of Idaho, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin all
have similar statutes, though the time periods used vary slightly. See IDAHO CODE
§ 5-237 (1990) (three years); MO. ANN. STAT. § 516.420 (West 1952) (six years);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-211(3) (1997) (three years); NEV. REV. STAT. § 11.380
(1995) (three years); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-33 (1991) (six years); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 15-2-19 (Michie 1984) (six years); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-27 (1996)
(three years); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4511 (1974) (six years); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.60 (1997) (six years). South Carolina also has such a provision in addition to
the specific D & 0 statute of limitations cited in note 347, supra. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-3-530 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
"5 See, eg., Briano v. Rubio, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that California limitations provision applies only to statutory claims not actionable
at common law); Hoover v. Galbraith, 498 P.2d 981, 984 (Cal. 1972) (in bank)
(same); Melgard v. Moscow Idaho Seed Co., 251 P.2d 546 (Idaho 1952). Sea also
Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451 (1904) (applying Montana statute of limitations to
claims against corporate directors arising out of failure to file statutorily required
reports); Adams v. Clarke, 22 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1927) (applying Montana statute
of limitations to statutory claims against bank directors for illegal loans). But see
Quinn v. Elliott, No. 94-15181 1996 WL 233144 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting
Nevada's essentially identical limitations provision to cover common law breach of
fiduciary duty claims); United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870
P.2d 880 (Utah 1993) (same).
See supra Part IILB.2.
It was the need for repose in real property law and other commercial set-
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left the issue of limitations to judicial development along with
the rest of corporate fiduciary law. More likely, the current
state of affairs is simply a product of the statute of limitations'
gradual replacement of the laches defense in corporate fiducia-
ry litigation over the course of this century.3" Because this
process occurred through judicial decision rather than legis-
lation, no clear statutory model emerged for states to emulate.
In any event, in the absence of specific legislative direction
concerning corporate fiduciary claims, American courts have
handled the limitations issue in a variety of ways. Courts in
many jurisdictions first categorize breach of duty claims
against corporate directors and officers as either torts or
breaches of contract, and then apply the corresponding statute
of limitations."' In some jurisdictions, courts apply a more
specific limitations rule, albeit one that does not expressly
reference corporate fiduciary claims. For example, Delaware
courts use the three-year limitations period applicable t6 ac-
tions "to recover damages caused by an injury unaccompanied
with force or resulting indirectly from the act of the defen-
dant."5 ' Colorado courts use the limitations rule applicable
to breach of fiduciary duty claims generally. 5 ' In still other
states, courts apply a residual or other general statute of limi-
tings that gave birth to modern statutes of limitations. See Heriot, supra note 100,
at 923-25 (describing origin of statutes of limitations in medieval England as an
effort to quiet title to real property). See also Green, supra note 28, at 971-72
(tracing history of limitation in personal injury actions and noting that limitations
rules first emerged in commercial settings).
'"See supra Part MA
Compare, e.g., FDIC v. Dawson, 4 F.3d 1303 (5th Cir. 1993) (claims against
directors and officers of failed bank sounded in tort and were therefore governed
by Texas' two year statute of limitations), and Crosby v. Beam, 615 N.E.2d 294
(Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (minority stockholder's claims against corporate directors and
officers and corporate entity governed by Ohio's four year tort statute of limita-
tions), with RTC v. Armbruster, 52 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 1995) (claims against direc-
tors of failed savings and loan governed by Arkansas three year limitations provi-
sion for contract actions), and Bibo v. Jeffrey's Restaurant, 770 P.2d 290 (Alaska
1989) (claims against corporate directors governed by Alaska's six year statute of
limitations for contract actions).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8106 (1975).
Michaelson v. Michaelson, 923 P.2d 237 (1995), rev'd and remanded, 939
P.2d 835 (1997) (applying 3-year limitations period of COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-
101(1)(f) (1997)). See also Lawly Brooke Bums Trust v. RKR, Inc., 691 So.2d 1349,
1352 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (Louisiana's 10-year prescriptive period applies to breach-
es of fiduciary duty claims against corporate directors) (dicta).
[Vol. 63:695
1997] STATUTES OF LiMITATIONS AND CORPORATE CLIA S 791
tations to such claims.' In roughly half the states it is not
clear which statute of limitations applies to corporate fiduciary
claims.9
Enactment of express limitations provisions for corporate
fiduciary claims would eliminate much of this uncertainty, al-
though legislatures would need to draft such statutes with a
fair degree of precision to accomplish that goal. In the few
states that have adopted express limitations provisions, out-
comes remain unpredictable because most statutes are not
specific about which "breaches of duty" are covered. For exam-
ple, the Michigan, South Carolina and Tennessee statutes of
limitation each reference the broad duties their respective
state corporation codes impose on corporate managers, but do
not otherwise define the character of the corporate fiduciary
claims to which they apply.360
This lack of clarity essentially nullified the effect of the
Tennessee statute of limitations provision in RTC v. Wood.'"
The court applied the statute to those claims against directors
and officers that were styled as "breach of fiduciary duty," but
refused to apply the statute to causes of action against the
same directors and officers for "breach of implied contract,"
"gross negligence" and "negligence per se," even though all of
' See, eg., FDIC v. Cocke, 7 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1993) (claims against former
directors of failed savings and loan governed by Virginia's one year residual stat-
ute of limitations); Hecht v. RTC, 635 A.2d 394 (Md. 1994) (claims against former
directors of failed savings and loan governed by Maryland's three year residual
statute of limitations).
'Precedent in Massachusetts illustrates the problem one typically encounters
when researching limitations rules in many jurisdictions. One recent case holds
that D & 0 claims are governed by the statute of limitations applicable to tort
claims (see Demoulas v. Demoulas Supermarkets, Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-2927(B) 1995
WL 476772 (Mass. Super.), while another holds that such claims are governed by
the statute of limitations for breaches of contract (see RTC v. Gladstone, 895 F.
Supp. 356, 374 (D. Mass. 1995)).
See supra note 347 and accompanying text A recent decision interpreting
the Michigan statute of limitations held it applicable to 'any action for breach of
fiduciary duty against a corporate officer or director." Bake v. Moroun, No. 92-
438547 1998 WL 27550 (Mich. App. 1998).
'RTC v. Wood, 870 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Tenn. 1994).
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the claims in the case were premised on the same fact pat-
tern.362 The "California model" limitations provision, in effect
in ten states, 36 suffers from an even more basic problem:
courts disagree whether these statutes impose any time limits
on common law breach of fiduciary duty claims against corpo-
rate directors and officers. 6"
An express limitations provision that comprehensively
covers D & 0 claims would cure these problems. And to the
extent that fiduciary breaches entail varying types of claims,
the statute of limitations could vary the time periods associat-
ed with each. For example, and as already described, most ju-
risdictions now allow corporations to waive claims against
corporate directors and officers for monetary damages arising
out of most breaches of fiduciary duty, but not for certain cate-
gories of serious misconduct.3' A limitations provision might
make similar distinctions, establishing a comprehensive stat-
ute of limitations for most breaches of duty by directors and
officers, with a more generous period applicable to claims for
serious misconduct. A sample provision might read:
A. Except as otherwise provided in Part (B), any action for damages
brought against a director or officer of a corporation for breach of
duty as a director or officer shall be filed within X years of the date
of the alleged act or omission constituting such breach. This time
limit applies whether such breach of duty creates a cause of action
sounding in contract, express or implied; negligence; gross negli-
gence; negligence per se; or any other cause of action.
B. If the alleged breach of duty by a director or officer of a corpora-
tion constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty, a bad faith act or
omission, or an act or omission involving intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law, or arises out of a transaction from which
the director or officer derives an improper personal benefit, then the
time period specified in Part (A) shall instead be Y years.3"
32 Id. at 806.
' See supra note 350.
See supra note 351.
See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
'" The only corporate statute of limitations that currently takes such a "two-
tiered" approach is Louisiana's statute of limitations for claims against directors
and officers of financial institutions. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6:787 (West 1986)
(setting limits of one year from discovery, but no later than three years from
occurrence for due care claims, and similar two and four year limits for more
serious misconduct).
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b. Tolling and Repose
The statute of limitations suggested above draws distinc-
tions between negligence-based (i.e., duty of care) D & 0
claims and claims for more serious misconduct. To the extent
that limitations periods for both groups of cases are sufficiently
generous (that is, longer than the one, two or three year peri-
ods that most existing statutes have adopted), then tolling
issues might not arise. Yet, for the claims listed in Part (B) of
the statute, additional judicial flexibility might be appropriate.
It is in. these cases that courts are in greatest agreement con-
cerning the use of adverse domination tolling theories.
A statute of limitations might draw similar lines by adding
an express discovery rule tolling exception for these claims.
Courts could then, as they have already done in so many ad-
verse domination decisions, use adverse domination to define
the concept of corporate "discovery." There would be no author-
ity concerns about courts taking this step, since the limitations
statute will necessarily embody the legislature's decision about
when use of the discovery rule is appropriate. Indeed, the leg-
islature could confine the dimensions of corporate discovery if
it desired, by defining the concept of corporate notice. Dis-
closure to shareholders might be an appropriate benchmark if
bright-line discovery standards are desired.'
But even if courts retain the power to define corporate
notice through existing adverse domination concepts, an ex-
press limitations provision will enable the legislature to con-
fine the scope of such judicial standards within manageable
bounds. That is, an express statute of limitations for corporate
fiduciary claims can include an outer limit of repose beyond
which tolling concepts cannot operate. As in many modern dis-
covery rule statutes, the legislature could provide that all
claims against corporate officers and directors are barred after
a certain number of years." As an example, Part (B) of the
proposed model limitations provision might revised to read as
- Cf. U.C.C. (1995) § 1-201(27) (defining notice and knowledge concepts as ap-
plied to "organizations," which include corporations).See supra notes 337-44 and accompanying text.
See 2 CORMAN, supra note 5, § 11.2, at 170-71.
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follows:
B. If the alleged breach of duty by a director or officer of a corpora-
tion constitutes a breach of the duty of loyalty, a bad faith act or
omission, or an act or omission involving intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law, or arises out of a transaction from which
the director or officer derives an improper personal benefit, then the
time period specified in Part (A) shall instead be the later of Y years
from the alleged act or omission constituting such breach, or Yyears
from the date the corporation discovers or should have discovered the
alleged act or omission in the exercise of reasonable diligence. In all
events, any claims covered by this Part (B) shall be barred Z years
after the date of the alleged act or omission.
Such a two-pronged legislative approach to limitations
problems in corporate fiduciary litigation provides both a rules
and a standards dimension that neither limitations rules nor
adverse domination tolling standards alone can provide. If
sanctioned by legislative action, such an approach creates no
judicial authority concerns and has the added benefit of provid-
ing notice to both potential litigants and courts of the rules
that should apply."'
3. Potential Constitutional Objections
The "statute of repose" dimension of the proposed legisla-
tive solution outlined above might be subject to constitutional
objections. For example, is there any rational basis, as Due
Process requires, for a statute of repose that cuts off a
corporation's claim against its fiduciaries before the corpora-
tion has actual or constructive notice of the claim? One might
even argue that such a statute is void as a denial of Equal
Protection to third parties (e.g., lawyers and accountants) who
remain at risk for related claims if the corporation does not
discover the claims under traditional imputation standards.
One might also contend that such a statute denies corporations
"access to the courts," at least where such access is guaranteed
by state constitutional provisions. Similar objections have long
plagued statutes of repose, and have produced a wealth of
caselaw and commentary."'
70 See also Baughman, supra note 18, at 1116-18 (making similar statute of
repose proposal, but without drawing any distinctions among types of potential
fiduciary claims).
'7' See, e.g., Kratky, supra note 28; Terry Morehead Dworkin, Product Liability
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While a detailed analysis of all the possible constitutional
issues such challenges would entail is beyond the scope of this
Article, a few observations are possible. First, most statutes of
repose have been held constitutionalY2 Second, the law has
long recognized the importance of repose interests in commer-
cial settings.373 This Article has demonstrated the serious ob-
stacles adverse domination theory places in the path of repose
for corporate directors and officers, as well as how the theory's
tolling standards upset the otherwise prevailing balance in
limitations and corporate law. These policy concerns may well
be adequate to satisfy any necessary rational basis review that
constitutional standards might entail.
Second, constitutional challenges to statutes of repose
have been most successful on grounds that they deny equal
protection to classes of defendants they do not cover." In the
corporate fiduciary context, the only plausible additional defen-
dant categories would be third party advisers to corporations,
like lawyers and accountants, but these parties will not inevi-
tably be involved in corporate fiduciary duty claims. Moreover,
since these defendants are increasingly subject to discovery
rule tolling standards in all aspects of their practice, they
might best be protected with statutes of repose directed to
their professions generally.
Finally, and as Professor Richard Epstein has counseled,
courts should not strike down statutes of repose without due
regard to the advantages of their enforcement" There is
of the 1980s: 'Repose is not the Destiny" of Manufacturers, 61 N.C. L. REV. 33
(1982); Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product
Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 579 (1981).
' See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 371, at 581, 622-24 (summarizing decisions
on the constitutionality of statutes of repose covering product liability claims).
' See Dworkin, supra note 371, at 37.
31 See 1 CORMAN, LIMITATIONS, supra note 5, § 1.3.2.3, at 34 (describing archi-
tecture and building statutes of repose).
' See Epstein, supra note 27, at 1218.
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nothing inevitably "correct" about adverse domination tolling
theory. Corporate law functioned well for many years without
it, and its recent emergence may unduly upset the balance that
both limitations and corporate law have long strived for. In-
deed, statutes of repose may in the end permit tolling theories
like adverse domination to remain viable, for unless some
sense of balance is restored, courts are likely to continue to
reject or restrict open-ended tolling standards in the spirit of
compromise. The few decisions available suggest that courts
will enforce statutes of repose in the corporate context.37
CONCLUSION
In both limitations and corporate jurisprudence the oppos-
ing interests of rules and standards create an inevitable, and
perhaps desirable, tension in the law. Statutes of limitation
are bright-line legal rules, but limitations law tempers their
mechanistic application in exceptional cases with standards-
based discovery principles. Traditional corporate fiduciary law
naturally gravitates towards standards, but modern corporate
law's increasing reliance on rules adds desirable certainty and
predictability to their application. In both cases, the movement
towards the middle ground recognizes that neither approach
alone provides an ideal model for solving legal problems.
The statute of limitations defense in corporate fiduciary
litigation, and the adverse domination tolling theory's response
to it, collapse these issues into a single paradigm. As the FDIC
discovered in the wake of the bank and thrift crisis, if courts
impose time limits on corporate fiduciary claims through mech-
anistic application of rule-based statutes of limitation, the
scope of judicial enforcement of such claims may be unreason-
ably restricted. On the other hand, as courts and litigants
discovered when the FDIC invoked the adverse domination
theory as an antidote to limitations defenses, tolling theories
that substitute open-ended fiduciary standards for bright-line
statutes of limitation may err too far in the other direction.
Two sets of responses are possible: judicial line drawing
that may be difficult to defend from a doctrinal perspective,
" Baks v. Moroun, 1998 WL 27550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (enforcing repose
provision in Michigan's D & 0 statute of limitations).
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but which nonetheless preserves the policy goals of limitations;
or a more comprehensive statute of limitations that itself pro-
vides room for the operation of both rules and standards. The
recent pendulum swing in adverse domination decisions re-
flects courts' efforts to do their part. It remains to be seen
whether state legislatures will do theirs.

